So, after Fr. Chaberek’s three critiques of my 2011 article on monogenesis and two replies from me, it is time to bring this exchange to a close. Where do matters stand?
The content of the book Wittgenstein in Polish Galicia is skillfully, even intricately, woven around Wittgenstein’s personal notes, mainly from the years 1914‑1917. Chapter 1 is entitled “The Movement of Thought. The Parable. The Apostle – Wittgenstein’s Underestimated Idioms,” while Chapter 2 has the title “MS 101: The First War Notebook 9.08.1914 to 30.10.1914.” Chapter 3 deals with “MS 102: The Second War Notebook 30.10.1914 to 22.6.1915,” and Chapter 4 addresses “MS 103: The Third War Notebook 28.3.16 to 10.1.1917.” Finally, there is an Epilogue. Given its subject matter, Idziak‑Smoczyńska’s choice of such a structure for her book turns out to be highly appropriate for several reasons.
Lonergan’s chapter 19 “proof,” in Insight, for God is typically assessed as a putative demonstration whose success rises or falls with the minor premise that “the real is completely intelligible.” Yet both the structure of Insight (proof as a “set of signs” requiring the reader’s self‑performance of rational judgment) and Lonergan’s later methodological turn (proof presupposes a horizon that cannot itself be proved) suggest that the apologetically decisive contribution of Insight 19 is not a freestanding inference but a meta‑apologetic, that is, an account of the normative conditions under which any natural‑theological proof can function as evidence. This article argues that Lonergan offers a two‑level model of apologetic rationality. On the first level, proofs function as instruments of clarification and as invitations to grasp a virtually unconditioned. On the second level, their cogency is conditioned immediately by intellectual conversion and, in the later Lonergan, within the fuller horizon shaped by moral and religious conversion. Interpreted this way, Insight 19 is not discarded by later Lonergan but re‑situated. It becomes a diagnostic and constructive tool within method, capable of exposing counterpositions and stabilizing conversion, without pretending to generate a horizon ex nihilo.
Studies of Karol Wojtyła’s personalism have consistently kept to his theme of understanding the person in a way that begins with the individual, prior to addressing the community. Following the paradigm of Person and Act, the I is seen as the ground for understanding the We, as it is through experience that one has contact with reality, and the community is itself composed of individual subjects. This article, however, inverts the question. Can a Community‑First approach strengthen personalism without falling into the trap of collectivism? I argue that the community is not merely a result of individual participation, but also the primordial soil that allows the subject to emerge as a person.
This principle has guided my work. Franciszek Bargieł’s Latin text has been translated here into English with attention not only to literal accuracy but above all to the author’s intended sense. Bargieł writes in the scholastic and Jesuit tradition, in which precision of definition and rigour of argument matter as much as manner of expression. My translation aims to highlight both. Latin and English differ in their preferred sentence structures. Bargieł frequently uses complex periodic sentences, suspending key predicates until the final clause. English does not tolerate such structures well. Where length and complexity would hinder understanding, I have split them into several sentences. This is an interpretative choice that preserves the argumentative structure while removing a barrier arising from syntactic differences alone. Orthography and Latin proper names follow standard contemporary conventions. Philosophical terms are rendered with established English equivalents; where no adequate equivalent exists, the Latin is retained, and Greek terms are given in transliteration. This posed no major difficulties, since most English philosophical vocabulary is calqued from Latin or, in part, from Ancient Greek.
This paper is the third reply to Prof. Kemp. It begins with a brief summary of the polemics between him and the author. The author states that Kemp misquoted St. Augustine and that he did not present any conclusive argument against Catholic monogenism. Then the argument is presented against the distinction proposed by Kemp into "biological" and "theolgical humans". The author restates that such distinction is either biologically impossible or is reducible to equivocation. The paper ends with a response to the three points of critique presented by Kemp in his previous paper. At the end the author explains why Humani Generis encyclical by Pius XII does not support the evolutionary origin of man rather it just opens the debate without settling the issue.
If A and B are giants of thought (be it philosophical or other), it is very tempting to compare ideas proposed by both of them (even in cases where they do not have very much in common). Sigmund Freud and Ludwig Witt‑ genstein are examples of A and B satisfying the antecedent of the preceding conditional.
This article proposes the concept of the iconic object as a phenomenological category capable of reconciling givenness and objectivity. Drawing on Jean‑Luc Marion’s distinction between idol and icon in his early theological works, and between object and event in his phenomenological writings, I argue that not every objectification is metaphysical. Beyond the a priori reduction that guarantees certainty by suppressing excess, there is a possible a posteriori objectification that recognizes its derivative character and preserves the distance that givenness requires. The iconic object designates precisely this mode of objectification: one that receives the given without exhausting it. The notion finds conceptual support in Marion’s “iconic use of concepts” and in Pascal’s doctrine of the three orders, which allows for the subordination rather than the abolition of metaphysics. Finally, the article explores how this framework can illuminate various fields such as medicine, education, and ecology.
