We all know that the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) is the cornerstone of international economic governance, especially trade governance. Yet, policymakers and scholars of late have paid relatively little attention to its variety and evolution. Since MFN is not only a fundamental principle but also a key device to spur economic liberalization in an equitable manner, we should renew our interest in it. With the five types of MFN in mind (multilateral, regional, bilateral [third-party], non-party [automatic], and unilateral), this paper will first examine the historical ups and downs of economic liberalization spurred by the MFN. Then, from a theoretical standpoint, we will discuss the ‘backlash allowance’ or institutional flexibility of MFN, which we should properly take advantage of, but not abuse. The paper will finally consider which type of MFN is likely to be the key device for the governance of the complex international economy in the future.
This article examines artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted international commercial mediation through the interface between the EU AI Act and the Singapore Convention on Mediation. It argues that AI systems may be classified as high-risk where they go beyond administrative support and contribute to outcomes capable of producing legal effects through enforceability. Focusing on structural influence, deployer responsibilities, human oversight, transparency, data governance, and ‘shadow AI’, the article shows how failures in AI governance may affect enforceability under the Singapore Convention. It concludes that legitimate AI-assisted mediation requires dual legitimacy: ex-ante governance under the EU AI Act and ex-post scrutiny under the Singapore Convention.
This article examines how the concept of ‘territory’ functions in World Trade Organization (WTO) law and how the law’s posture toward extraterritoriality is shifting as states adopt trade measures with global policy ambitions, particularly in climate and environmental regulation. It shows how domestic rules are designed to shape conduct abroad while maintaining a territorial façade. Mapping every use of ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ across WTO agreements, the article finds the texts territorial by default, deploying ‘jurisdiction’ only where territorial containment fails. Territory thus operates both as an existential status, the predicate of membership, and as a functional tool that organizes trade rules. Normatively, the article distinguishes territoriality (authority tied to space), functionality (vertical delegation to issue-specific regimes), and extraterritoriality (horizontal reach into other states’ domains). Many contemporary unilateral measures blend the three, with functionality often serving as the legal design through which extraterritoriality is delivered. The article concludes by proposing a ‘territorial-functional synthesis’. Measures should remain territorially anchored, answer a genuine cross-border need, and be filtered for extraterritoriality through WTO law’s existing discipline of non-discrimination.
The thirty-sixth Revised Kyoto Convention Management Committee (RKC/MC) meeting, held at the World Customs Organization (WCO) in April 2026 marked a watershed by officially adopting the proposed comprehensive amendments to Specific Annex K on Rules of Origin. This proposal was the result of a process started in 2018 by a sizeable group of sponsoring countries, an international organization, and private sector representatives (The Sponsoring Group of the proposal for Annex K on rules of origin during the ongoing comprehensive review of the Revised Kyoto Convention includes Australia, China, European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Eurasian Economic Community, Renault Nissan, Fonterra as of December 2025.) (hereinafter the Sponsoring group) for an updated Annex K on rules of origin of the RKC. While final implementation is still pending in accordance with RKC procedures, the Sponsoring group has nonetheless been able to agree on a plurilateral text on rules of origin – a remarkable achievement. The absence of multilateral disciplines on rules of origin – the plumbing of international trade in goods – exacerbates compliance costs in trade transactions that are not only continuing but are increasing exponentially in a fractured world trade. The updated Annex K text provides leverage to resume plurilateral cooperation to enhance transparency and predictability in an area where consensus has proven impossible for decades within both the WCO and the World Trade Organization (WTO). WCO and WTO secretariats, as well as their respective Members, should reflect on the model, dialogue, and mechanisms adopted by the Sponsoring group to reach consensus on the updated text of Annex K on rules of origin. This experience may offer valuable lessons on how to improve their intergovernmental decision-making machinery. This article outlines the content of, and the process leading to consensus on the updated Annex K on rules of origin. It further recommends ways and means to leverage this advance in international cooperation as a building block towards the establishment of a plurilateral agreement governing rules of origin and pursue further cooperation in developing guidelines in implementing the updated Annex K.
For decades, international trade law was premised on the expectation of regulatory convergence. However, the shifting dynamics of European Union (EU)–China relations reveal a contrasting reality: the strategic instrumentalization of domestic legal orders to construct new regulatory barriers to trade. This article introduces the concept of ‘Managed Legal Incompatibility’ to analyse this shift. By examining the structural asymmetry between the EU’s rights-based constitutionalism – manifested in the new Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Forced Labour Regulation – and China’s production-oriented, state-centric legal order, it argues that trade is no longer about managing openness, but about to conditional inclusion. The article demonstrates how the collision of these systems generates a ‘compliance paradox’ for firms, necessitating the bifurcation of supply chains and marking a transition from liberal market integration to functionally re-bordered exchange.
