Penny-picking refers to the often-observed phenomenon of repeatedly taking negatively skewed risks and seems directly at odds with evidence on (positive-) skewness-seeking as observed in static settings. We show that penny-picking may not only occur despite skewness-seeking, but-seemingly paradoxically-because of skewness-seeking. With sufficient time available, risks with arbitrary negative skewness can be gambled in such a way that, overall, skewness is positive. Therefore, classical behavioral theories like prospect theory straightforwardly explain penny-picking. More generally, we show that the versatile dynamics of skewness reconcile apparent preference reversals concerning the avoidance and acceptance of (skewed and non-skewed) risks.
We introduce a new type of games, called “opportunity-hunting games,” in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (“opportunity”) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free riding on the other player’s effort is the dominant force. We characterize the game’s unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C73)
We study quality distortions when firms hold market power. We develop a model allowing for flexible functional forms of demand in order to extend Spence’s (1975) monopoly analysis to imperfect competition. We show that quality distortions are determined by a competition effect that captures the externality a firm exerts on its competitors when raising both its price and its quality, in addition to Spence’s (1975) effect related to the shape of total market demand. Our approach also allows us to analyze the effects of commodity taxation and technology shocks on the equilibrium allocation when firms compete in prices and qualities. (JEL D43, D62, H22, L13, L15, O31)
This paper examines efficient allocations in economies where consumers exhibit heterogeneous smooth ambiguity preferences and face model uncertainty with a common set of identifiable models. Aggregate endowment is ambiguous. We characterize economies where the representative consumer is of the smooth ambiguity type and derive efficient sharing rules. Heterogeneous ambiguity aversion leads to sharing rules that systematically differ from those in vNM economies. The representative consumer's ambiguity aversion differs from that of the typical consumer; this leads to more compelling asset-pricing predictions. We focus on point-identified models but show that our insights extend to partially identified models.
This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicate that the retailers have most of the bargaining power. Counterfactual simulations show that most-favored-nation clauses raise prices but would lower the profits of the publishers and Amazon. C78, D86, K21, L14, L42, L81,
I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an "ordeal"-that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lump-sum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity have an expected value for money that exceeds the average value by more than a factor of two. (JEL D63, D82, H23, I38)
We examine the dynamic connections between local wealth inequality and the local politics of property rights. A jurisdiction comprises a politically dominant in-group and a marginalized out-group. At each date, the jurisdiction exploits weaknesses in due process rights under the legal system to redistribute property claims away from the out-group and toward the in-group. It combines takings and zoning with the leveraging of public assets to deter legal challenges. This leverage varies over time and depends on status quo effects and asymmetries in legal treatment of assets. The results show how local politics and policies are linked to wealth disparities. (JEL D31, D72, H13, H77, K11, P14, R52)
We generalize the captive-and-shopper model of sales to allow asymmetries in production costs and captive audiences, in oligopoly. Both kinds of asymmetry determine the firms that compete (via randomized sales) to serve the price-comparing shoppers, while other firms exploit their captive audiences. In contrast to a model with symmetric costs (but asymmetric captive audiences), there are natural situations in which more than two firms use sales by engaging in pairwise battles across distinct price intervals. We also study the choice of production technologies via innovation and extensions to consider costly acquisitions of captives and shoppers, and captives' choice of captor.
This article develops techniques for the empirical analysis of repeated sequential search over unordered alternatives using data on consumer search processes. I use these techniques to assess why consumers conduct little search in e-commerce and often pay significantly above the minimum available price for a product. Search costs could explain these facts, as could pre-search seller differentiation: Consumers with low search costs may not visit stores they dislike based on information known before search. I find that seller differentiation is primarily responsible for limited consideration and market power. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D83, L81)
We provide axioms that relate the preferences of each group in a society to the preferences of the subgroups contained in them. These axioms yield cardinal utility indices for each individual and a representation of group preferences as the group-dependent weighted sum of the utility indices of the members of that group. We show that these weights are group independent whenever one additional axiom and a mild linear independence assumption are satisfied. (JEL D11, D71, D81, D83)
Backward induction (BI) is only defined for perfect information games, but its logic is also invoked in many concepts for imperfect or incomplete information games. Yet, the meaning of BI reasoning is not clear in these settings, and we lack a way to capture the essence of BI without assuming equilibrium. We introduce backward rationalizability, a nonequilibrium solution concept for incomplete information games, which we argue distills the logic of BI reasoning. We show several of its properties and discuss a few applications, including a new version of Lipnowski and Sadler’s (2019) peer-confirming equilibrium. (JEL C72, C73, D83)
Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously-informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously-informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters’ ability to communicate with each other. When communication is impossible, less-informed voters can be better off than more-informed voters.
Individuals often attach a special meaning to attaining a certain goal, and getting past a threshold marks the difference between success and failure. In this paper, we take a standard expected utility (EU) setting with an exogenous reference point that separates success from failure and define attitudes toward success and failure as features of preferences over lotteries. The distinctive feature of our definitions is that they concern a local reversal of the decision-maker's risk attitude across the reference point. Our findings provide a unified view of several well-known models of reference-dependent preferences and suggest new forms of comparative statics exercises.
In this paper, we propose a novel way to measure behavioral heterogeneity in a population of stochastic individuals. Our measure is choice-based; it evaluates the probability that, over a randomly selected menu, the sampled choices of two sampled individuals differ. We provide axiomatic foundations for this measure and a decomposition result that separates heterogeneity into its intrapersonal and interpersonal components. (JEL D01, D11, D91)
This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a Poisson process. A combination of membership fee and continuously increasing prices induces a threshold response from the buyer, endogenously segmenting the market along timing of purchase. This pricing mechanism achieves the deterministic global optimum. The tools developed here are shown to be useful in thinking about global incentives in dynamic mechanisms, and mapping dynamic pricing to the classic taxonomy of consumer-producer surplus and deadweight loss.
We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and characterize the commitment structures leading to consumer-and producer-optimal outcomes. (JEL C72, D43)
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings. However, matching is often not a static allocation, but an ongoing process with long-lived firms and short-lived workers. We show that stability is always guaranteed dynamically when firms are patient, even with complementarities in firm technologies and peer effects in worker preferences. While no-poaching agreements are anti-competitive, they can maintain dynamic stability in markets that are otherwise unstable, which may contribute to their prevalence in labor markets.
We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model with uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects: It may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect), increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect), and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). The model suggests mergers are more desirable when R&D outcomes are highly uncertain, but less so when the innovation path is clearer. A surprising policy implication is that the benefit of the merger may be higher if the first and subsequent innovations are closer substitutes.
This paper uses new data to reexamine trends in concentration in U.S. markets from 1994 to 2019. The paper's main contribution is to construct concentration measures that reflect narrowly defined consumption-based product markets, as would be defined in an antitrust setting, while accounting for cross-brand ownership, and to do so over a broad range of consumer goods and services. Our findings differ substantially from well established results using production data. We find that 42.2% of the industries in our sample are “highly concentrated” as defined by the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which is much higher than previous results. Also in contrast with the previous literature, we find that product market concentration has been decreasing since 1994. This finding holds at the national level and also when product markets are defined locally in 29 state groups. We find increasing concentration once markets are aggregated to a broader sector level. We argue that these two diverging trends are best explained by a simple theoretical model based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), in which the costs of a firm supplying adjacent geographic or product markets falls over time, and efficient firms enter each others' home product markets.
