Conventional wisdom assumes that rural elites oppose democratization. However, because agricultural mechanization reduces farmers' demand for labor, it also reduces their need for autocratic coercion to control the supply, mobility, and price of agricultural workers. That is, the adoption of laborsaving technology can alter agrarian elites' political preferences. Specifically, farmers who have mechanized production should be relatively favorable toward democracy compared to those who have not. We test this proposition at the individual level using Asia Barometer surveys in eight East and Southeast Asian countries that include questions about both attitudes toward democracy and agricultural machinery ownership. Results support our main claim that tractor-owning farmers are more supportive of democracy than their non-tractor-owning counterparts. Mechanization is also associated with greater support for the proposition that democracy should entail investment in public goods that foster employment opportunities. These results provide insight into how technological change could challenge longstanding assumptions about the political preferences of rural elites around the world.
Across the world, cyber actors are destabilizing democracies by flooding public spheres with disinformation. While a preponderance of studies has focused on how the Russians interfered in the U.S. 2016 presidential election, this essay addresses two cyber-disinformation campaigns against Taiwan. The first case study is the 2016 ＂sticker war,＂ wherein Chinese netizens bombarded Tsai Ing-wen's Facebook page following her election as Taiwan's president. Addressing the ＂sticker war＂ opens questions about the nuances of user-led cyber activism in and between China and Taiwan. The essay then tackles the more expansive 2018-2020 cyber-disinformation campaign launched by the Communist Party of China (CPC) against democracy in Taiwan, focusing on the case of Su Chii-cherng, wherein the CPC sought to sow confusion and chaos into the democratic process. Both cases confirm the fears of scholars tracking the evolution of a new ＂post-truth＂ communication paradigm. Citizens have risen to the defense of democracy, however, so the essay closes on a hopeful note, arguing the hacking of democracy via cyber-disinformation operations has led to healthy debates about communication norms, and hence a renewal of democratic practices in Taiwan.
The promotion of democracy has long been a cornerstone of states’ foreign policy and the work of international organisations. The online diffusion of grey literature on ‘best practice’ by the international community has been one method for democracy promotion, which has been overlooked by the literature on democratisation and international organisations, however. This article provides a heuristic model for understanding the diffusion pathways, accelerants and barriers to use for this democracy promotion method. This is constructed using the analysis of original data about the nature, volume and direction of downloads from a major democracy promotion IGO from 2006-2017 alongside the process tracing of the impact of one key publication. The analysis suggests that the resources were more likely to be used by electoral management bodies lacking capacity as well as universities worldwide with less educational/research resources. Internet access was a barrier to diffusion. The use of the materials in the policy process is found to be dependent on actors strategically using them during decision-making policy windows. This notwithstanding, the production of grey literature provides a useful tool for democracy promotion.
Are economically insecure voters potential constituents for populism in Taiwan? This essay summarizes three conceptualizations of economic insecurity from the literature and uses them to predict support for populism in its generic form, specifically for the left- and right-wing populist attitudes in Taiwan. The Asian Barometer Survey (2014 and 2018) is used to test the economic insecurity thesis. The essay presents the following findings: First, among the three conceptualizations, the income-based conceptualization is the most consistent predictor for populist support. Second, the China factor is systematically correlated with both left- and right-wing populist attitudes, creating a second dimension along which populist candidates can mobilize voters. Third, the effect of income insecurity is orthogonal to that of the China factor. Income insecurity has a separate and independent effect on populist support that is beyond the impact of economic interdependence with China. Taken together, income insecurity transcends labor market positions and creates a broader social base for populism in Taiwan. As insecure voters are vulnerable to the appeals of both left- and right-wing populist ideas, the ideology to which Taiwan's populism is attached is contingent upon the island's supply-side politics.
Taiwan has had a highly stable party system since democratization, with the Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party dominating elections. Although they have faced a number of challengers over the last three decades, the two mainstream parties have always managed to maintain their dominance. However, in early 2019, it looked as though an earthquake election was in the cards in the upcoming January 2020 national elections. The mainstream parties faced unprecedented challenges both from within their own parties and from rival smaller challenger parties. What makes 2020 so puzzling is that it would ultimately be a maintaining election, with little change in both the parliamentary and presidential results compared to four years earlier. This essay tries to explain why 2020 featured continuity rather than the expected change in the party system. This is done with reference to (1) the China factor, (2) shortcomings in the challengers’ campaigns, and (3) institutional factors.
On November 18, 2020, the National Communications Commission (NCC) revoked the application of cable news station Chung Tien TV (CTiTV) to renew its broadcasting license. This decision triggered supporters of this television channel, mostly pan-Blue voters, to protest and rally. One man self-immolated to express his support for CTiTV. This act aimed to copy a prodemocracy figure, Cheng Nan-jung, an editor of China News Analysis Freedom Era Weekly, who, on April 7, 1989, burned himself to death to defend press freedom. After losing its license, CTiTV subsequently accused the Taiwanese government of infringing press freedom through the NCC's decision-making body. Taiwan's people have fought for democracy since the 1980s; indeed, press freedom has been one of the cornerstones for which they have been fighting. Between 1996 and 2020, Taiwan experienced three shifts in governmental power. The question arises: Has the Taiwanese government censored cable television channels, forgetting how press freedom was earned over this long and hard process? This essay aims to clarify the situation first by reviewing the theoretical discussion of press regulation and public interest. By addressing the public interest, the study enters the debate about elitism and populism. Following this conceptual discussion, the study focuses on the case of CTiTV, particularly regarding this TV channel's promotion of a populist figure, Han Kuo-yu, during his runs in both the mayoral election in Kaohsiung in 2018 and the presidential election in 2020. The concluding analysis revisits the essay's core question: Does press freedom come with an obligation regarding fulfillment of responsibility? The discussion aims to generate more reflection by scholars and students in media studies, politics, and governance.
