The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has carried out post-conflict environmental assessments (PCEAs) to evaluate the environmental damage of conflicts since the late 1990s. This article considers UNEP’s PCEAs as a case of securitisation. Existing literature suggests securitisation can lead to de-politicisation, associated with non-participatory, obliging policy practices, or politicisation, which can lead to inclusive, democratic outcomes. For environmental security policy to be effective, it therefore is crucial to know whether the securitisation of the environment has led to de-politicisation or politicisation. To explore this in the case of UNEP, the article examines whether the securitisation with regard to PCEAs has been de-politicising or politicising and, as a result, whether it has contributed more effective methods, practices, or policies to assess wartime environmental destruction. Focusing on the period after 2010, when PCEA was an established part of UNEP’s work but started to lose its role at the core of UNEP’s environmental security dimension to other issues like climate risks, this paper argues that UNEP’s approach to PCEA was mainly marked by depoliticisation, which may have hindered the efficacy of the assessments in practice. Due to UNEP’s waning interest in PCEA, its methodological development has lagged, suggesting the need for a new approach also incorporating politicised aspects.
This study advances an institutional perspective on climate-security dynamics by examining how climate action can foster conflict or collaboration under different governance settings. Using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, local adaptation is conceptualized as an “action arena” where communities and organizations negotiate responses to climate threats within institutional constraints. Fieldwork was conducted across 14 climate-affected communities in Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, Guatemala, and the Philippines. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 31 action arenas assessed how combinations of five institutional conditions shape conflict and collaboration: nested institutions, resource tenure clarity, legitimacy, capacity, and multiplicity. Results show that no institutional condition consistently prevents conflict across contexts. Instead, collaboration and conflict emerge through multiple institutional pathways. Institutional legitimacy was found to be a central factor, being present across all collaborative pathways and absent from all conflict pathways. The findings further show that the effects of institutional capacity, tenure arrangements, nested governance, and institutional multiplicity depend on the broader institutional configurations in which they operate. These results highlight the importance of conjunctural causation in climate-security dynamics and suggest that conflict-sensitive adaptation requires attention to how institutional conditions interact, rather than focusing on individual governance characteristics in isolation.
This article offers an original synthesis of 23 peer-reviewed articles published between January 2010 and June 2025, identified through a broader search covering 2000 to 2025, following PRISMA and scoping review guidelines to explore the interdisciplinary aspects of how gender shapes the experience and governance of environmental security. Employing a novel triadic lens—risk, resilience, and governance—the article investigates the gendered dynamics of environmental security across global contexts. Grounded in feminist international relations theory, political ecology, and critical environmental governance, it identifies three interconnected themes: (a) women’s disproportionate exposure to climate-induced hazards due to gendered roles and socio-cultural constraints; (b) women’s active role in resilience-building through local ecological knowledge, caregiving networks, and community-based adaptation; (c) structural barriers that hinder women’s meaningful participation in environmental governance, including tokenistic representation and institutional inertia. The findings indicate that gender is often sidelined in global and national strategies, resulting in gaps between policy and practice for legal, financial, and political barriers. Knowledge of production is uneven, with significant regional disparities. This article advocates for gender-transformative environmental governance that redistributes power, legitimizes diverse knowledge systems, and institutionalizes intersectional justice. It provides strategic recommendations to realign governance at different levels toward equitable, sustainable, and feminist-informed environmental security.
Australia stands to benefit from the current global security–sustainability nexus, or the convergence of Western actions to meet both security and sustainability objectives, which are centred around the supply of critical raw materials (CRM). Australia is the largest producer of lithium, the third largest producer of cobalt, and the fourth largest producer of rare earth elements resources in the world. However, Australia’s realist pragmatic response to increasing tensions between the United States and China over CRM, which is exacerbating the trend towards resource nationalism, does not provide assurance for its national security. The article examines Australia’s resource liberalism which has embedded CRM mining companies and exports in Chinese dominated global supply chains. Despite limited efforts to emulate the great powers in industrial policy and enthusiasm for joining Western-led agreements, these do not protect Australia from great power rivalry, nor does its resource liberal orientation through open investments, CRM exports, and partnerships ensure its national security.
