
Abstract I argue that even if divine command theorists can ascribe obligations to non-believers, they cannot ascribe full moral virtue to non-believers, because non-believers do not act for all of the right reasons even when they do the right thing. I focus on the Platonic version of divine command theory proposed by Robert Adams and leverage crucial points from another Platonic moral theorist, Iris Murdoch, to emphasize the importance of one’s aspirational orientations for proper moral motivation. I distinguish an approach to the moral life that is grounded in a responsive aspiration towards a transcendent Good from one that is conditioned to some degree by a comparatively rigid alternative that I, following Adams, describe as moral idolatry. I appeal to this distinction to explain what is lacking in the moral motivation of the non-believer as an improper-aspirer, and thereby define a moral limitation that could apply in principle to avowed believers as well. I ultimately leave open whether or not this argument constitutes an objection to divine command theory, and hope primarily to stress the broad importance of clarifying the roles that central concepts in moral psychology (such as virtue and motivation) play in the structure of metaethical theories.
Abstract The editors introduce the special issue on atheism and the meaning of life, providing an overview of its scope and a concise summary of the contributions included in the issue.
Abstract Yujin Nagasawa has argued that treating absolute perfection as a necessary condition of worship-worthiness generates a vagueness problem. If worship-worthiness requires omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, then it appears to hinge on God’s knowledge of a single proposition p : without knowledge of p , God would not be omniscient and therefore not worship-worthy. Yet such a small difference seems too trivial to ground the evaluative difference between worship-worthy and not worship-worthy. I argue that this problem arises only if absolute perfection is the single minimally sufficient threshold of greatness for worship-worthiness. I develop instead a gradable, dual-threshold account. On this account, a sufficient inequality in value establishes the lower threshold for worship-worthiness, while absolute perfection marks the intrinsic maximum of worship-worthiness. Distinguishing mere worship-worthiness from supreme or maximal worship-worthiness separates vagueness at the lower threshold from God’s status as supremely worship-worthy. I then defend the account against objections concerning the relational character and possible range of worship-worthiness. Finally, I argue that the account creates a difficulty for Nagasawa’s maximal God approach to perfect-being theism. If supreme worship-worthiness is understood normatively, then a being that falls short of absolute perfection may be worship-worthy without being supremely worship-worthy. Nagasawa’s approach therefore risks implying either that God is not supremely worship-worthy or that whichever being happens to be greatest in the available modal space is supremely worship-worthy.
Abstract This paper argues that the contemporary shift from the meaning of life to meaning in life reflects not a rejection of transcendence but a transformation in its structure. It distinguishes between absolute transcendence, which locates meaning within a comprehensive horizon beyond the situated subject, and immanent transcendence, which understands transcendence as the inexhaustibility of lived experience and interpretation. The former tends towards a third-person perspective and risks displacing the subject as the locus of meaning. The latter preserves the first-person perspective and grounds meaning in the subject’s relation to experiences, actions, and events that exceed its control. This shift also challenges the primacy of narrative identity: while narratives render actions intelligible, events reveal a more fundamental, pre-reflective dimension of subjectivity, identified here as the minimal self. Drawing on Taoist and Buddhist perspectives, particularly the concept of śūnyatā, the paper argues that meaning in life emerges through participation in a relational reality rather than through the fulfilment of an externally given purpose. Transcendence thus becomes an immanent feature of lived existence.