The experiment of initiating nuclear transformation artificially was first carried out by Rutherford in 1919. Since then many artificially made radioisotopes have found variety of applications. Isotopes of chemical elements represent a tool which can do certain jobs more easily, quickly, simply and cheaply than the competitive methods. Some measurements could not be done at all without the use of isotopes as there are no alternative methods available. In agricultural research and application, isotopes and radiation play a part in so many fields and in so many ways that it is difficult to obtain a proper picture of their enormous importance. Applications of radiation and radionuclides for human health followed rapidly in the wake of the discovery of X-rays by Röntgen. Techniques which permitted the production of specific radionuclides in useful quantities were developed. Today, hardly a single major hospital exists in an industrialized country which does not have a department of radiology and a department of nuclear medicine, or which does not use an extensive array of laboratory radiochemical methods for the diagnosis and investigation of a wide variety of diseases. Many beneficial applications of radiation and radioisotopes in industry are well established. The use of radioisotopes and radiation in modern industry is of great importance for process development and improvement, measurement and automation and quality control. Let us mention some: radioisotopes as tracers, radioisotope instruments, radiation in manufacturing, use of radiation for cultural heritage conservation and other. Radioisotopes, as well as stable isotopes, can be produced by accelerators, mainly cyclotrons, reactors or by devices constructed for isotope separation.
In this chapter, the decontamination measures after radiation exposure are considered. The protecting first responders, whole-body decontamination, general public—instructions for decontamination and guidelines, treatment of radiation exposure victims, most sensitive body parts and decontamination strategies in radiation contaminated areas (cost and effectiveness, decontamination of buildings, decontamination of environmental terrains and roads, decontamination of domestic animals and pets, decontamination of human and animal food) are discussed in detail. List of references providing detailed instruction is also given at the end of the chapter.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the single most important component of the non-proliferation regime. Under it, the 182 nonnuclear-weapon State Parties have committed themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device and to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all source or special fissionable material to verify that commitment. One of the IAEA's (headquarters in Vienna, Austria) most important responsibilities is to verify the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States, under agreements with the IAEA concerning the peaceful use of nuclear materials or equipment. The IAEA safeguards system comprises technical measures for performing these verifications within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by the (NPTs). Iraq was the first Member State with declared nuclear facilities (which had been regularly inspected by the IAEA under a Safeguards Agreement) had clandestinely established additional nuclear facilities and had begun to produce nuclear material in violation of the Agreement. The IAEA Action Team succeeded in implementing a comprehensive programme of inspection activities by calling upon an impressive range of technical and administrative resources within the IAEA and its member states. The IAEA laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria, played an important role in this effort by performing hundreds of analytical measurements on samples brought back by inspectors. IAEA is able to deploy the "state-of-the-art" tools, techniques, methodologies and expertise that are required for effective and efficient safeguards with Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs), which provide an additional financial and in-kind support through extrabudgetary contributions.
There are three energy sources which might give us confidence that the world's energy needs will be met in the second half of the 21st century. These are nuclear energy, renewable energy and nuclear fusion. Nuclear fusion has enormous potential, but will be very difficult to achieve from an engineering point of view. It is prudent to rely, for the time being at any rate, on the growth in renewable and nuclear energy. The problem with the continuing growth in nuclear power is the public's perception of its safety. The data compiled about nuclear power reactors in the world can be found in IAEA's Power Reactor Information System (PRIS). The PRIS database is a comprehensive source of data on all nuclear power reactors in the world. It includes specification and performance history data on operational reactors as well as on reactors under construction or in the decommissioning process. Energy production as well as other human activities is always connected with risk taking. Radiation, and everything related to it, generates a fear not easily understood. This probably comes from the "invisibility" of the danger and relation to the bomb. Therefore the safety of nuclear power must be compared with the safety of alternative ways of generating electricity. Like all industries, the generation of electricity produces waste. Whatever fuel is used, the waste produced in generating electricity must be managed in ways that safeguard human health and minimize the impact on the environment. Strategic considerations favour the development of energy sources that offer greater sustainability and have less impact on health and the environment. Nuclear fusion, for which the fuel source is virtually limitless in quantity, could in the long term be an important option in this energy mix. International effort on fusion, International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), hopefully will not turn to be only "A dream of clean energy at a very high price".