In its palm oil disputes with Indonesia and Malaysia at the WTO, the EU proposed a novel approach to invoking three exceptions in framing an affirmative legal defence under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The EU explained that it was raising subparagraphs (a), (b), and (g) as a ‘composite whole’. While respondents have relied on multiple GATT XX items before, the EU’s insistence that these items were non-separable represented a departure from established WTO practice. We argue that the EU’s composite defence was both analytically unsound and legally consequential. Drawing on how composite variables are used in empirical research, we submit that the EU’s defence was not intended to clarify the relationship among multiple regulatory objectives, but to obscure it. The main payoff was to prevent the complainants from proposing less trade-restrictive alternatives, which would increase the likelihood that its GATT XX defence would be provisionally justified and almost entirely obviate the function of the chapeau. If accepted by future WTO panels, this framing would risk Article XX’s two-tier test, and upend the careful balance sought between regulatory autonomy and trade discipline.
Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005 followed one of the most extensive negotiation processes for a recently acceded member, resulting in a wide range of WTO-plus commitments set out in the Protocol of Accession (WT/L/627) and the Working Party Report (WT/ACC/SAU/61). This article provides the first systematic, doctrine-based assessment of the Kingdom’s behaviour within the confines of WTO law since joining the multilateral trading system. It examines the full spectrum of accession obligations – including trading rights, transparency requirements, Trade-Related Investment Measures elimination, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)/technical barriers to trade (TBT) procedures, services commitments, and disciplines governing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – and evaluates how these obligations have been internalized in practice. The analysis further reviews Saudi Arabia’s participation in WTO dispute settlement as complainant, respondent, and third party, with particular attention to DS567 as the primary instance involving an accession-related violation. The implementation record is assessed against the standards set out in Dispute Settlement Understanding Articles 21 and 22, together with evidence from Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs). Applying benchmarks derived from non-discrimination, transparency, exceptions jurisprudence, and implementation discipline, the article finds that Saudi Arabia has generally maintained a stable compliance profile, with notable strengths in tariff observance, publication of measures, and administrative modernization, alongside areas requiring continued scrutiny such as SOE transparency and certain localization practices. The study contributes to an underdeveloped literature by offering a strictly WTO-focused evaluation anchored exclusively in primary multilateral legal sources.
As multilateral trade institutions struggle to keep pace with evolving global priorities, regional groupings are increasingly filling critical governance gaps. This article examines the limitations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in addressing inclusive trade concerns - particularly the ones relating to women - and explores how informal regional and interregional coalitions such as and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are emerging as key actors in the evolving landscape of trade regulation. Through the use of soft law, cooperation, and informal diplomacy, these blocs are crafting flexible frameworks that can possibly respond more effectively to contemporary socio-economic challenges. The article examines the increasing legitimacy and influence of these networks in shaping international trade norms and policies in an area where consensus within the WTO has stalled: trade and women empowerment. Focusing on the role of these groups in setting norms on inclusive trade, the article argues for a re-imagined model of trade governance - one that is multilayered, adaptive, and inclusive - where regional and informal mechanisms complement, rather than replace, multilateralism.
Transition economies from the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) that acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made extensive market access commitments. However, the WTO accession is not the end point of these countries’ trade policy reform. Whereas Georgia pursued unilateral liberalization after accession to the WTO, a few other countries including Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic raised their applied tariff rates on average for joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Kazakhstan and some other economies in 2015. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) broadly discourages external tariff rates from being raised after the formation of a customs union, such as the EAEU. However, the present method for calculating the general incidence of duties and regulations of commerce does not necessarily deter upward tariff adjustments by each of the constituent economies. The general incidence should be calculated to discourage such upward tariff adjustments. Ideally, trade-weighted average pre-customs-union tariff rates of individual countries, rather than that of the prospective customs union, should be adopted as a baseline.
This paper examines the interpretation and application of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXI(b)(ii) in the context of export controls on dual-use items, a topic of increasing importance as international export control regimes grapple with ambiguities in defining the scope of such measures. While export controls are legitimate when addressing genuine security threats, their exploitation for economic advantage undermines World Trade Organization (WTO) principles. By focusing on the underexplored GATT Article XXI(b)(ii), this study provides a foundation for assessing the legality of dual-use export controls and proposes standards of proof that clarify the level of evidence required to establish facts under the burden of proof. The paper advocates for a balanced approach that acknowledges the sensitivity of security exceptions while mitigating the risk of abuse. It further emphasizes the role of multilateralism in maintaining the integrity of international trade law amidst escalating geopolitical tensions.