How did American democracy get to the breaking point symbolized by the ＂storm on the Capitol＂ on January 6, 2021? Since its founding, the Republican Party has employed several elements of populism to mobilize a base of mostly white Christian voters. Former president Donald Trump has successfully added elements of an economic populism to appeal to working-class white voters. This contributed to Trump's 2016 success, to the closeness of his 2020 defeat, and to the GOP's down-ballot success in 2020. The GOP's populism has become ever more radical and polarizing, in part due to its shrinking base of voters, resulting in the current tribal state of American party politics and society. In other words, polarization in the United States is no longer based on policy or ideology; it is endemic, cultural, and a threat to the country's democratic institutions. At the same time, a divided Democratic Party has failed to embrace an economic populism that could very well serve to renew its lost appeal to the white working class.
This essay investigates the critical factors contributing to peaceful power alternation and, by extension, charts the path for democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria. It adopts an exploratory research design which involves systematic collection, presentation, and analysis of data through relevant texts, observations, interviews, and documentary evidence. The essay relies on primary and secondary data from Ghana and Nigeria. The results show that, for Ghana, factors such as the country's transparent electoral management system and formidable democratic culture have been major contributors to the nation's democratic trajectory. Whereas in the Nigerian experience, an improved electoral management system; the perceptions of the electorate; pressure from stakeholders; and the personality of the incumbent president have had significant effects. The essay concludes that the transparent electoral management system and solid democratic culture in Ghana and the improved electoral management system and the personality of the incumbent president in Nigeria have been the greatest influences on power alternation and the democratic process. However, Ghana has fared better than Nigeria in these respects.
Analyzing Indonesia's COVID-19 response offers valuable insights into general debates about the linkage between pandemic management outcomes and a state's economic capacity, regime type, and individual policy decisions This essay systematically reviews arguments that tie Indonesia's pandemic response to its limited economic capacity and status as a democracy with lower coercive power than autocratic counterparts It finds that while it is true that Indonesia, now a higher middle-income country, had fewer economic resources to respond to the crisis than fully industrialized states, its response was less effective than those of other, significantly poorer nations Similarly, Indonesia's democracy controlled considerable coercive resources when the outbreak began, but it opted not to mobilize them to enforce a coherent lockdown Thus, there is little evidence for the notion that Indonesia's central government was severely constrained by structural predispositions;instead, its response was entirely consistent with the policy preferences of the national leadership, which were set in a climate of growing populism and developmentalism as the dominant ideational streams since the mid-2010s
Contrary to the situation in Europe, comparative study of party membership in Latin America is virtually nonexistent. The goal of this essay is to fill this gap in the study of party politics and the internal organization of parties in the region. This essay examines the statutes of the principal political parties in Latin America and analyzes the role given to party members in fifty-one political parties in the region. This information is organized into three categories: entry requirements; members' rights; and members' duties (in formal terms). The essay argues that these aspects are rather homogenous among Latin American countries; unlike the situation in Europe, they cannot explain differences in party membership growth rates. The essay evaluates six alternative hypotheses, concluding that the varying levels of party membership in Latin American countries are the result of a combination of historical factors, candidate selection procedures, and party strategies.
In the past, debates have focused on the question of whether Confucianism is in conflict or compatible with democracy. While these two models are partially accurate, they are increasingly becoming inadequate when dealing with new political and social forces and new sets of questions concerning the relationship between democracy and Confucianism. This essay deconstructs the conventional conceptualization of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy through a critical and empirical examination of four ideal-type models of that relationship. These models can be characterized as conflictive, compatible, hybrid, and critical. The essay examines the strengths and weaknesses of each model, and tests each through empirical engagement.
This essay attempts to shed light on the fact that, more than two decades after regime change, most Balkan countries remain either hybrid regimes or tentative democracies. It focuses primarily on the ways in which political party system dynamics influence democratization trajectories in these countries. The essay first explores the argument about party system competitiveness as a key driver of the process, but in doing so, reveals its limited explanatory potential. Instead, it is suggested that the crucial relation in a democracy is not the horizontal marketplace of the election, but the vertical relation of accountability between parties and voters. Given that the dominant strategy of voter-party linkage in this region is clientelism, the second part of the essay argues that the client-patron relation of accountability undermines rule of law and protection of civil liberties as fundamental pillars of democracy. The effects of the resulting power morphology are particularly pronounced in the Balkans, primarily due to factors of strong nationalist mobilization and disputed statehood processes. As a result, it is argued that further democratic advances depend on the growing social contention and mobilization as sources of pressure from below, which are currently jeopardized by rising levels of inequality and poverty in this region.
This essay revisits the causal relationship between corruption and institutional trust in East Asian democracies. Utilizing recent data from the Asian Barometer surveys, we find that corruption undermines institutional trust, while tolerance of malfeasance mitigates such a detrimental effect. We further explore the conditions under which Asian citizens are more likely to tolerate corruption. Our findings complement the conventional wisdom on the effects of corruption on institutional trust, and shed light on why some citizens in East Asian democracies are able to retain political trust despite the prevalence of corruption.
