In the 21st century, a global, often subtle and piecemeal retreat from the principle of universal suffrage has been taking place. This article examines the constitutional and legislative techniques through which (nominally) democratic states restrict or deprive certain citizens of the right to vote and/or stand for election. The main techniques include: expanding grounds for disenfranchisement (criminal convictions, especially corruption, terrorism, organized crime, and “moral” offenses); introducing competency-based voting or candidacy tests (knowledge of the constitution, language proficiency, “economic citizenship”); disqualifications linked to unpaid taxes or public debt; restrictions targeting dual citizens; group-based exclusions (e.g., residents of overseas territories, internal migrants, homeless persons); de facto disenfranchisement through increasingly burdensome water registration and identification procedures; new forms of political censorship and candidacy ban justified as “protection of democracy” (the so-called “militant democracy 2.0”). The author argues that, while the scale of these measures remains limited compared to the19th century property or gender-based suffrage restrictions, there is a clear return to the logic of “common-sense” limitation of democracy by political and judicial elites. This process is typically framed as “defending democracy against its enemies”, allowing regression to be legitimized and the language of progress and security justifies it. The article draws on a comparative analysis of legislative changes and case law in over 30 countries between 2000 and 2025, with particular attention to Europe, Latin America, the United States, India, and selected states of Africa and Southeast Asia. The selection of over 30 countries was made using a comparative case study methodology, prioritizing states that represent diverse legal traditions and varying degrees of democratic backsliding to illustrate the global reach of these restrictive techniques.
The regulation of digital platforms is undergoing a significant transformation. Traditional regulatory models relied primarily on intermediary liability rules and reactive enforcement mechanisms, focusing on the removal of unlawful content after notification. More recent legislative frameworks, however, increasingly adopt systems-based approaches that require platforms to identify and manage systemic risks generated within their communication environments. This article offers a comparative analysis of three influential regulatory models: the United States’ intermediary immunity regime, the European Union’s Digital Services Act, and Canada’s proposed Online Harms Act. While these frameworks differ significantly in structure and regulatory ambition, they collectively illustrate a broader shift in platform governance—from ex post liability toward proactive risk management and structured internal decision-making. The article argues that this transformation reshapes the institutional role of digital platforms. Rather than functioning solely as intermediaries responding to unlawful content, platforms are increasingly required to interpret regulatory standards, assess systemic risks, and implement mitigation measures within their own governance systems. As a result, regulatory scrutiny increasingly focuses not only on individual moderation decisions but also on the adequacy of the internal structures through which platforms observe, assess, and mitigate risks. Understanding this emerging regulatory architecture is therefore essential for evaluating accountability and the protection of fundamental rights in the evolving governance of digital communication systems.
This article examines the concept of militant democracy, a particular form of democratic order that actively defends itself against political actors and ideologies aiming to destroy democracy by using democratic institutions. The study focuses on the complex interrelationship between militant democracy and fundamental human rights and freedoms in the context of safeguarding the democratic order. Since militant democracy inherently involves the possibility of restricting certain rights to prevent antidemocratic actions, this article examines the normative justifiability of such limitations. The theoretical analysis traces the evolution of the concept of militant democracy through the works of key political and legal theorists, with special emphasis on Karl Loewenstein and Hans Kelsen. Alongside a conceptual approach, the authors analyse the application and acceptability of the instruments of militant democracy through the practice of competent judicial bodies. The findings reveal that there is no single position on the acceptability of militant democracy in legal theory whereas certain measures of militant democracy, especially the ban on political parties that advocate undemocratic goals, are recognized and accepted in legal practice as legitimate means for preserving democratic institutions.
Climate litigation is increasingly framed not only as an environmental issue, but as a struggle over human rights in a changing global political climate. At the same time, business and human rights frameworks in Europe—especially mandatory due diligence and sustainability reporting—are expanding and are often presented as tools to strengthen corporate accountability. This paper argues that, despite the expansion of legal and regulatory mechanisms, corporate actors continue to rely on ESG narratives as a form of corporate legitimization, while affected communities face structural barriers to accessing justice. Drawing on developments in Europe and the Global South, the paper highlights a persistent gap between corporate contribution to climate harm and legal accountability. It concludes that without stronger attention to power asymmetries and access to justice, climate litigation and Business and Human Rights (BHR) regulation may reinforce existing inequalities rather than deliver climate justice.
Resilience is commonly defined within scientific literature as the capacity to adapt successfully to stressors while preserving psychological and social continuity in the face of adversity. Yet before resilience can emerge, there must first be a situation of vulnerability and an “act of courage”: a deliberate decision to confront danger, uncertainty, or loss rather than withdraw. This paper argues that such “acts of ‘courage’” acquire juridical relevance within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly under Article 2, Article 8, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Adopting a qualitative methodology, the study examines how natural catastrophic events activate the intrinsic bond between individuals and their environment, placing them before the choice to remain, rebuild, or abandon their homeland. Through an analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the article contends that, although neither the Convention nor the Court explicitly refers to “courage” as an autonomous legal category, “act of courage” are implicitly protected insofar as they express free will and human dignity. By safeguarding life, private and family life, home, and property, the Court secures the material and relational conditions that allow individuals to determine their place of belonging and affirm their identity within a community. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates that courage constitutes the subjective manifestation of dignity, while resilience emerges as the collective outcome of such acts. The protection of fundamental rights in disaster contexts thus preserves not heroism, but the dignified capacity to remain and persist within one’s social fabric.
