
ABSTRACT Does intensifying US‐China rivalry in development finance empower developing countries, or deepen their dependence? This article argues that it does both, through a mechanism called strategic ambiguity: the deliberate maintenance of relationships with multiple, competing creditors, maximizing access to resources while avoiding binding political commitments to any single patron. Three developments have made this strategy viable at scale: record Belt and Road Initiative engagement in 2024; the cancellation of 83% of USAID contracts in 2025; and BRICS+ expansion covering approximately 45% of the world's population. The article proposes a three‐part typology, namely, competitive hedging, issue‐selective alignment, and institutional forum shopping, and tests it against five cases using a replicable coding protocol. Strategic ambiguity generates real bargaining gains for institutionally strong, diversified states; for commodity‐dependent states in acute debt distress, it often entrenches dependence. Developing states are bending the rules of development finance, not yet rewriting them.
ABSTRACT The limited capacity of many African economies to effectively harness the opportunities presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) continues to constrain innovation‐driven productive activities. Although increasing attention has been given to the AfCFTA–innovation nexus, limited empirical evidence exists on the role of industrial capacity in shaping this relationship. This study examines the conditional effect of industrial capacity on the relationship between AfCFTA and the innovation ecosystem across 35 African economies from 2010 to 2022 using the Bias‐Corrected Method of Moments (BCMM) estimator. The findings reveal three main outcomes. First, AfCFTA indicators, measured by (i) the share of intra‐African exports and imports relative to GDP, (ii) the share of intra‐African trade relative to total African trade, and (iii) intra‐African trade integration, exert a significant negative effect on Africa's innovation ecosystem. Second, industrial capacity, proxied by manufacturing and industrial value added, exerts a significant positive conditional effect on the AfCFTA–innovation ecosystem nexus. Specifically, the estimated industrial capacity thresholds necessary to mitigate the negative effect of AfCFTA on innovation range from 10.84% to 13.40% for manufacturing value added. The corresponding thresholds for industrial value added is 39.19%. The policy implications of these findings are discussed in the context of SDG 9.
ABSTRACT Modernization theory posits that socio‐economic development fosters value change, increasing popular demand for democracy and improving democratic quality. This article revisits this claim by examining whether traditional beliefs undermine democratic attitudes and democratic outcomes in Sub‐Saharan Africa. Using survey data from more than 25,000 respondents in 19 African countries collected by the Pew Research Center, we analyze the relationship between traditional beliefs and democratic preferences at both the individual and aggregate levels. We show that traditional beliefs systematically reduce individuals' support for democracy. At the macro level, however, the prevalence of traditional beliefs does not undermine democratic performance, nor is aggregate demand for democracy associated with democratic quality.
ABSTRACT The move from unipolarity to a fluid and contested multipolar world order has significantly changed the way African nations form national security policy due to changes in the nature of the strategic environment of those states. Much of the literature has focused on how the actions of major world powers ‐ the United States, China and Russia shape their respective national security strategy. There is relatively little literature on how African states develop strategic responses to this process of systemic transformation. This paper assesses how the shift in distribution of power across the globe affects the national security dynamic of peripheral African states by using comparative case studies of Cameroon and Mali. Both countries face many of the same internal security challenges including insurgency, state fragility, and foreign intervention‐ yet both countries’ governments have responded differently to these internal security challenges with regard to their external security alignment strategies. The paper argues that differences in elite coalitions, the legitimacy requirements of regimes, the historical strategic cultures of the two states, and the sequences of perceived threats faced by each country are the primary explanations for why Cameroon's and Mali's government developed such distinct external security alignment strategies. Based on theories of realism, constructivism, and critical security studies, we use a comparative analytic framework to explain why some states may choose to diversify their security relationships ‐realignment while others choose to focus on maintaining existing security relationships ‐diversification. Utilizing a combination of qualitative document analysis techniques based on secondary data from policy documents, official statements, multilateral reports and scholarly works ‐the study also enhances the transparency of the research methodology used here. Our results indicate that peripheral states are not simply passive recipients of the competition of the great powers; they are active agents who use the uncertainty created by the transition to a multipolar world order to solidify their own domestic authority. In addition to its contribution to the debate regarding the implications of multipolarity, we also address the issue of ontological security and African agency in international relations. Overall, the study demonstrates that the transition to a multipolar world order provides states with additional strategic options, at the same time increasing the domestic political risks associated with regime survival.
ABSTRACT This article examines how traditional beliefs shape electoral participation in Togo and Tanzania, two Sub‐Saharan African countries facing political turmoil. Using original survey data collected through face‐to‐face interviews in 2025 (Togo, n = 185; Tanzania, n = 200), we use logistic regressions to test whether traditional beliefs and practices predict voter turnout and party preference. Contrary to earlier findings, we show that traditionally minded voters are now more likely to vote in both countries, and, in Tanzania, are now more likely to support the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. These results suggest that, in times of political instability and institutional uncertainty, traditionally minded voters become more likely to participate in elections as a means of safeguarding the status quo, reflecting their aversion to change and highlighting the enduring influence of traditional beliefs on political behavior in contemporary Africa.