The paper explores the views of St. Thomas Aquinas on the virtue of charity and the increasing problem of antibiotic resistance in the contemporary world. In my work, I will explore how the virtue of charity in Aquinas may help shed light on the formulation of possible solutions to addressing this problem. In this exploration, I argue that Aquinas’ charity forms the individual, out of love, to be responsible for one’s and others’ health, especially regarding antibiotics. To achieve this, I shall discuss the following: first, I shall deal with Aquinas’ idea of the virtue of charity and the place of the common good in it; second, I shall give a cursory background on antibiotic resistance and its consequences; third, I shall discuss how Aquinas’ idea of charity would be helpful in man’ formation on using antibiotics responsibly, bearing in mind that his use of such not only impacts him but others.
This article offers a philosophical analysis of Gregory Palamas’ One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, focusing on the philosophical form through which the text articulates unity and totality. Rather than treating the fragmentary structure of the Capita as a secondary vehicle for doctrinal content, the study argues that fragmentation performs a constitutive philosophical function. Situated within the context of ancient and late antique philosophy, particularly Neoplatonism and the Pseudo‑Dionysian corpus, the analysis explores how fragmentary articulation safeguards unity from reduction to a conceptual system. In these traditions, such a mode of ontological articulation affirms totality without totalisation. Against this background, Palamas’ work is interpreted as enacting a model of unity that resists discursive synthesis. The article demonstrates that the coherence of the Capita arises not from linear argumentation or deductive order, but from relations of resonance, repetition, and mutual illumination among autonomous fragments. Totality remains operative as a real horizon of intelligibility without being constructed or closed. Ultimately, the philosophical form of the Chapters is presented as an instance of “totality without system,” offering a significant alternative to modern totalising models of metaphysical thought.
This article develops a philosophical explication of monotheism through fundamentality, using Rudolf Carnap’s method of explication and Karen Bennett’s concept of ‘building‑fundamentality.’ By examining how contemporary philosophers and theologians have struggled with defining monotheism in light of Second Temple Judaism’s complex theology, this article argues that understand‑ ing monotheism as the belief in one fundamental deity provides a more philosophi‑ cally robust framework than numerical definitions. This framework helps reconcile divine plurality in Jewish theology while offering new perspectives on polytheistic traditions and interfaith debates, thus contributing to broader discussions in the philosophy of religion and theology.
Since antiquity, humans have traditionally been characterised as animal rationale or homo sapiens. Such a definition takes into account, on the one hand, the physical aspect, referring to the human body, but also, on the other hand, the mental aspect. With this in mind, the present article seeks to develop a philosophical approach to the problem posed in its title. Various aspects of human language use and cognition are, in the era of the information revolution, being increasingly taken over by AI. So what still remains specific to humans—or, more precisely, to human, natural intelligence, given this dynamically developing context? The article addresses this question in a series of steps. Initially, it considers whether rationality is a good candidate for a uniquely human trait. In defence of the distinctiveness of human intelligence, and using Robert B. Brandom’s semantic inferentialism, it then points to our ability and skill in understanding, as well as the normativity of language use and cognition. The ensuing discussion focuses on the normative categories of deontic status and deontic attitude, and related notions of commitment and entitlement that these in turn imply.
This article explores Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of “critique” (Kritik) and his critical method. The most important components of Hartmann’s critical philosophy are the distinction between problem-thinking and system-thinking (problem-oriented and system-oriented thinking), the criterion of presuppositionlessness (neutral attitude, “this side” stance, which also highlights the priority of the phenomena over theory), the preference accorded to the natural attitude (toward the object) as opposed to the reflective attitude, the emphasis on the aporetic, the critique of the common philosophical methods, the critical review of Kant’s philosophy, and lastly the theory of critical realism. Linked to the analysis of Hartmann’s critical ontology, critical epistemology and critical metaphysics I also point out an uncritical concept in those. The discussion of the elements of Hartmann’s critical methodology (transcendental, descriptive, and dialectical) shows that the various meanings of the concept of “critique” in Hartmann’s philosophy converge in the methodology of aporetic phenomenology.
Teologia ewolucyjna: Założenia – problemy – hipotezy (Evolutionary Theology: Assumptions – Problems – Hypotheses), by Wojciech P. Grygiel and Damian Wąsek, is an interesting and inspiring book. The attempt to formulate traditional problems of theology in the context of the natural sciences should com‑ mand special attention today. And if it is also a successful and consistently pursued attempt, then we should welcome it with particular interest. In this article, however, I do not want to dwell on the advantages of the publication being discussed, but rather to make some comments that may appear relevant when seeking to assess the theses of its authors from the perspective of a classical theist entertaining a metaphysical rather than scientific perspective on theology. I will focus on four issues: (1) the concept of Revelation developed in the context of the natural sci‑ ences, (2) the understanding of evolution, (3) the metaphorization of theological language, and (4) the panentheistic perspective of theology practiced in the context of science. In conclusion, I state that the proposed development of theology in the context of science, despite the advantage of presenting old theological problems in a new perspective, is vulnerable to the accusation of pan‑positivism, which entangles theology in too strict a context, depending as it does on the results of the empirical sciences.
