For elections to the European Parliament in Germany, an electoral system is used that entails four major disadvantages: (1) there is no mechanism to ensure a regionally balanced distribution of representatives; (2) closed party lists prevent a close connection between voters and their representatives; (3) the simultaneous conduct of local elections in some federal states gives certain parties an advantage; and (4) the nationwide allocation of seats fosters fragmentation of the party system. Since the Federal Constitutional Court abolished the five-percent electoral threshold, however, debate has focused almost exclusively on the legitimacy of this decision and on possibilities for re-introducing such a threshold. This article argues that more suitable reform options exist. It proposes introducing six electoral regions or districts and switching to an open-list system. This would promote a more concentrated party system, greater regional proportionality, and a closer link between voters and their representatives. At the same time, it would avoid conflicts with the Federal Constitutional Court, disputes with Spain over a legally mandated electoral threshold under European law, and the preferential treatment of certain parties resulting from the uneven synchronization of European and local elections.
At the center of this mixed methods study is the research question, how the parliamentary communication on gender equality issues has deteriorated since the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has entered the German Bundestag. The analysis is based on a web scraped dataset of all debate contributions on gender equality in the minutes of plenary proceedings from October 22, 2013 to March 31, 2023. It approaches the subject through a quantitative sentiment analysis and a qualitative content analysis exploring the communication of the AfD. This reveals a change in parliamentary communication: (1) There is both a generally more negative communication in the relevant debate contributions in the 19th and 20th legislative periods, during which the AfD was part of the Bundestag and a more negative communication on average by AfD MPs compared to the other parliamentary parties. (2) The AfD members tend to use a sharp and incivil tone in their interjections and speeches, which contradicts the required civil, polite and collegial communication in parliament.
This article extends previous data collections on interest articulation in the committees of the German Bundestag. The analysis shows a further increase in the relevance of expert participation, without a corresponding expansion in the number of experts or statements per committee meeting. At the same time, substantial differences persist between committees with regard to the scope, composition, and fragmentation of participating interest groups. The COVID-19 pandemic and the reorganization of several committees constitute an important institutional context in which established patterns of interest representation remain largely stable.
So far, the literature on descriptive youth representation in parliaments has mostly focused on the national and occasionally in federal states on the subnational level. We broaden this focus by analyzing the local level that often serves as an entry point into politics. Our case is the German state of Baden-Württemberg, as it has recently lowered the candidacy age to run for local level parliaments (city councils and municipal assemblies) below majority age. Based on data collected via a survey of the state’s civic education board (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung) after the 2024 elections, this research note gives an overview of youth descriptive representation in local parliaments and analyzes the effects of a lowered candidacy age, whereby not only differences between parties/lists but also gender distribution, the occupational background of young politicians and pathways into politics are focused. By describing the first case where the candidacy age was lowered to 16 years, we contribute not only to the literature on youth political representation in parliaments but also to an informed policy debate regarding future reforms.
This article examines the limits of government information and expression activities in the context of parliamentary debates. It explores the extent to which members of the government are subject to a duty of political neutrality when speaking in parliament. To answer this question, the article first outlines the most important limits on the state's right to expression and analyses the arguments put forward that members of the government are not subject to any obligation of political neutrality in parliament. In a recent ruling of September 5, 2025 (Ref. HVerfG 2/24) the Hamburg Constitutional Court assumed that there is no room for a duty of political neutrality in the parliamentary debate characterized by speech and counter-speech.
Public officials play a particularly important role in the work of parliamentary committees of inquiry. Thanks to their official knowledge, they can explain contexts to members of parliament that cannot be gleaned from reading files alone. In addition, their duty of political neutrality makes them particularly credible. A parliamentary committee of inquiry relies on public officials as witnesses to perform its supervisory role. They are therefore obliged to prepare thoroughly for their testimony. Although the committee of inquiry cannot itself enforce this obligation to prepare, it can do so with the help of the Federal Constitutional Court.
In the direct election of the mayor of Ludwigshafen in 2025, the candidate of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was not allowed to stand for election because of doubts about his loyalty to the constitution. The AfD criticized this as “a party ban through the back door”. The exclusion of the AfD candidate was made possible because the Rhineland-Palatinate Municipal Code stipulates loyalty to the constitution as a prerequisite for candidates for the office of mayor. This is verified by the election committee in the run-up to the election. The essay first shows that, from a democratic and constitutional perspective, there are good reasons to verify loyalty to the constitution only after the election and then only for the candidate who is ultimately elected. The result of this review should then determine whether the candidate is appointed. Furthermore, an analysis of the election results in the city districts shows that AfD supporters in the Ludwigshafen mayoral election reacted to the exclusion of their candidate in part by casting invalid votes, in part by abstaining from voting, and in part by voting for the SPD candidate.