Operations and activities which act to concentrate and redistribute naturally occurring radioactive material in the environment are numerous and further sources continue to be identified. Coal, like most materials found in nature, contains trace quantities of the naturally occurring primordial radionuclides. Therefore, the combustion of coal results in the release to the environment of some natural activity and in the redistribution of that natural activity from deep in the earth to locations where it can modify ambient radiation fields and population radiation exposure. The radionuclides included in the noncombustible mineral matter are thus partitioned between the bottom ash and fly ash, except for the gases and volatilized minerals which will be incorporated directly into the flue gases. Phosphate rock deposits contain uranium (U), radium (Ra), thorium (Th), and other radionuclides as contaminants. Literature on the radionuclide content of phosphates is rather extensive. Radioactivity released by the use of phosphate fertilizers, accumulation in soil, migration and transfer or radioactivity into plants is extensively discussed. Between sea level and the upper limit of the earth's atmosphere there is about 1000 g cm–2 of air mass. The earth's atmosphere provides an effective shield against cosmic radiation; the dose rate doubles for every 1500–2000 m increase in altitude. Dose rates at the edge of the atmosphere at high altitudes are around 1000 times higher; solar flares can increase these levels by orders of magnitude. Miscellaneous sources of radiation include radiation exposures due to geothermal energy production, different consumer products; all of this discussed in details in yearly Reports to the General Assembly by United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) serves two distinct and important roles. It prevents the declared nuclear weapons states and all other parties to the treaty from developing with confidence new or advanced weapon designs, including "mini-nukes", and it establishes a strong international norm against nuclear proliferation by any state. A Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was established on 19 November 1996. The Provisional Technical Secretarial started work at its offices in the Vienna International Centre on 17 March 1997. The Treaty has a Protocol under which an International Monitoring System (IMS) and an International Data Centre (IDC) are being established as part of the global verification regime foreseen under article IV (Verification). IMS consists of a global network of 321 monitoring stations, as well as 16 laboratories, capable of detecting nuclear explosions worldwide. This network of 170 seismic, 80 radionuclide, 60 infrasound and 11 hydroacoustic stations, as well as 16 radionuclide laboratories—comprising a total of 337 facilities—will supply data for processing and analysis to IDC. The IDC of the CTBT organization functions as the nerve centre of the CTBT's verification system. A critical part for the functioning of IDC is the Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI). The GCI will support the transmission of raw data from the 337 facilities of the IMS to the IDC in Vienna, and the distribution of data and IDC products to State Signatories, primarily through their national data centres (NDCs). As of 31 July 2018 the CTBT which prohibits nuclear weapon test explosions has not yet entered into force, since 3 of the 44 required states have yet to sign it and 5 to ratify it.
The development of a nuclear arsenal required a comprehensive series of tests. The pattern of nuclear testing by countries has been to conduct atmospheric tests, some of which were of relatively high total yield, followed by a series of more numerous underground tests. Tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere were conducted by five countries during the period 1945–80. When a nuclear weapon is tested in the atmosphere, the large amount of radioactive debris produced in the explosion is freely released into the environment. This radioactive debris, consisting of gases and particulate radionuclides, disperses with atmospheric circulation and is transported and deposited throughout the world. In an underground nuclear test the radioactive debris is confined by design to the underground cavity. If the underground test has been done properly, there is no release or venting of gases or particles to the atmosphere, and there will be only very slow migration, if any, of radionuclides to the surrounding media. As an example of the underground testing, the French nuclear testing in the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa (French Polynesia) is described in some details. Other nuclear test sites are also described, in particular, Maralinga test site in South Australia (UK), testing site in the Marshall Islands (US), Semipalatinsk nuclear test site (SSSR), other French testing sites, North Korea testing sites.
This chapter addresses the problem of accidental release of radionuclides into the environment. Accidental release could be the consequence of activities such as mining, milling, enrichment and conversion of uranium, nuclear fuel fabrication, reactor operation or meltdown, nuclear fuel reprocessing, and nuclear materials transport. The primary source of radionuclides produced in the fission process and found in the environment is because of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. The major source of fission derived radionuclides in the recent years has been from nuclear accidents. Environmental monitoring means the measurement of radiation and radioactivity outside the boundaries of installations operating nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel reprocessing plant, accelerators, handling radioactivity materials including nuclear fuels, or radioactive sources. In case of heavy contamination, early warning is essential. Gamma radiation, which in nearly all the cases is associated with the radioactive material emitted in an accident, can be easily measured. Many instrument systems can measure the dose rates caused by gamma radiation ranging from environmental levels up to extremely high levels. The higher the level, the faster and easier it can be measured. Therefore, on the instrumentation side, the requirements for a quick, early, and timely warning can be met.
Over the past ten years there has been an increased awareness of the importance of stakeholder involvement and public participation in policy making. However, despite a general acceptance that stakeholder participation is important within decision-making, it is less clear as to how that participation should be undertaken, who should be involved, and how the various methods for participation should be evaluated. By first reflecting on some of the philosophical assumptions behind the view that stakeholder engagement is important, this paper presents a number of possible evaluation criteria for such involvement. It suggests that the appraisal of processes needs to include consideration of the legitimacy of the procedure, in addition to the more common efficiency evaluation of procedures and outcomes. Using experience from case studies, these criteria are then used to highlight the main promises and pitfalls of the various participation procedures.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is an advisory NGO whose recommendations underpin the international Basic Safety Standards document and are reflected worldwide in radiological protection legislation. The ICRP system of radiological protection aims primarily to protect human health, but nowadays also considers protection of the environment. Early ICRP recommendations (1928–1950) focused almost exclusively on preventing deterministic tissue effects of high doses of radiation, and appear to have been based mainly on virtue ethics. The aim of those recommendations was to keep doses below safe threshold values. With increasing attention to stochastic effects such as cancer and genetic harm, which can be induced also by low radiation doses, optimization of radiological protection such that doses are kept not just below some limit, but as low as reasonably achievable, became an important protection measure. Initially, such optimization was mostly synonymous with collective dose reduction—thus very utilitarian—and focused on societal benefits (although always supplemented by dose limits that are deontological measures protecting individual rights). More recently, increased societal attention to individual rights is mirrored in a shift of emphasis in ICRP recommendations within this spectrum, with more attention to deontological criteria such as the introduction of individual dose constraints on optimization. It is argued that protection against risks (such as radiation risks) will always involve components of both utilitarian and deontological considerations.
