
Using data from the 2004–2022 waves of the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), this paper evaluates the reliability of self-assessed financial risk attitude among investors by comparing it with their reported investment choices. The survey allows respondents to self-assess their risk tolerance, specify the types of investments they hold (categorised as more or less risky), and report the corresponding amounts. The consistency observed between stated risk attitude and the composition of reported portfolio holdings supports the reliability of the risk-aversion measure. The findings contribute to the ongoing methodological debate, providing evidence that self-reported measures are robust and reliable instruments for validating behaviour in financial markets.
Abstract We propose an experimental interface designed to elicit the distribution of a budget of resources over a very large number of items. The interface has two related innovations. First, it asks participants to indicate how they allocate the resources by drawing a curve over a stylized representation of the many items. Second, because the curve represents relative, rather than absolute, levels of resources, it remains visually stable when a participant revises any specific allocation, while the program automatically enforces the budget constraint. We describe the application of the interface to a Blotto game with more than 200 items, but the approach can be adapted flexibly to general problems of resource allocations over many items, under a budget constraint.
Through a cluster randomised field trial, we evaluate the impact of an evidence-based, soft skills curriculum aimed at adolescents, referred to as Healthy Minds, that ran in 35 high schools in England over four years (2013/14 - 2017/18). We find supportive evidence that Healthy Minds positively augments the primary outcome of self-reported physical health in the treated adolescents. Treated pupils have global health attainment that is 0.235 standard deviations higher than children in the control group, resulting in a 10-percentile increase in their measured health status. We also find evidence of positive impacts on behaviour. There is no evidence of impacts on improved emotional wellbeing. We note significant gender differences in the effects found, strongly favouring boys. Overall, we provide strong evidence that a designed, taught life skills curriculum can improve related outcomes during the adolescent years, and that differential learning styles across visible aspects of diversity are worthy of consideration Healthy Minds.
Open science initiatives have gained traction in recent years. However, open peer-review practices, i.e., reforms that (i) modify the identifiability of stakeholders and (ii) establish channels for the open communication of information between stakeholders, have seen very little adoption in economics. In this paper, we explore the feasibility and desirability of such reforms. We present insights derived from survey data documenting the attitudes of 802 experimental/behavioral economists, a conceptual framework, a literature review, and cross-disciplinary data on current journal practices. On (i), most respondents support preserving anonymity for referees, but views about anonymity for authors and associate editors are mixed. On (ii), most respondents are open to publishing anonymized referee reports, sharing reports between referees, and allowing authors to appeal editorial decisions. Active reviewers, editors, and respondents from the US/Canada are generally less open to transparency reforms.
We experimentally investigate whether lying is more likely when the addressees are individuals or groups of individuals, and in the latter case how the probability of lying depends on the group size and the magnitude of the negative externality inflicted by the lie. We employ an observed cheating game, where an individual can reveal or misreport a privately observed number. A misreport can be monetarily beneficial for the liar but imposes a monetary loss on addressees. The privately observed number is also known to the experimenter, who, therefore, can study both whether there is truth or misreporting and, in the latter case, the extent of misreporting. Treatments vary the loss for group members compared to the loss for an individual addressee. We find that groups are never lied to more than individual addressees. When considering how much to deviate from the truth, liars are sensitive to a decreasing loss at the individual level but do not care for an increasing loss at the group level. Groups of different sizes are treated similarly. Social image concerns may explain the results.