The explosive growth of industrial policy worldwide poses an unprecedented challenge for the world trading system. This paper conceptualizes this challenge as a fundamental shift of policy an ongoing trend of 're-globalization', a term coined by the Director-General of the WTO. As governments increasingly prioritize self-declared non-economic goals over established trade norms and values, there is an urgency to systematically rethink and reconstruct WTO rules and mechanisms to rebalance trade liberalization and domestic autonomy. Instead of a detailed examination of these rules, mechanisms or reform proposals, this paper, via a series of case studies, is one of the first attempts to expound the new paradigm of industrial policy and the need for reconceptualizing the WTO. It also considers three major proposals for reform and explains why none of these might provide an adequate solution to the challenge facing us. Ultimately, the prospect of the global trading system will hinge on whether governments can make political choices in coordinated and creative ways to restore the integrity and centrality of the WTO while providing the flexibility to accommodate national preferences and priorities.
As China expands its influence over the Global South, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the United States and the European Union have proactively initiated new Antidumping and Countervailing Duties (AD/CVD) investigations into transnational subsidies to minimize adverse impacts on their economies and to counter China’s global expansion. These newly emerging transnational subsidies are now causing a paradigm shift from territoriality to transnationalism. However, it remains unclear whether Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement), designed to regulate traditional subsidies, can keep up with this paradigm shift. Even after the first World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel ruling on transnational subsidies, legal uncertainty persists, as the Panel left important questions unanswered. In this vein, this paper critically reviews the first WTO ruling, focusing on the attribution and the specificity issues of transnational subsidies. After reaching a conclusion that the SCM Agreement is insufficient to regulate transnational subsidies within its current framework, this paper sheds light on how this paradigm shift will lead to the creation of a new transnational subsidy rule. Specifically, this paper employs the Median Voter Theorem to analyse how the preferences of states will converge and to predict the feasible trajectory of new transnational subsidy rules.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) seeks to expand intra-African trade and support regional value chain (RVC) development, yet its impact is constrained by the continued coexistence of multiple Regional Economic Communities (RECs), some with deeper and more established integration regimes. This parallel structure has created fragmented Rules of Origin (RoO) and certification systems, limiting firms’ ability to move intermediate goods across REC boundaries and hindering the formation of continent-wide value chains. This paper examines how cross-cumulation can serve as a practical mechanism for bridging this fragmentation. By allowing originating inputs from different RECs to be mutually recognized under the AfCFTA, crosscumulation can facilitate the movement of intermediate goods across regions without requiring full harmonization of REC-level rules. The paper argues that while cross-cumulation is not a complete solution, it provides an important interim measure to promote inter-REC value chain linkages and lays the groundwork for longer-term convergence toward a unified continental RoO regime.
The establishment of a two-tier dispute settlement system (DSS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) has significantly judicialized international trade relations. However, this process is currently hindered by the Appellate Body's (AB's) dysfunctionality. In the absence of the AB, the Multi-Party Interim Arbitration (MPIA) Arrangement is partially bridging the gap. This MPIA initiative aims to restore the WTO's two-tier DSS and has gained traction, garnering support from fifty-seven countries. However, India, a crucial developing-country member, has not joined the MPIA, despite its ongoing calls for the restoration of the two-tier dispute resolution system at the WTO. Most of India's concerns regarding the MPIA do not hold up under scrutiny. Contrary to India's argument, joining the MPIA would not diminish its position in advocating for the restoration of the AB. Furthermore, although the United States-India's key trading partner-is not a member of the MPIA, India can still invoke the MPIA in disputes with other significant players, such as the European Union (EU) and Japan. As the multilateral trading system faces increasing challenges, countries like India need to build alliances, develop innovative solutions, and demonstrate unflinching commitment to trade multilateralism through actions, not just words. Supporting the MPIA is one such step toward restoring the WTO's judicial function and should be embraced by India.
