This contribution attempts to make sense of the year-long student led protests in Serbia. For the past year, students have been protesting in support of the rule of law, against state capture and corruption, mobilising a broad coalition bridging class, urban/ rural and religious divides. In the process, students have emerged as the main political actors, organising a bottom-up, grassroots democratic resistance to the authoritarian regime and its political economy, and providing transformative practices and guiding principles for a more democratic, just and distribution of power and resources. The essay engages with the political economy of these protests—all the material, political and economic conditions—that shaped them, and their meanings. It offers reflections on their fea-tures and strengths; the reactions of domestic institutions, which for the most part have resorted to intimidation and police violence; and the evolution of the EU’s position, which, from relatively supporting the regime, is increasingly pointing out its dysfunctions. Finally, it describes the political economy of authoritarianism that students are resisting, in which domestic laws are bypassed and breached, considerable power is given to corporate interests, and corruption, state capture and ensuing inequalities are high. At a time when democratic values are eroding in the Global North, and power concen-tration and inequalities are rising, the student led movement offers a glimmer of hope and, perhaps, valuable lessons.
The article analyses the VGH Munich judgment of 17 March 2025 (10 BV 24.700), the first German decision to declare Germany’s internal border controls at the German–Austrian border unlawful under EU law. It situates the case within the Schengen system, whose core achievement is the abolition of systematic controls at internal borders. Since 2015, however, several Member States have repeatedly reintroduced “temporary” con-trols, initially in response to the refugee crisis and later justified by terrorism, secondary migration and COVID-19, with some measures persisting for years. While the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) permits reintroduction only exceptionally and within strict time limits, Member States have increasingly exceeded those limits, and the Commission has largely refrained from enforcement, shifting the burden to individuals and national courts. The case arose from an identity check carried out as an internal border control in June 2022. The plaintiff, an Austrian academic who frequently crosses the border, sought a declaratory judgment that the check was unlawful. The VGH held the action admissible on the basis of a concrete risk of recurrence, rejecting arguments based on short-term expiry and finding the check not to be a “serious” rights infringement. Substantively, ap-plying CJEU case law in NW, it held the SBC time limits to be absolute: controls become unlawful once they exceed the permitted duration unless a genuinely “new” serious threat is shown. Judicial review is limited to the reasons stated in the Article 25a notification. The judgment highlights both national courts’ enforcement role and the potential incom-patibility of German admissibility rules with effective judicial protection under EU law.
Avtorja obravnavata dve procesni dilemi, ki se porajata v postopkih zaradi prepovedanih ravnanj (prekrškov in kaznivih dejanj) s področja prepovedanih drog. V prvem delu namenita pozornost dometu varstva privilegija zoper samoobtožbo pri izročanju predmetov na zahtevo državnih organov. V drugem pa analizirata problematiko podvajanja kaznovalnih postopkov (prekrškovnega in kazenskega) in s tem problem dometa prepovedi ponovnega sojenja o isti stvari. Pri tem se osredotočita na nedavne spremembe pristopov evropskih in domačih sodišč k presoji omenjenih vprašanj. Glede tega ugotavljata, da v pozitivnem pravu ne najdemo podrobnejših in določnih pravil, kako naj ravnajo organi, soočeni s konkretnim problemom. Z obema jamstvoma skladno ravnanje državnih organov je zato morala vsebinsko napolniti sodna praksa evropskih in domačih sodišč, katere odgovori pa v nekaterih vidikih ostajajo nedorečeni.
Popular constituent power is not bound by the rules and procedures of a pre-existing constitution. Nevertheless, it is possible and desirable to place that power within the framework of a constitutional regime. The Constitution of Kosovo provides for the en-actment of constitutional amendments proposed by ordinary institutional actors. There are topics, however, which—owing to their fundamental constitutional importance—should meet the approval of popular constituent power. The exercise of popular constit-uent power should be legalised and strictly limited to issues of fundamental importance for the constitutional order of Kosovo. This is especially crucial for amendments affecting core constitutional principles enshrined in Chapter I of the Constitution of Kosovo, such as the unitary character of the state, the uniqueness of the judiciary, and multi-eth-nicity. This article proposes the legalisation of popular constituent power by establishing mechanisms such as referenda and constituent assemblies to enable popular approval of amendments, in addition to international agreements capable of transforming the Kosovar constitutional order in a fundamental way. By doing so, Kosovo can strengthen internal statehood and enhance the democratic legitimacy of fundamental constitutional changes. The article concludes by calling on the authorities in Kosovo to enact legislation on the exercise of legalised constituent power, while by also putting in place safeguards in compliance with international standards on basic human rights and liberties.
Emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, present significant challenges to discrimination law, particularly regarding effective enforcement. This article highlights the evidentiary difficulties in proving algorithmic discrimination and examines the rule on the burden of proof under EU non-discrimination law in this context. It discusses challenges and possibilities relating to the role of the burden of proof rule in enhancing the principle of equality and non-discrimination, particularly in relation to algorithmic discrimination. A key obstacle is the lack of transparency, a problem not unique to al-gorithmic discrimination but also a well-known challenge in the field of pay discrimina-tion. The article argues that valuable insights can be drawn from how the burden of proof rule has been developed and concretised under EU law on the right to equal pay between women and men, with particular attention to the 2023 Pay Transparency Directive.
The analysis of telework legislation can be approached from various angles. This article aims to examine the Romanian Telework Act, its subsequent amendments, and the relevant provisions of the Labour Code from a human rights perspective. Such an approach is justified by the fact that telework, as a flexible and atypical work arrangement, diverges significantly from traditional employment, raising distinct legal and practical challenges regarding fundamental rights. Within the framework of the right to fair and just working conditions—and in connection with the right to respect for private and family life—the article reviews the provisions on working time, work schedules, and work-life balance in telework legislation. Regarding privacy, it devotes attention to the parameters of moni-toring teleworkers’ activity and the conditions under which inspections may be carried out, placing particular emphasis on the issue of the teleworker’s consent. Furthermore, it addresses the provisions concerning the protection of teleworkers’ health and safety, highlighting how the implementation of such measures—and, by extension, the responsibilities of the parties—is affected by the atypical nature of telework. Additionally, it briefly touches upon the principle of equal treatment and the extent of collective rights and agreement coverage for teleworkers. Ultimately, it seeks to answer the question: how secure are the employment relationships of teleworkers in terms of the fundamental rights guarantees that apply to them?
This article scrutinises the evolving paradigm of human rights justifications (HRJs) and the growing complexities encountered by civil society when states invoke human rights to legitimise restrictive migration policies. Originally conceived as a shield to protect in-dividuals from state power, human rights have increasingly been appropriated by states as instruments of governance, particularly in migration law. Through a typology comprising direct reference, misuse of human rights doctrine, and misuse of international law, the article analyses contemporary legislative reforms in the EU and Sweden—including the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, tightening of residency requirements, and citizenship restrictions. The empirical and methodological approach integrates the coproduction of knowledge with civil society actors. The analysis demonstrates that, while HRJs can be mobilised to expand rights in times of crisis, as in the EU’s response to the Ukrainian refugee influx, they are also deployed to restrict rights, as seen in recent Swedish legislative processes. The article further explores intersectionality as a critical lens and ou-tlines coalition-building and experiential learning as strategies for civil society to counter HRJs. Ultimately, it contends that reinstating human rights as a protective shield depends on strengthening civil society’s role in legal and policy advocacy, knowledge production, and accountability requirements in an era of shifting state rationales.
Avtor obravnava slovensko ustavnopravno ureditev izrekanja omejevalnih ukrepov zoper politične stranke po 68. členu Zakona o ustavnem sodišču (ZUstS). Ta določa izključno pristojnost Ustavnega sodišča za presojo protiustavnosti aktov in delovanja političnih strank ter za odreditev njihovega izbrisa iz registra političnih strank. Podrobno so analizi-rani procesni elementi ter vsebinska merila, ki jih je oblikovalo Ustavno sodišče, vključno z zahtevo obstoja posebej kvalificirane grožnje demokratični ureditvi. Prispevek pokaže, da slovenska ureditev na eni strani sledi nemškemu modelu, hkrati pa od njega na več mestih pomembno odstopa. Tako določa zelo širok nabor subjektov, ki lahko sprožijo postopek za presojo protiustavnosti aktov ali delovanja politične stranke, hkrati pa ne vsebuje zakonskih določb o učinkih izbrisa parlamentarne stranke iz registra, kar se v praksi lahko pokaže kot problematično. Primerjalnopravni okvir (Nemčija, ESČP) služi kot ozadje za kontekstualizacijo in kritično vrednotenje slovenske ureditve. Avtor odgovarja na raziskovalno vprašanje, kakšne so značilnosti postopkov po 68. členu ZUstS v Republiki Sloveniji. S tem si prizadeva zapolniti vrzel v teoretičnih razpravah, kjer je bilo to vprašanje doslej spregledano.
