The article evaluates the Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (“SEBI”) orders on insider trading matters between September 2009 and July 2023, and the performance of such orders on appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”). It develops an evaluation framework based on elements of the rule of law applicable to regulatory adjudication. It finds that SEBI orders often fall short of standards laid down in law. It also finds an overall appeal rate of such orders between 30–41%. This does not include more recent appeals that may not have been decided. Appeals before the SAT are more likely when the monetary sanctions are higher than the minimum threshold of ₹1 million. Once appealed, almost 52% of the orders are modified. We suggest that one way to improve SEBI orders to ensure that they withstand appellate scrutiny is investing in capacity building and order writing.
This article interrogates the constitutional validity of Section 3(c)(ii) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, which exempts "publicly available" personal data from the Act's scope. The provision is assessed against the rights to privacy and equality under the Indian Constitution. Anchored in the unfounded assumption that publicly accessible data falls outside the realm of privacy, it constructs a hierarchy between public and non-public data. This approach contradicts the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence. The provision fails the proportionality test, as it grants broad discretion to process publicly available data in virtually any manner, without adequate safeguards. Such unchecked processing can result in downstream harms, violating the right to privacy. Additionally, we argue that Section 3(c)(ii) violates equality by creating an arbitrary and irrational classification between publicly and non-publicly accessible data. To remedy these constitutional defects, we argue that the exemption should be reframed as a legitimate use ground.
This article deploys a qualitative comparative analysis between Bangladesh and Sri Lanka on constitutions and parliamentarism. Both these South Asian countries began independence with a Westminster model of government. Bangladesh exhibits some successes with parliamentary design which could be replicated in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the study explores Bangladesh's key lessons in parliamentarism: The role and appointment of a ceremonial president; political accountability; floor-crossing; parliamentary committees; and Bangladesh's Technocrat Ministers. Based on John Stuart Mill's most similar cases principle well known as \"method of difference\", this study select case studies that control for variables as far as possible, by being as similar as possible on everything other than the factor those are researching, then that is the causal factor in any diverging outcomes. The findings suggest that Bangladesh's innovations in political accountability, parliamentary committees, and Technocrat Ministers which could be replicated in Sri Lanka. Also, Sri Lanka should design a presidential balancing mechanism. On the other hand, floor-crossing provisions in Bangladesh should probably not be a feature of the Sri Lankan system. Therefore, this comparative analysis helps Sri Lanka to avoid pitfalls and recreate successes that other countries have already experienced.