Armed conflicts fundamentally reconfigure environmental security, forcing civilians to depend on terrain and ecosystems for physical safety, food and energy. This article examines how natural landscapes, indigenous biodiversity and traditional ecological knowledge functioned as environmental security infrastructure during the war and siege (2020–2022) and post-war crisis (2022–2025) in Tenbien, northern Ethiopia. Drawing on interviews and repeated field observations, the study shows that mountains, incised gorges, forested cliffs and caves became life-saving refuges from bombardment and shooting, while indigenous fruit trees and shrubs supplied critical food, medicinal products and biomass fuel during the crisis. Households also relied on stone grinding mills and traditional stoves to sustain basic needs during the blockade. Particularly, farmers harvested up to 2,115 kg of Ziziphus spina-christi fruit per tree, generating about 931.53 USD annually and buffering acute livelihood insecurity. However, the continued siege and post-war crisis also drove overexploitation of restored landscapes and fragile terrains, degrading forests and shrublands. The article argues that wartime nature-based coping simultaneously enhances short-term human security and undermines longer-term environmental security. Therefore, urgent, ground-based ecological restoration, integrated into post-war recovery and peacebuilding, is essential to rebuild resilience and safeguard biodiversity in war-affected regions.
As of late, environmental considerations have been on the rise in all types of discourses, including academic ones, plenty of which address the connection between environmental and security issues, and aim to influence decision-making. Whether it is climate change, extinction of species, pollution, migratory pressures, or scarcity of resources, the grounds for analysis are numerous. In line with this thinking, the following article provides an insight into the applicability of one of such terms, the contested “environmental terrorism” concept, beyond the realm of mere theory and into the concept’s application in reality. Albeit contested, the concept is based on a relevant idea, whereby it spotlights how actors, state or non-state, may commit “acts of terror” against civilians through the damage of the environment. In turn, the environment itself becomes the misused victim and/or weapon, which thus may prove to be futile for the civilian population that depends on environmental resources for survival. For that reason, acts of “environmental terror” are particularly worrisome, especially when used in situations of armed conflicts to which they tend to be connected. Arguably, it is thus meaningful to assess what is the pertinence of this contested concept in practice. Does it have the necessary baseline to be utilized by the key actors in armed conflicts, namely states, who have the supremacy in deciding what the laws of armed conflict, including the concepts and their definitions, may be? In answering this question, the article contributes to the theoretical literature related to terrorism as well as the protection of the environment in armed conflicts. Results of a longitudinal qualitative content study in Atlas.ti focused on state positions in the UN system (UNSC, UNGA, UNEP, etc.) related to environmental destruction in armed conflicts over the course of more than 50 years (1970s–2020s) imply this has not been the case for decades, nor is it likely to change. The reasons are manifold, as this article shows; nevertheless, in general, they relate to the prevailing politicization of the overarching term “terrorism” by states. In turn, this sensitivity seemingly makes the concept obsolete beyond scholarship. The article, therefore, highlights the meaning of a practical approach for the sake of positive results and outlines how the international community could proceed with this matter. It is thus argued here that the tools used for theoretical analyses must at least to some extent reflect reality, which in this case speaks against the viability of the concept.
This article critically examines Australia’s approach to climate-induced mobility through the lens of securitization theory, focusing on whether and how Australia constructs climate mobility as a security issue. While irregular migration has long been securitized in Australian policy, climate change has received inconsistent security framing, and climate-related displacement remains unaddressed in legal or strategic terms. Drawing on policy analysis and expert interviews, the study examines how these divergent securitizations logics shape three major initiatives, the Pacific Step-Up, the Pacific Engagement Visa, and the 2023 Falepili Union treaty. Findings show that labour mobility programmes, though framed as regional climate resilience measures, primarily serve Australia’s domestic labour and geopolitical interests. The Falepili Union marks a partial normative shift, explicitly recognizing climate mobility as “mobility with dignity,” signalling an emerging regional governance model that integrates adaptation and sovereignty. The study concludes that Australia’s bifurcated approach remains burdened by inconsistent climate commitments, securitized migration logics, and colonial hierarchies, yet recent initiatives demonstrate the potential for planned, rights-based, and relational mobility frameworks. Achieving this requires a paradigm shift from reactive, control-oriented immigration policy policies to collaborative, forward-looking strategies that centre on dignity, agency, and shared regional responsibility, to ensure stable economic progress and long-term sustainability.
