In this article, I support the thesis proposed by Tappenden and Wilson that Frege's function-argument distinction was inspired by the work of the geometer Julius Plucker. However, I also highlight the limits of Plucker's influence on Frege. I argue, therefore, that the distinction between concept and object - which is crucial for distinguishing between functions of different orders - cannot be traced back to Plucker. Likewise, the clear distinction between a function and its value range is a contribution made by Frege himself. Finally, I take a closer look at Frege's distinction between arithmetic and geometry, arguing that the concept-argument distinction arises much more naturally in the domain of arithmetic than in that of geometry.
Abstract Frege’s decision to refer the problem of how thoughts are grasped to psychology has led many critics to conclude that all subjective considerations are absent from his work. However, beginning in 1893, Frege’s critique of psychologism centers on a rejection of the psychologist’s conception of subjectivity, summarized in his fierce opposition to its basic premise: epistemological idealism. Yet Frege does not merely reject this basic premise; rather, he builds upon this rejection to formulate a series of interrelated theses concerning representation, thinking, judgment, decision, perception, and the self. The fact that this dimension of his philosophy has often gone unnoticed is largely due to the neglect of key texts, frequently overlooked because their philosophical background has not been adequately considered. When these passages are examined collectively and situated within their proper context, it becomes clear that Frege articulates a conception of subjectivity.
The aim of this article is to offer a solution to an exegetical puzzle which Weiner (2020) has recently put as follows: "Why does Frege analyze (some) imperfect parts of natural language?" According to what Weiner calls the "Standard Interpretation", Frege analysed logical imperfections because he "wanted to give a general account of the workings of language" (Dummett 1981). Weiner (2020), in contrast, claims that Frege was solely concerned with the fragment of natural language "in which we express apparently evaluable inferences". I argue that neither of these interpretations offers an accurate picture of the historical Frege. On my view, Frege is (primarily) interested in those linguistic phenomena that are (in some sense or other) relevant to his logical concerns, and I buttress this interpretation by a detailed analysis of Frege's views on existential import, existential presuppositions and colouring.
Gottlob Frege is usually taken to be a pioneer of the second-order theory of existence. According to this theory, existence is not a first-order concept, but is entirely captured by the existential quantifier of first-order logic. In this article, I argue against this naive interpretation of Frege's work. In fact, Frege believed that the German verb `existieren' expresses a first-order concept under which every object falls. I discuss the consequences of this fact for the interpretation of his rejection of the ontological argument. Central to my argument is a detailed analysis of Frege's arguments concerning existence in his posthumously published dialogue with Bernhard Punjer.
Five types of photographs of Gottlob Frege and twelve total copies of them are in the Collection Frege at the university library of Munster. This essay provides a historical investigation concerning these photographs. It aims to find out i) whether they are original photographs that were made during Frege's lifetime or not, ii) when the photos were made, iii) by whom they were made, iv) how they found their way to Munster, and v) if the photos aren't originals, on which originals they are based.
Abstract This article aims to highlight conceptional similarities between Sigwart’s and Frege’s philosophy of logic and language: It will be shown that Sigwart and Frege had related views on the following different topics: (a) the nature of judgments and truth, (b) existential presuppositions, (c) the critique of Kant’s table of judgments, (d) the structure of judgments, (e) the cognitive value of identity judgments, and (f) existential statements. Since we know that Frege read Sigwart’s logic quite carefully, a direct substantive influence of Sigwart on Frege is quite likely, and, hence, the parallels do not seem to be pure coincidence.
Abstract The first paragraph of Freges essay “On Sense and Reference” is generally understood to mean that Frege here refutes his sign-based conception of identity from the Concept Script and replaces it with the now-familiar objectual conception of identity. According to this interpretation, there are several sentences in the first paragraph of “On Sense and Reference” which can and must be interpreted in such a way that they speak of objectual identity. I, on the other hand, will show that these sentences have hitherto been mistakenly understood. Even though they form the most important textual witnesses for the standard interpretation and should talk about the concept of objectual identity, they are unsuited for this purpose, because their literal contents or their context is irreconcilable with this interpretion.
