
This essay examines the physiocrats’ vision of economic development in eighteenth-century France, emphasizing their belief in agriculture as the foundation of prosperity. Quesnay and Turgot advocated trade liberalization and legal despotism to raise agricultural productivity and stabilize the economy. However, entrenched social structures and elite consumption diverted wealth from rural investment, undermining these goals. The physiocrats’ reliance on price incentives ignored competitive pressures that drive reinvestment in modern economies. Quesnay’s idealization of China as a model of state-enforced natural order revealed both his recognition of these limits and the theoretical contradictions within physiocratic thought on growth and governance.
Despite being questioned and criticised since classical antiquity, monopolistic institutions and practices have persisted for centuries. Indeed, they remain a contentious issue in modern-day political debates. Some have argued that the longevity of monopolistic institutions, such as guilds, was the result of political arrangements with public authorities. Others, however, claim that they persisted because they were useful and efficient institutions (for example, they were a means of knowledge transfer that ultimately helped Europe surpass Asia). Much less discussed is how such institutions defended themselves in the public arena against widespread criticism. Drawing upon underexplored source material held in the Portuguese National Archives (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, ANTT), this article examines how Portuguese commercial guilds justified their monopolies and privileges in the early 1820s. The article shows that while the defense of monopolies did involve economic justifications, it nonetheless mostly emphasized the social impacts of commercial monopolies (positive externalities), in particular the formation of a reliable class of merchants and citizens.
In the Second Discourse , Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides an account of the origin and consequences of landed properties. The narrative blends theoretical speculation with normative critique and serves as a starting point for Rousseau’s political and economic programs. Adam Smith responds to Rousseau in two ways. First, Smith’s corresponding discourse highlights the role of economic productivity and downplays the special role of the rich. Furthermore, by distinguishing between natural logic and moral sentiments, Smith shows greater support for the existing landed property regimes than Rousseau does. Second, Smith historicizes Rousseau’s propositions. By comparing ancient and modern times and analyzing the emergence and decline of feudalism, Smith identifies forces within European history that could mitigate the negative consequences of land-based politics. While Rousseau believes commerce merely exacerbated the consequences of land inequality, meaning the beginning of history determined historical process, Smith asserts that commerce greatly changed history, enabling modern politics and economy to progress differently.
Luis Mar & iacute;a Pastor (1804-1872) was the most important monetary economist in mid-nineteenth-century Spain. By examining his ideas and their evolution, this paper sheds new light on how the banking question was addressed in the country. Traditionally, Pastor has been associated with the British Free Banking School. However, we argue that his main intellectual sources were French liberal economists. This paper also provides evidence that domestic economic realities can shape an author's economic thought. Pastor nuanced the Free Banking School's tenets by emphasizing liquidity problems as the main trigger of economic crises. We attribute this originality to the influence on him of the Spanish financial crisis of the mid-1860s.