Water infrastructure projects in transboundary conflict settings, such as the Middle East, are shaped by political tensions, governance fragility and competing narratives. Traditional assessment approaches of water projects focus on tangible factors such as water volume, cost-benefit analyses and technical feasibility; while intangibles, including peace dividends, trust building, cooperation and inclusion, remain insufficiently operationalized and underexplored for optimizing decision-making processes. This paper addresses this gap by deductively applying the concept of intangibles – categorized as human, structural and social capital, as established in corporate finance – to the planning and implementation of contested water infrastructure projects. Drawing on examples from the Middle East, including the Red-Dead Canal and the Jordan-Israel water-energy exchange project, the paper outlines how neglecting intangibles may exacerbate mistrust, stall cooperation and undermine project progress. Overall, the paper aspires to propose a typology of intangibles and to demonstrate the potential of operationalizing them in water projects within a politically sensitive region.
Myanmar’s climate vulnerability intersects with conflict-related violence, creating differentiated impacts on marginalized communities. This perspective calls for extending climate justice as praxis in advancing climate action in and for Myanmar. The argument is built on three key observations: the ways differentiated climate vulnerability is shaped by conflict-related and structural violence; the global push for a so-called “green” transition that has resulted in environmental and social injustices in Myanmar; and the potential convergence of the climate justice movement and political resistance to address structural inequality and the drivers of injustice. Fossil-fuel-funded violence and rapidly expanding rare earth mining are presented as illustrations of how climate action, structural inequalities, and social justice are interconnected. These observations challenge the tendency to approach climate change as a purely techno-managerial issue and inform future interventions and research on climate change. The perspective concludes with reflections on potential ways forward, including entry points for engagement and the risks involved.
The Indus Basin has long been both a lifeline and a fault line, where the vulnerabilities inherent in transboundary water governance are amplified by India’s upstream position and Pakistan’s downstream position, as well as by deep-seated political and territorial disputes between these riparian neighbours. Such upstream–downstream power asymmetries and entrenched disputes culminated in 2025 when India permanently suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and unilaterally closed the sluice gates of the Baglihar dam on 4 May 2025, reducing by up to 90% the Chenab River’s flow to Pakistan. India’s actions emerged as a response to the Pahalgam terror attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on 22 April 2025, and render visible its power to control the Indus Basin’s water flows due to its upstream geography. Drawing on Grech-Madin’s revised conceptual framework, this article examines how India’s unilateral management of the Chenab River’s waters through the closure of the Baglihar dam constitutes a case of international water weaponization. I argue that the closure of this dam in the Chenab River represents a case of international water weaponization on multiple levels, unfolding through a continuum of escalating water violence practices, encompassing rhetorical threats, treaty suspension and physical obstruction.
The Netherlands has committed itself to accelerating the transition to green energy. For the enormous amount of critical raw minerals (CRM) needed for this transition, the country is fully dependent on imports from a relatively small number of countries, mostly in the Global South. This article discusses how the Netherlands navigates between the enhanced demand for CRM and the expectation that sustainability requirements are not compromised. It examines to what extent the foreseeable legal infrastructure in the Netherlands and the European Union (EU) provides sufficient safeguards that CRM sourcing respects human rights and the environment, and meaningful engagement with those adversely impacted by mining activities. The focus is on Indigenous Peoples, who especially suffer the consequences of an irresponsible energy transition and financial institutions as actors of critical importance for the energy transition. The article argues that the Netherlands should adopt a strong national implementing law that goes beyond the minimum requirements set by the EU, increasing the level of protection of people and the environment in CRM supply chains. Adopting such a due diligence law is essential for the Netherlands to fulfil its duties for human rights and the environment abroad, in the context of a just energy transition.