Abstract Kant’s critique of the ontological and other related arguments for the existence of God was part of his groundbreaking critique of traditional rational theology (a classical branch of metaphysics). Frege as a philosopher was not particularly interested in rational theology or metaphysics, but he used his interpretation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument to elucidate some of his most important logical notions and distinctions. Frege was not a Kant-scholar, who spent a lot of his research time investigating Kant’s philosophical views. Nevertheless, he was informed about Kant’s conception of logic, his epistemology, his foundation of mathematics and his critique of the ontological argument. In this article, I will argue (i) that Frege endorsed two objections against the ontological argument, (ii) that his philosophy teachers, Kuno Fischer and Hermann Lotze, are the most probable main sources of Frege’s knowledge about Kant’s critique of the ontological argument, and (iii) that their views on this topic influenced Frege’s view on existence and his way of understanding of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument.
Abstract The-predicativism is the view that proper names (henceforth, names ) are common count nouns with a denominative use in all their literal occurrences. A core tenet of this view is that bare singular names in (apparent) argument position of a predicate function as the descriptive component of a covert incomplete definite description with a definite article as a phonologically null determiner. This article presents two closely related counterexamples to the-predicativism. The argument will be made that indefinite singular names ( ISN s) – that is, singular names preceded by indefinites, with or without fronted-modifiers – generate a significant asymmetry between names and common count nouns.
Abstract This article compares Bolzano’s and Frege’s views on existence. The highest overlap is found in their treatments of there-is sentences. Both advocate a higher-order account, according to which ‘There is an F’ does not predicate existence of the entities to which the general term in place of ‘F’ applies but rather predicates instantiation of the idea or concept of an F. But there are many differences in the details. Among other things, ideas in Bolzano’s sense differ from concepts in Frege’s sense; and while Frege strictly distinguishes not only objects and concepts but also concepts of different levels, Bolzano does not stratify ideas in this way. A further overlap is that, for Bolzano and Frege, particular sentences from syllogistics express the type of existence denoted by ‘there is’. Whereas Frege is very clear about condemning there-is sentences with singular terms, there is some question as to whether Bolzano has the same opinion. Finally, the biggest difference shows up when it comes to sentences using ‘exist’. Although both let ‘exist’ be what it seems to be at first glance, viz., a predicate, Frege understands it as a predicate embracing everything, while Bolzano’s view is that there are existing and non-existing things.
G. Frege is often regarded as having created modem logic and analytic philosophy ex nihilo. This assertion is attributed to M. Dummett and has had a lasting impact not only on the history of philosophy, but also on other disciplines. This article posits that Dummett's thesis can be traced back to a concise text passage by J. Venn dating back to 1880. Prominent logicians subsequently took this passage out of context, and radicalized it further and further. Despite the presence of notable critics of this thesis since the 1g10s, their views have often been marginalized. To this day, the Dummett thesis continues to be a point of contention, as evidenced by disputes surrounding the question of whether Frege plagiarized Stoic logic or not. Furthermore, current research shows that Dummett-like theses are wrong in many ways.
Abstract This article examines what might explain the pull of racial figleaves on certain audiences. It discusses Jennifer Saul’s influential work that illuminates the nature and workings of racial figleaves: extra utterances made (for example, by politicians) that provide just enough coverage to turn an otherwise unacceptable racist utterance into a prima facie acceptable one. The article holds that to understand figleaves as linguistic devices, it is important to examine how figleaves have normative power and pull. The article then interrogates from where such normative power conceivably derives and presses Saul’s treatment of figleaves in political discourse on two related points: first, to do with their receptivity; second, to do with their normativity.
Abstract In this article, we consider several responses to Wittgenstein’s private language argument ( PLA ) beginning with A.J. Ayer’s “Robinson Crusoe” thought experiment from his 1954 symposium with Rush Rhees. While I’ll claim that Ayer’s response is unsound and doesn’t imperil a properly understood version of the PLA , it does point towards more enduring concerns. Even if private language is impossible, the PLA may not preclude the possibility of “solitary” speakers –isolated individuals who are the sole speakers of languages they develop, even though others could later learn these languages. I present an analysis of these problems as a trilemma for defenders of the PLA and offer a response that suggests some ways to defuse it.
Abstract Language is a crucial instrument in creating the social realm – and at the same time, it is an important part of this realm and thus calls out for a social ontological analysis. This article explores the wide and diverse ground such an ontological analysis needs to cover, and argues that language is a transcategorial phenomenon, i.e., that it covers various ontological categories. Among other aspects, I follow Ferdinand de Saussure in distinguishing individual linguistic competences, abstract language systems, and their concretizations in oral or written linguistic performances. While some argue that language is always an aggregate of linguistic competences, I argue that ontological primacy among these aspects varies according to which variety of language is to be analysed: for living languages, individual linguistic competences are the ultimate authority, but for formal languages the abstract systems of rules, and for dead languages the corpus of surviving linguistic performances.