The root of the narrative that places naturalism in opposition to the central tenets of Christianity resides in the perception that a “naturalist” account of reality has no space for the nonmaterial/transcendental. That perceived dichot‑ omy, this paper will argue, resides in a categorical error about the nature and number of things in reality. The apparent conflict assumes that one faces a binary choice between matter and non‑matter, where the first of these falls under the remit of investigation by the natural sciences while the second does not, thus putting theology at odds with naturalism.In contrast to this dichotomous account, the scientific holistic ontologies pro‑ posed by Michael Esfeld (philosopher of science) and Hans Primas (quantum chem‑ ist) provide a radically different account of foundational reality in which one can argue that there is no requirement to reconcile two fundamentally different kinds of “stuff.” The contradiction between naturalism and Christianity is only apparent. It is based on our presuppositions about the world as described by science and our commitment to particular accounts of the nature of personhood. This paper does not claim that scientifically informed holism “solves” the naturalism versus anti‑naturalism debate; however, it does provide a way to integrate naturalistic (scientific) metaphysics into our Christian thought.
This article explores the anthropological views of Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990), an Italian philosopher who identified herself as a Thomist while advocating a broadening out of this classical approach through the incorporation of phenomenological elements. The text outlines her conception of the human being, distinguishing between phenomenological and metaphysical levels. A key focus here is her critique of naturalism—which, she argued, is unjustly reductive in its approach to human beings. This polemical reflection situates her views within a broader context, addressing in particular the call for a re‑empiricization of Thomistic anthropology.
Arguments against naturalism and materialism have a long history, from Plato to Plantinga. The paper has three parts: First, I reconstruct an argument from reason found in Plato’s the Phaedo. Second I consider whether the argu‑ ment is relevant to contemporary forms of naturalism. I argue that the argument does constitute a serious objection to some forms of naturalism. I then defend the argument against objections from GEM Anscombe, Graham Oppy, and Peter van Inwagen.
This article is devoted to the problem of responsibility as it arises in the context of the technosystem—where the latter is enhanced by the work of intelligent devices. In this case, the system in question refers to the relationship between man, functioning in the various roles of creator, trainer, owner and user of intelligent agents, and machines equipped with artificial intelligence. Suppose we assume that the aim of technological development is the well‑being of the human being living now and the human being of the future. In that case, attention must be focused on the value of responsibility. The system of technology is embedded in a cultural and social context. The author diagnoses the causes of the disap‑ pearance of responsibility (the adjacency of actions) in the context of using smart devices, and considers what should be done to counteract this. The background for the analyses undertaken is furnished by ecosystem theory, together with the related concept of instrumentalization as construed by Andrew Feinberg, and Hans Jonas’ ethical theory of responsibility—considered as they relate to the analysis of selected cases.
This paper deals with a twofold understanding of the notion of event. The first construal of the latter draws upon the philosophical framework of Marc Richir, in which that concept event corresponds to a process of phenomenalization occurring within a schematism that serves as a transcendental matrix for individual phenomena. It enables access to a sphere of fluctuating phenomena correlated with the non‑intentional activity of phantasia, which precedes their symbolic institution. According to Richir, the experience of reading literature can exemplify this kind of phenomenalization, one that activates interaction with human affective experience. The second concept of event referred to in the study is derived from the thought of Paul Ricoeur, and may be characterized as a discursive one, since the latter thinker emphasizes the transcendence of the merely event‑referring dimension of discourse in favour of the meaning it conveys. In his elaborated theory of reading, Ricoeur describes the process as both active and passive: a wandering point of view on the world opened up by the text, a dynamic synthesis of sentential retentions and proten‑ tions, a bidirectional modification of the reader’s expectations and memories, a search for meaning and a struggle with its absence, and a breakdown and reconstitution of narrative coherence. Yet Ricoeur’s category of the world of the text appears to suggest a certain kind of symbolic and ontological institution. At the stage of exis‑ tential appropriation of textual proposals, these proposals are directed toward the imagination (operating intentionally), not toward fantasy (non‑intentional). The paper examines some consequences of both views of the act of reading through the lens of two selected narratives from Difficult Loves by Italo Calvino. The aim of this final investigation consists in assessing, from the perspective of reading literature, the joint contribution of both thinkers to an event‑oriented reshaping of human identity.