The German Bundestag is caught in an endless cycle of tortuous amendments of its electoral system. Past attempts were restricted by retaining the traditional ballot design. Without this restriction new options become feasible. The article outlines a system of “proportional representation with personal votes”. In essence, local constituencies are enlarged to regional districts and, simultaneously, candidate lists of parties are opened up so that voters elect individual persons rather than closed lists.
Parliamentary democracy is in crisis, and society’s trust in democratic institutions and their representatives is dwindling. While plebiscites are considered a risky option for alleviating these problems in times of right-wing populism, interest is turning to citizens’ assemblies as consultative-deliberative forms of participation. In 2023, the German Bundestag commissioned a citizens’ assembly on the topic of “Food in Transition” for the first time. In addition to developing recommendations for healthy eating, this participatory format was to be tested at the federal level. Based on a qualitative evaluation of interviews with participants in the citizens’ assembly, this article shows the extent to which it can serve as a blueprint for overcoming the crisis of confidence in democracy. The conclusion is mixed: on the one hand, the majority of those surveyed expressed positive views. Democratic erosion processes are also pushing for new instruments to be tested. On the other hand, institutional precautions and political will are needed to prevent the possible stagnation of the citizens’ assembly’s results from giving the impression of mere token participation.
In German politics for a long time, issues of lobbying regulation were put on the political agenda only in some periods and with varying subjects. Only at the beginning of the 2000s the isolated rules were recognized by political actors as a political complex of correlated issues. Analyzing the development of German lobbying regulation policy, at first the focus lies on the normative context which had a major impact on the several political debates, for depending on the different theoretical principles of democracy that were emphasized in the various phases of debates the requirements regarding the actions of interest groups varied, too. The descriptive part of the study pursues the goal to describe the development of regulation policy as a sequence of phases of policy stability and policy change. Theoretically, this part of the study is based on the Punctuated Equilibrium-Theory developed by True, Jones and Baumgartner. Explanations found refer primarily to three developments: the process of politicization of lobbying as a political issue, coming along with the increasing interest in questions of lobbying in general since the early 2000s, the process of political agenda setting in regulation policy at the end of the decade, and the major legal reforms regarding lobbying regulation since the middle of the 2010s.
How the Bundestag works depends largely on the skills and abilities of its members. The expertise of MPs is determined in particular by their previous professional experience. Building on earlier studies, changes in the parliamentary composition can be analyzed comparatively over the long term with regard to MPs professional background using Adalbert Hess’s categorization scheme. The following is observed for the 21st German Bundestag: (1) As a result of the early 2025 federal election, the composition of the parliament has changed significantly. (2) Among the total of 630 members, 232 are newly elected. Die Linke and the AfD have by far the highest proportion of new members – only these two parliamentary party groups consist of more newly elected than re-elected members. (3) For the first time, MPs from occupational areas close to civil society organizations and politics (especially staff members of parliamentary party groups and parties) are the biggest group in the Bundestag. MPs who previously worked in those jobs are often younger and their share is higher among East German MPs. (4) In all other election periods, civil servants constituted the largest occupational group. Now, this description applies (only) to just over one in five members of the Bundestag. (5) Equally large is the group of MPs who worked in the private sector before entering parliament. (6) The proportion of the self-employed, which had already declined in the 20th Bundestag, continues to fall.
The analysis of party-voter congruence and divergence in Germany’s 2025 federal election draws on around 330,000 users of the “Wahl-Kompass” voting advice application, who donated the data. Five salient campaign issues are analyzed: the debt brake; the nationwide public transport ticket; conscription; a wealth tax; unified health insurance. Results point to a polarized party landscape, yet sizeable cross-camp public majorities exist on some policies. Congruence is comparatively higher on the debt brake and transport ticket, while conscription shows mixed majorities. The largest representation gaps concern redistribution and social policy: support for a wealth tax and especially unified health insurance is high even among supporters of conservative parties.
The parliamentary party group (PPG) and the political party are regularly perceived by the public as a single entity; the success and failure of one is also attributed to the other. The aim of both is to gain public trust and approval for their own political direction. However, a strict distinction is made between political parties and PPGs in the area of political funding in order to prevent state funding for PPGs from being passed on to the parties by circumventing the limitation of state funding for political parties. Particularly in the area of the – generally permissible – public relations work of PPGs, the distinction between PPG tasks and – impermissible – party work can become difficult in individual cases. This has led to problems in practice, which is why the legislature has adapted the legal standards that were previously only rudimentarily defined in Section 55 (3) of the Law on MPs. However, the amendment to the law only makes a minor contribution to clarifying the ring-fencing of the funds made available to PPGs for public relations work and is in part unconstitutional.