Abstract When is a mark or sound a token of a word? There is no once-and-for-all answer: word tokening is iteratively socially constructed, so the conditions for tokening a word can shift across socio-technical regimes. I first argue that word-tokening’s messy boundaries have a distinctive temporal structure I call initiated: initiation is relatively demanding, maintenance more permissive, exit difficult. Word-token kinds are initiated proxy kinds: anchored as stable, low-cost proxies that play a functional role, as is common for social kinds. I then historicize the picture. Tokening conditions shift as pressures accumulate through large-scale changes to roles, constraints, and costs within a regime; I consider historical and current regimes, and the implications of AI -generated text. But they change conservatively—sedimented and path-dependent rather than anchored from scratch. The aim is a pragmatic but stable theory of word-tokening, and a broader model of how social kinds are built over time.
Abstract This article presents an ontological taxonomy of language developed from the perspective of general and applied linguistics. Corresponding to the noncountable form of the word ‘language’ is a family of entities that figure in the realization of the universal, evolved sociocognitive capacity (‘L-language’). Yet the dominant conceptualization of language entails a fundamentally distinct ontological category expressed by the countable form of the word, as a set of monolithic, named languages (‘N-language’). This category is believed to be constituted by sets of determinate social norms, viewed as the inalienable possessions of so-called ‘native’ speakers. It arose relatively recently, as powerful cultural groups ideologized their conceptualization of how they used language as a shared resource, resulting in an ontological shift to language as a characteristic of the nation-state. The fundamental distinction is not adequately acknowledged in much language scholarship, thereby compromising its ontological rigour. To provide some clarity, I outline an approach to language ontology that identifies multiple entities across different domains and allows for distinct linguistic systems to be viewed as collections of lexico-grammatical constructions, independent of peoples and places.
Abstract In both philosophy of language and social ontology, there has been a recent shift towards the ‘non-ideal’. This shift aims to reject approaches that have assumed certain idealised linguistic or social contexts as the background for their theoretical work on linguistic or social topics (Burman 2023; Keiser 2023). In this article, I explore what an analogous shift might mean for our metaphysics of words. Substantive engagement with the metaphysical question of what words are has increased in recent years, but none has explicitly considered whether those theories are best interpreted as ideal or non-ideal theories, and whether the theories can account for the relevant linguistic phenomena that we are interested in in non-ideal contexts. I will argue that the move towards the non-ideal in theorising in philosophy of language and social ontology should be accompanied by a similar move towards the non-ideal in theorising about the metaphysics of words.
According to one view in epistemology, epistemic normativity is grounded in one's evidential circumstances. This seems to imply that our positive epistemic duties are fully grounded in our evidential situation. However, the idea of positive epistemic duties or obligations is both demanding and unrealistic and it is only in conjunction with nonepistemic considerations that we will be obliged to hold beliefs. The denial of positive epistemic duties has several sources. I focus on three: (A) epistemic instrumentalism; (B) the thesis of justification fecundity'; and (C) the thesis of clutter evidence. Positive epistemic duties have a categorical nature. What has fueled such debates has to do with the ambiguity of the notion of evidence employed in them. I begin by explaining how participants in these debates have helped themselves to the notion of evidence. I then introduce a dispositional theory of epistemic reasons, where a distinction between `available' and `possessed' reason or evidence is made and argued for. This is followed by another distinction between two stages of epistemic normativity, namely, the `possession' and justification' stages. I use this apparatus to explain why the disputants seem to talk past each other and defend a categorical account of positive epistemic duties.
The article distinguishes between logico-psychological and socio-linguistic perspectives on proper names. On the basis of the latter, it argues for allowing for different semantic mechanisms of reference of proper names in different contexts, societies and cultures. It outlines a metaphilosophical position, according to which the task of philosophy is to identify and discriminate possible mechanisms and modes of reference, while determining which of them are appropriate in specific contexts, societies or cultures is a matter for special sciences: linguistics, sociology or anthropology. Against this background, a project of another approach to proper names, termed `Genealogical Descriptivism', is presented and confronted with several classical as well as recent approaches. It is argued that this approach deserves to be accepted alongside others, as plausible in certain contexts, without claiming to dominate in every context.