This article starts by diagnosing the discursive amnesia that came to surround interna-tional humanitarian law in contemporary public discourse in 2023–2025. While viola-tions of IHL have proliferated, the legal categories that render warfare legible—civilian, combatant, proportionality, distinction—have been systematically evacuated from po-litical and media narratives. It is submitted here that this silence is as dangerous as the violations themselves, as it condemns international humanitarian law’s prescriptions to oblivion. The article identifies five plausible causes of this discursive amnesia: intra-norm competition with the legal rules on genocide, complexity in asymmetric conflicts, the narrative monopoly of jus ad bellum discourse, critical discomforts with the colonial and gendered histories of international humanitarian law, and the emergence of zones of incriticability. Against this diagnosis, the article argues that international humanitarian law has lost none of its performative lustre, which can be tapped and mobilized through sustained, institutionally-backed articulation of its core categories. The article concludes with an invitation to mobilize the performativity of international humanitarian law across legal, educational, operational, and communicative registers.
The article reassesses the trajectory of European anti-discrimination law from the “re-volution” of 2000—marked by the EU Racial Equality and Employment Equality Directives—to the more sobering climate surrounding their 25th anniversary in 2025. While the Directives broadened protection and introduced potent enforcement tools (including burden-of-proof rules and requirements for effective sanctions), the mom-entum of EU equality law has largely stalled. The clearest symbol is the Horizontal Directive proposal, blocked in the Council since 2008, alongside only modest and often consolidating developments in EU secondary law, mostly in the gender field. The author, therefore, asks how anti-discrimination law can be advanced in a political and social landscape increasingly different from the one that enabled the 2000–2004 expansion. Drawing on collective reflection at the 12th Annual Berkeley Center on Comparative Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law Conference in Ljubljana (2025), the author distils three interlinked themes. First, he maps contemporary challenges: entrenched discriminatory attitudes, institutional bias, weak enforcement marked by political and judicial obstacles, data deficits, and the practical difficulty of addressing intersectional and algorithmic discrimination. Second, he outlines possible responses that build on a dual strategy of defence and adaptation: the principle of non-regression o human rights standards as a shield against rollback, alongside equality mainstreaming, strategic litigation, and complementary policy tools that may bypass legislative dead-lock. Third, he highlights the importance of inspiration as a professional and civic re-source, emphasising professional responsibility, coalition-building beyond the juridical field, and persistence amid setbacks.
This article explores the dialogue between the CJEU and national courts on the scope and meaning of religious discrimination under Framework Directive 2000/78/EC. Focusing on two main emerging strands of case law concerned with (1) neutrality policies banning religious symbols at work and (2) the internal autonomy of religious organisations, and drawing together insights from integration studies and critical comparative law; the analysis explores how national courts framed, explained and presented their preliminary references and how this potentially impacted CJEU judgments. Using the preliminary reference procedure, national courts from three jurisdictions repeatedly asked the CJEU very similar questions, to clarify, challenge or confirm the Court’s approach with various degrees of success. Three common strategies emerge. National courts ask questions via the preliminary reference procedure to shelter national law from EU influences; they rely on EU law to empower themselves domestically; and, occasionally, they reach out to influence the development of EU law. In the latter case, the dialogue seems to be most challenging in the context of religious discrimination, as self-referential national courts often struggle to fully engage with the EU legal framework and to provide a convincing argument to the CJEU. While not conclusive in isolation, the findings provide another piece of knowledge in our quest to understand the apparent stagnation of EU non-di-scrimination law and the CJEU case law on religious discrimination, which has attracted significant criticism from academia and practice.