With its ruling of December 10, 2024, on signature quorums, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court abandoned the principle that strict constitutional control is necessary when parliamentary majorities act on their own behalf. Instead, the court is expanding the legislature's discretionary powers and marginalizing its obligations to act. Even in the case of a minor impairment of constitutional objectives, the legislature is to be entitled to intervene significantly in the equal opportunities of the parties, while conversely it is not to be obliged to examine potentially milder means that are more than 100 times more effective. The integration function of elections is highlighted as more or less the only remaining justification for signature quorums; here, the court returns to a definition from the 1950s. For some of the small parties, the decision means a restriction of their right to participate in elections, imposes unreasonably high burdens on others, and poses risks to the acceptance of democracy and its institutions.
With the Act on the Federal Police Commissioner at the German Bundestag (Police Commissioner Act – PolBeauftrG) of February 28, 2024 (BGBl. 2024 I Nr. 72), the Bundestag created a new instrument for monitoring the federal government, but also the police at the Bundestag. In addition to this legal basis, a new and considerable administrative apparatus has been set up within the Bundestag administration. What is still missing is an anchoring in the Basic Law, which raises questions, particularly with regard to the status of the instrument. On the one hand, the instrument is intended to be an auxiliary body of parliament but, on the other hand, it is supposed to be independent, which contradicts the character of parliamentary auxiliary bodies and raises questions about the preservation of the democratic chain of legitimacy. In view of the massive criticism of growing bureaucracy and, in particular, the excessive number of commissioners in the executive and legislative branches, the creation of this instrument was also highly controversial. This article sheds light on the controversial discussion about the ‘if and how’, the different expectations and fears, and the individual legal regulations. The commissioner has now taken up his duties and is providing insights in his reports. It is up to the Bundestag to evaluate and assess these, especially whether these insights justify the effort or whether there is an appropriate balance between effort and return.
“Interactive representation” refers to an ongoing interaction between representatives and those they represent, where a reliable balance of responsiveness and leadership sustains widespread belief in the legitimacy of a system of government. Since interactive representation is more sophisticated than merely formal, symbolic, or descriptive representation, it relies on dependable networking structures connecting a population with its representative assembly. This is especially important when the pre-democratic principle of representation is combined with the principle of democracy, resulting in modern parliaments founded on strong parliamentary party groups. This essay examines the specific networking structures of such parliaments, explores how the performance of all parliamentary functions has evolved with the rise of this form of parliamentarism, and discusses the opportunities and challenges it presents. Throughout, the analysis of parliaments’ networking function is approached systematically, historically, and within the context of power politics.
This article analyzes party positions and political polarization in the German party system during the 2025 federal election using the online voting advice applications “Wahl-O-Mat” and “WahlSwiper”. The findings show a strong programmatic convergence among the SPD, the Greens, and The Left, while on the right a growing substantive proximity between the CDU/CSU and the AfD becomes evident. The Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) occupies a distinctive position by combining economically left-wing with socially conservative stances, thereby acting as a bridge between the traditional camps. Overall, differences between political blocs have increased, while intra-bloc differences have decreased, indicating advancing polarization. Furthermore, it becomes clear that online voting advice applications do not merely reflect existing party positions but can themselves have polarizing effects: through their design and issue selection, they tend to favor clearly profiled or extreme parties as high matches, potentially reinforcing polarization within the electorate.
Parliamentary party groups (PPG) are the central actors in Germany’s political system, yet their mode of operation is often misunderstood. To adequately assess PPG’s role, the entire legislative process must be considered and an enlightened understanding of parliamentarism can then be developed in five steps. First, the Bundestag plenary is merely the place where laws are formally adopted, not where legislative decisions are actually made. Second, the standing committees are of greater importance; they serve as crystallization points for parliamentary work, since their establishment creates the policy-based division of labor within the Bundestag. This leads, third, to a further functional specialization into working groups within the PPGs. Fourth, within these working groups an additional level of differentiation takes place among the members: Rapporteurs can thus be key actors in policymaking. Fifth, these actors can exert substantial influence on the pre-parliamentary phase of legislation, for instance when draft bills are prepared within the ministries, coalition treaties are negotiated or electoral platforms developed. The strengths of this highly specialized division of labor are evident; at the same time, however, it may give rise to deficits in innovation and political communication.
The new electoral law passed in 2023 was primarily intended to prevent dramatic increases in the size of the Bundestag, as had occurred in 2017 and 2021 due to overhang and compensation mandates. Thanks to the newly introduced mechanism of second vote coverage, according to which no party in a federal state receives more seats than it is entitled to in proportion to its second votes, in the 2025 federal election the standard size of the Bundestag was achieved for the first time in around 50 years. However, politicians criticized especially the associated effect that some constituencies are no longer represented by a directly elected member of parliament. In contrast to this, the results of a population survey show that compliance with the target size of the Bundestag and proportional representation between the parties are the most important goals from the population's point of view, and that the occurrence of such “orphaned constituencies” is perceived as the lesser evil compared to a dramatic increase in size. That said, survey findings show that it would be best if the creation of overhang mandates could be avoided by reducing the number of constituencies.