When the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) adopted by the European Commission becomes fully effective in 2026, it will inevitably affect exports from China and other jurisdictions. The EU CBAM requires that imports into the EU carry a carbon price similar to that of items manufactured within the EU. Although China has a national carbon emissions trading system (ETS), its current carbon price is a mere fraction of that of the EU ETS. This article supports the expansion of CBAM crediting of carbon pricing in third countries by using an effective carbon pricing method that covers both explicit and implicit carbon prices. Two taxes collected in China, resource tax and consumption tax, can be considered as effective carbon prices, which could help reduce the CBAM cost on Chinese exporters. Nevertheless, this article points out that the gap between the EU's and China's effective carbon prices will still be significant even after taking indirect carbon prices into account. Advocating the expansion of the CBAM crediting rules can only be a stopgap approach compared with decarbonizing China's economy.
The United States and China put parts of the global economy at risk in 2025 through their trade war over rare earth elements and semiconductors. A series of escalatory tariffs and export restrictions led to shortages of essential inputs, nearly forcing automakers worldwide to shut down production. The costly policies reflected uncoordinated and uncommunicated efforts by both countries to reduce their mutual economic dependence. This paper explores a novel path for the United States and China to 'cooperate' over how they reduce their dependence on each other in critical minerals and technologies related to artificial intelligence (AI), with the aim of limiting future escalation risks and avoiding unnecessary costs. The proposal draws on a version of the reciprocal approach to negotiations developed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), modified to accommodate a mutual reduction in each country's market dominance in key sectors.
The paper presents the evolution of the US-China relationship regarding technology transfer as a geopolitical backdrop of China’s export control reform amid the US-China trade dispute. And with the most updated information on laws, cases and statistics, it has analysed China’s current dual system of technology export control under the Foreign Trade Law (FTL) and the Export Control Law (ECL) in light of the present practice and policies of the Chinese government. It evaluates the influence of the US behaviour on its trade partners like China, as well as the impacts of the interactions between the US and China around protectionism and free trade on the multilateral trade system from the perspective of international technology transfer. The analysis of the legal reform has not shown a general increasing of technology export control, but an improvement of the efficiency, certainty and transparency of the Chinese legal regime. In addition, the reform has a political signification and has offered China the possibility of using export control as a countermeasure in case of abuse of export control by other countries, though China defends and relies on multilateralism and opposes using national security as a pretext for protectionism.
The paralysis of the Appellate Body (AB) has turned ‘appeal into the void’ into a central fault line of the WTO dispute settlement system. This article characterizes this practice as counternormative: formally compliant with the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) yet undermining the system’s capacity to deliver enforceable rulings. Doctrinally, the article reconstructs two competing interpretations of DSU Articles 3, 16.4, and 17: one viewing a notice of appeal as sufficient to block the adoption of Panel reports; the other treating effective appellate review as a prerequisite for any blocking effect. This split is traced to the tension between contractualism and constitutionalism, and their differing prioritization of input versus output legitimacy. Using a Kantian antinomy framework, the article maps these opposing logics and analyses recent safeguard and anti-dumping disputes. It concludes that because the WTO rests on state consent while striving for a rule-based order, appeal into the void cannot be resolved by technical fixes alone; reform entails redistributing burdens between competing normative commitments.
This article reconceptualizes differentiation within the WTO by analysing the attempted transplantation of the responsibility-based frameworkof Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) into a system built around Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). It argues that SDT functions as the WTO’s anchor for responsibility-sensitive differentiation. Although originally an entitlementbased mechanism, SDT has gradually evolved to incorporate capacity- and responsibility-oriented elements. By contrast, CBDR remains a regime-specific interpretive principle rather than an autonomous source of obligations. This status was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Using the fisheries subsidies negotiations as an institutional test, the article demonstrates that CBDR’s transplantation exposes structural limits in the WTO’s legal and procedural architecture. The analysis advances the claim that SDT, rather than CBDR, provides the only viable anchor for integrating responsibility-sensitive differentiation within the multilateral trading system.
This article analyses how recent developments in the trade relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States - particularly under President Trump's second term - interact with the foundational principles of international customs law: multilateralism, rules-based trade and the rule of law. It argues that the current US trade policy represents a structural departure from these principles, characterized by the extensive use of unilateral import duties, broad interpretations of national security and emergency powers, and a declining commitment to multilateral dispute settlement. These developments have placed the transatlantic trade relationship under sustained pressure, culminating in a politically driven and legally fragile framework agreement concluded in July 2025. The article examines the content, legal qualification and World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatibility of this agreement and highlights the tensions created by selective tariff concessions and inconsistent adherence to most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligations. At the same time, the analysis recognizes that the EU is also increasingly deploying trade instruments with protectionist effects, including Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), challenging its traditional role as a defender of multilateralism. The article concludes that safeguarding a rules-based trading system requires strategic restraint and continued commitment by the EU, even as global power dynamics shift and unilateral trade measures proliferate.