Z analizo primarnih in sekundarnih virov v angleškem jeziku avtorica predstavi nekatere značilnosti Mednarodnega vojaškega sodišča za Daljni vzhod, ki je po koncu druge svetovne vojne dve leti in pol zasedalo v Tokiu. Opre se na uradno, pogosto tajno korespondenco nekaterih članov sodišča, saj so njihove misli, izražene domačim institucijam, zelo zanimiv vpogled v delovanje sodišča, njegove značilnosti, meddržavno sestavo in tudi dileme, s katerimi so se pri sprejemanju končne odločitve soočali sodniki. Skozi multilateralno prisotnost in sočasno aplikacijo značilnosti različnih pravnih sistemov – čeprav je sodišče delovalo na osnovi Statuta Mednarodnega vojaškega sodišča za Daljni vzhod in takrat veljavnega mednarodnega prava –, sodniki niso zmogli v celoti izstopiti iz svojih pravnih tradicij in v mnogoplastnih okoliščinah dolgotrajnega dela daleč od doma je prihajalo med udeleženci na lokaciji – in v njihovih odnosih z vodilnimi v domačih državah – do nepričakovanih, dotlej nepoznanih zapletov in merjenj moči na različnih ravneh. Glavna posledica tega je bila neenotnost razsodbe: sprejeta večinska sodba je 25 obtožencev spoznala za krive, sedem jih je obsodila na smrtno kazen. Od enajstih članov senata so trije podali (delno) ločeno odklonilno mnenje, predsednik senata pa je na koncu uradno vložil le izjavo o nestrinjanju z višino kazni. Tako je glavni doprinos tega prispevka razkritje neenotnosti sodnega senata, saj nasprotuje običajno razširjenim predstavam, da je bilo predmetno sojenje »ameriška predstava«.
The increasing presence of non-State actors in space raises a plethora of legal questions, including those related to the use of force, especially in the context of the right of self-defence. The first aim of this article is to explain the legal basis for resorting to force in the exercise of self-defence in space, specifically in the Earth’s orbit. The second goal is to contribute to the legal framework concerning how States may exercise self-defence against attacks committed by non-State actors in space. In this regard, the author distinguishes between the rules of attribution of the use of force to a State and the “unwilling or unable” doctrine. It is suggested that the latter may be transposed into the space domain, mutatis mutandis, by a re-conceptualisation of the notion of a State’s “territory”, shifting from its sovereignty-based foundation towards State jurisdiction. Further on, in the realm of the rules of attribution of conduct to a State, the author compares the ARSIWA rules of State responsibility with the strict responsibility regime of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), to clarify which system applies when addressing State responsibility for the use of force by non-State actors in space. Three solutions are offered in this regard. The first rests on the premise that space law, specifically Article VI OST, may be seen as lex specialis in relation to ARSIWA. The second supports the view that the general rules of State responsibility in ARSIWA should apply, as they are secondary rules of international law, whereas Article VI OST encompasses primary rules. The third approach offers a combined reading of Article VI OST and ARSIWA, based on a systematic interpretation of the norms contained therein, to preserve the purpose of the secondary rules on State responsibility.
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems pose both immediate and long-term risks to hu-man rights, necessitating AI governance that aligns with international norms and princi-ples, including respect for human rights.Human rights are a well-established concept in legal discourse, and the right to life has, since the earliest codifications of human rights law, been recognised as the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted—even in situations of armed conflict or other public emergencies that threaten the life of a nation.
With the 1957 launch of the satellite Sputnik I, the frst space object reached outer space. Many more followed, and today space objects are considered an invaluable part of our everyday lives. Satellites and the data they provide are used for monitoring the environment through Earth observation, climate regulation, and natural disaster management, as well as economic activities, for example, agriculture, transportation, communication, and several others. Despite these numerous benefts, however, space objects pose threats to human lives in outer space, in airspace, and on Earth. Te technological advancement of the 21st century, especially the increased use of artifcial intelligence, brought hope that these threats would be minimised, mitigated, or even completely resolved. In this paper, I am going to evaluate whether such hope is reasonable and justifed. To do this, I will, frst, identify some examples of the threats to human lives arising from space objects and provide examples when such threats already materialised in reality. Second, I will present the applicable legal framework and then, third, evaluate it and show that it falls short in addressing those threats. Fourth, I will demonstrate how AI is planned to be used in mitigating these threats. Fifth, I will outline some of the new legal challenges such use of AI would bring and, against this background, fnally assess whether such AI threat mitigation is going to be as efective as currently predicted.