Across the globe, government officials, politicians, and law enforcement agencies increasingly label or treat climate activists as criminals or terrorists. Employing theoretical insights from terrorism studies this contribution discusses the potential counterproductive effects of this approach. It investigates the likelihood that climate activists might eventually adopt violent methods to advance their political goals and argues that the trend to criminalize climate activists and label them as terrorists could potentially become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In some of the most contested and violence-affected areas of the world, carbon resource rents underpin fragile peace arrangements. But as global pressures to decarbonize intensify, the effects of removing carbon resource rents on these peace deals remain poorly understood. This article makes a new contribution to the emerging scholarship on the relationship between peacebuilding and decarbonization via a comparative case study from Indonesia. We explore the post-war political settlements in the Aceh and Papua regions, where natural resource governance reforms have underpinned contrasting approaches to ‘peace’. In both sites, political stability has relied on local elite access to carbon resource rents via predatory peace arrangements. In the Aceh region, the peace settlement was formally negotiated and included important reforms. It has remained resilient through rapid decarbonization, with alternative revenue sources accessible to the local elite. In the Papua region, conflict was managed via an informal securitized settlement, which has stayed relatively stable, although it remains untested by decarbonization. Overall, we find that predatory peace settlements reliant on carbon revenue resource sharing among local elites can be resilient to decarbonization with relevant mitigation and political reform measures in place. However, without these measures, stability appears conditional on repressive security measures.
Concerns about climate change and conflict are ubiquitous. Systematic research on the climate-conflict nexus in the Pacific is lacking, despite the region’s high vulnerability to climate change as well as several past episodes of political instability. Using a new dataset, we analyze the impact of climate-related disasters and temperature extremes on social conflict events in Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. According to theoretical expectations, climate change should engender more social conflicts, for instance due to intensified grievances, resource competition (especially about land), and rural-to-urban migration. The results indicate that in the three countries studied, disaster shocks and temperature extremes do not noticeably affect conflict risks, even after controlling political, economic, and environmental context factors. Major cities, commonly considered most prone to climate-related conflicts in the region, do also not experience higher conflict risks following disasters. These findings indicate that Pacific Island countries may be more resilient to climate-related conflict risks than commonly assumed.
Climate adaptation policies often intersect with conflict dynamics, demanding approaches that promote resilience while minimizing unintended consequences. However, assessments of conflict sensitivity in adaptation have focused on narrow, project-based analysis, failing to capture multilevel governance arrangements where policy instruments operate. Addressing this gap, this article introduces the Conflict Sensitivity Wheel, a novel framework and tool for evaluating climate adaptation policy instruments through the lens of conflict sensitivity. Grounded in the governance theories of polycentrism, adaptive governance, and political ecology, the Wheel provides a structured approach for analysing how adaptation instruments address the socio-political complexities of conflict-prone contexts. The tool operationalizes these theories through 22 governance criteria and 49 indicators, systematically categorized across the policy cycle. The study develops a protocol guiding the tool’s application, and tests it on Kenya’s County Climate Change Fund, demonstrating its ability to diagnose strengths and limitations for conflict sensitivity. The application highlights the Conflict Sensitivity Wheel’s versatility and potential for guiding adaptation governance toward more conflict-sensitive approaches. Future research could explore its application across diverse geographies and policy contexts, further refining its utility as an instrument for advancing conflict-sensitive climate action.
A fundamental idea in the environmental peacebuilding literature is that environmental cooperation can serve as a catalyst for broader collaboration and, in turn, reduce the risk of renewed conflict. While this claim has long been asserted, only a few empirical studies have examined it in cross-country and comparative analyses. This article adds to these works by providing a comprehensive quantitative analysis of conflict recurrence data and provisions for environmental cooperation in over 1,000 peace treaties since the end of the Cold War. The central finding is that environmental clauses in such agreements are associated with a significantly lower risk of conflict recurrence. This result not only provides systematic empirical evidence supporting the environmental peacebuilding thesis but also demonstrates that environmental cooperation is not merely a symbolic gesture. Rather, it plays a vital, substantive role in establishing sustainable post-conflict stability and durable resolution.
