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    AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS

    AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS

    JournalISSN 1945-7669eISSN 1945-7685中科院 经济学 2区

    年发文量

    研究主题

    论文(795)

    排序
    1Welfare of Competitive Price Discrimination with Captive Consumers
    Yanlin Chen,Xianwen Shi, Jun Zhang

    We study the welfare effects of price discrimination in a duopoly with both captive and contested consumers. Using a unified information design approach, we characterize the best and worst market segmentations for producer surplus, consumer surplus, and social surplus. The firm-optimal segmentation, which divides the market into two nested segments, consistently reduces consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing. The consumer-optimal segmentation, which divides the market into a symmetric segment and a nested segment, may sometimes yield a Pareto improvement but does not necessarily coincide with the social-optimal segmentation. (JEL D43, D83)

    2026
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    2Optimal Design of Market Access
    Takuro Yamashita,Shuguang Zhu

    We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple “fixed-price” implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing. (JEL D82, L81, M31)

    2026
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    3Higher-Order Beliefs and (mis)learning from Prices
    Kevin He,Jonathan Libgober

    We study misperceptions of private-signal correlation in an incomplete-information Cournot duopoly game. Exaggerating the correlation between players' demand signals is beneficial when agents hold flexible beliefs about price elasticity but is harmful when their beliefs are dogmatically correct. For agents with flexible beliefs who learn elasticity by observing prices, correlation misperceptions indirectly distort behavior through elasticity misinference. If agents know the true elasticity, this learning channel is eliminated. Correlation misperceptions have opposite direct and indirect effects on behavior, so the presence of elasticity inference can reverse an error's viability. (JEL C72, D21, D43, D81, D82, D83)

    2026
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    4Sequential Protest Formation
    Benjamin Matta

    People participate in protests even though it is costly, benefits are not exclusive to participants, and each individual is unlikely to be pivotal. Building on these characteristics, I propose a sequential model of protest formation where opportunities to participate arrive stochastically, and the protest succeeds if participation surpasses a threshold. I show a unique equilibrium exists and characterize its dynamics. If the unique equilibrium involves participation, the time between participation decisions shortens as the protest progresses—a pattern observed empirically. A player with an opportunity becomes sequentially pivotal if, after abstaining, the protest will likely end before another opportunity arrives. (JEL D72, D84, D91)

    2026
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    5Exploiting Rivals' Strengths
    Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò

    We analyze oligopolistic competition in which firms use contracts contingent on what buyers purchase from their rivals. We present a new mechanism through which a dominant firm, by using these contracts, can gain more from exploiting its rivals than from foreclosing them. This exploitation is achieved by requiring buyers to source at least a certain share of their total requirements from the dominant firm, though less than 100 percent. By optimally designing these contracts, the dominant firm can earn as much as it would if it were to acquire the rivals' specific technological and marketing capabilities at no cost. (JEL D43, D82, D86, K21, L14, M31)

    2026
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    高被引作者

    作者引用发文
    Matthew O. Jackson12515
    Benjamin Golub9641
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    David Eil6221
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    Jan De Loecker4211
    Leeat Yariv4024
    Michael Kosfeld3653
    Doh-Shin Jeon3547

    高产作者

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    Doh-Shin Jeon3547
    Christopher P. Chambers1186
    Aldo Rustichini365
    Eyal Winter1585
    Matthew O. Jackson12515
    Michael Waldman955
    Drew Fudenberg1975
    David L. Levine3115
    Federico Echenique735
    Philippe Jehiel2875

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