The author analyses the notion of State consent in the delivery of humanitarian assistance supported by artificial intelligence (AI) systems from the perspective of the existing applicable international legal regimes, in particular, the general legal regime of humanitarian assistance and the specific rules deriving from international humanitarian law and international human rights law. She argues that the notion of consent lies at the heart of these rules with a distinction made between strategic and operational consent to humanitarian assistance. The former refers to a State’s general consent to the delivery of humanitarian assistance on its territory, while the latter refers to the consent required at the operational level for the delivery of a particular type of humanitarian assistance in a specific geographically defined area. It is argued that valid reasons for withholding operational consent to AI-supported humanitarian assistance under international humanitarian law must be distinguished from the arbitrary withholding of strategic consent. While withholding operational consent may be legally justified, the arbitrary withholding of strategic consent to humanitarian assistance is prohibited under the relevant international legal regimes when it amounts to a violation of other existing obligations of the State concerned (e.g., under international humanitarian law or human rights law). In such situations the non-consensual delivery of humanitarian assistance could be legally justified either through United Nations Security Council authorisation or by secondary rules of international law, in particular countermeasures.
Prispevek analizira vprašanje, ali je treba v kaznovalnih postopkih priznati pravico do privilegija zoper samoobtožbo ne le fizičnim, temveč tudi pravnim osebam. Ker pregon kaznivih dejanj oziroma prekrškov, v katerem nastopajo pravne osebe, bolj kot pregon fizičnih oseb temelji na materialnih, torej neverbalnih dokazih, uvodni deli razprave obravnavajo vprašanje dometa privilegija zoper samoobtožbo. Ta v sodobni pravni dogmatiki in sodni praksi ne zajema le testimonialnih dokazov, temveč tudi materialne dokaze oziroma dokumentarno gradivo, nad katerim ima osumljenec kontrolo. Ker je kaznovalni očitek – zaradi sistema limitirane akcesorne odgovornosti pravnih oseb – fizični (odgovorni) osebi pravne osebe praviloma vsebinsko prepleten z očitkom pravni osebi, privilegij zoper samoobtožbo, ki ga uživa domnevni storilec kaznivega dejanja oziroma prekrška, pogosto hkrati varuje pred izpovedovanjem in izročanjem dokumentarnega gradiva v svojo škodo tudi pravno osebo. Ne pa vselej! Avtor zavzema stališče, da bi bilo treba v slednjem primeru pravnim osebam priznati samostojno pravico do privilegija zoper samoobtožbo. Še zlasti, kadar je osumljena oziroma obdolžena enoosebna gospodarska družba, pri kateri se s podelitvijo privilegija zoper samoobtožbo dejansko varuje pred izpovedovanjem (ravnanjem) v svojo škodo njenega »lastnika« – edinega družbenika.
ESA was established on 30 October 1980. It currently has twenty-three Member States, and its mission is to shape the development of the European space capability and to ensure that investment in space is continued in the direction of bringing benefts to European citizens and the world. Artifcial intelligence (AI) can be seen as intelligence exhibited by machines that can observe, perceive and act upon their environment to maximise their chance of success at a given goal. AI can be an important and enabling technology for space missions, bringing added value for scientifc return and for the efciency of the mission itself. Te most successful AI implementations are still rarely used in the space in[1]dustry today, as the models developed within the neural network are not human-readable. Despite the challenges, there are examples where AI is successfully being demonstrated in the space sector through ESA’s own activities. Te fast-evolving feld of space research and technology, AI, and the related applications are raising numerous doubts and debates while challenging the adequacy of traditional space law. Tere is a looming concern as to whether the legal framework is up to date to meet the challenges that may arise within the AI and space sector, and what can be done to meet those challenges accordingly and on time. Others also argue that, in addition to liability concerns, ensuring confdentiality and data protection are some of the more acute issues in the context of AI.
