
Context & Objective: The legal status of the property and spoils associated with Ahl al-Baġy (armed rebels against an Islamic Ruler) constitutes a critical subject in Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). The primary scriptural source, the Quran, dedicates only a single verse to the treatment of such groups, mandating mediation between warring factions of believers and authorizing armed conflict solely against the transgressing party until they submit to divine command. However, this foundational text provides no explicit guidelines regarding the mechanics of the conflict or the subsequent disposition of wartime spoils. Furthermore, the Prophetic tradition lacks direct precedent, as the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) engaged exclusively in conflicts against polytheists and disbelievers, whose property was subject to entirely different confiscation rules. Consequently, Islamic jurists formulate the legal framework for internal armed rebellion exclusively upon the established conduct and military precedent of Imam Ali (PBUH), who commanded the forces of the legitimate government during the internal conflicts of Jamal, Siffin, and Nahrawan. The purpose of this research is to comprehensively investigate the jurisprudential rulings governing the property of armed rebels and to determine the legality of appropriating their assets as wartime spoils. The primary research question examines the exact legal status of rebel property during and after conflict, analyzing the foundational principles of engagement derived from historical precedent to determine what distinct rulings govern the confiscation, preservation, or return of such wealth. Method & Approach: The investigation employs a historical method combined with an analytical approach to examine the legal frameworks established by classical Islamic scholars. The research relies strictly on the foundational jurisprudential sources and texts from both major Islamic legal schools, encompassing Shiite and Sunni traditions. To execute this comparative analysis, the study systematically reviews classical literature specifically categorized under chapters concerning the conduct of war and the localized chapters dedicated to armed rebellion in early jurisprudential treatises. Findings: There is a definitive consensus among the jurists of both schools regarding the absolute prohibition of seizing the personal property and spoils of armed rebels, though extensive divergence exists concerning specific applications and sub-rulings. All jurists derived their rulings from the precedent that treated rebels not as infidels, but as Muslims whose broader property rights remain protected. Confiscation is strictly limited to the weapons, armor, and mounts actively utilized within the military camp and battlefield. The appropriation of private property situated outside the military encampment, including residential assets and real estate, is unequivocally prohibited both during and after the cessation of hostilities. Assets left in the rebel camps, aside from active military equipment, cannot be distributed as spoils and are legally classified as inheritance that must be returned to the survivors of the deceased combatants. Furthermore, the enslavement of women and children or the sale of rebel captives is strictly forbidden by universal juristic consensus (Ijma'). Rulings differ based on the organizational structure of the rebel forces. For rebels possessing a backing force or base (Ḏī Fiʾah), confiscated military equipment is permanently retained as public spoils. Conversely, for rebel groups lacking a supporting base, seized weapons must ultimately be returned to the owners once the conflict concludes and the threat is neutralized. The forces of the legitimate Islamic government are explicitly prohibited from consuming the agricultural produce or destroying the property of the rebels without dire military necessity. If the government forces unlawfully destroy or consume rebel property outside the parameters of active combat, they are legally liable and mandated to pay compensation. If rebels repent and cease hostilities, their protected status is fully reaffirmed, provided they return any property they usurped from the government or citizens. Conclusion: The jurisprudential frameworks governing internal armed conflict mandate a profound degree of restraint and adherence to property rights, fundamentally distinguishing the treatment of armed rebels from that of foreign belligerents. Despite their armed insurrection against a legitimate Islamic ruler, the rebels retain their legal status as Muslims, ensuring their lives and assets remain legally inviolable outside the immediate theater of war. The stringent limitations placed on the confiscation of property, restricted solely to active military equipment within the battlefield, underscore a legal doctrine prioritizing the preservation of human dignity and financial restitution. The obligation to return non-military assets as inheritance to rebel families, coupled with the strict liability imposed on government forces for unwarranted property destruction, demonstrates a remarkable commitment to justice and equity. Ultimately, the legal implications confirm that the primary objective of engaging armed rebels is strictly reformative and defensive, aiming to restore civic obedience rather than to penalize dissenters through economic deprivation, expropriation, or enslavement.
Context & Objective: The intellectual property framework is traditionally conceptualized through an economic and technical lens, positioned as a market mechanism designed to rectify market failures and incentivize innovation. This utilitarian discourse neglects the profound distributive, cultural, and human consequences inherent in these regimes. As a legal institution regulating access to knowledge, health, and technology, intellectual property inherently influences equitable social ideals. The complexities of this influence have intensified amid the digital revolution, biotechnological advancements, and international legal demands, necessitating a reassessment of philosophical foundations. An exclusive economic focus has exacerbated structural inequalities, ranging from restricted access to essential medicines to the monopolization of indigenous knowledge. A central inquiry addresses whether social justice components are effectively institutionalized within the current architecture, or if the system itself acts as a structural impediment to equitable distribution. A theoretical framework is articulated for a balanced paradigm wherein the socio-economic interests of all groups—including asset holders, the public, and marginalized communities—are integrated fairly into the design and execution of these legal systems, moving beyond one-sided economic discourse toward equitable, capability-enhancing governance. Method & Approach: A qualitative and doctrinal analytical methodology is utilized to evaluate the intersection of intellectual property and equitable resource distribution. The theoretical framework is anchored in two prominent theories within the liberal philosophical tradition: John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, and Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice. This foundational analysis is integrated with capability-centric social justice paradigms to construct a comprehensive evaluative mechanism. By juxtaposing Rawls’s structural, goal-oriented perspective—which relies on the veil of ignorance and the difference principle—with Nozick’s strict adherence to absolute private property and a minimal state, the analytical boundaries of legitimate monopoly rights are delineated. Findings: Social justice considerations constitute an inherent element of the nature, normative legitimacy, and ultimate purpose of intellectual property, rather than merely existing as marginal constraints. A functional dependency exists between social justice and social utility; structural inequalities stemming from intellectual monopolies actively undermine long-term economic efficiency and normative legitimacy. Comparative theoretical analysis reveals that the Rawlsian framework, emphasizing the difference principle and equal opportunity, provides a robust justification for limiting intellectual property rights. Mechanisms such as reasonable protection terms, compulsory licensing, and fair use doctrines are validated as essential tools serving the public interest and disadvantaged populations. Conversely, the Nozickian approach, advocating absolute property rights, struggles to accommodate necessary regulatory limitations. An evaluative framework comprising three core criteria—equitable access, inclusivity, and human empowerment—emerges as necessary for reforming intellectual property architectures. Within the Iranian legal system, substantial deficiencies exist regarding these criteria. The current copyright framework features a narrowly defined scope for fair use, restricting it strictly to personal and non-commercial applications. Furthermore, judicial practice concerning compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical patents remains exceptionally limited, and the legal structure lacks mechanisms to protect indigenous knowledge against external appropriation. Conclusion: Resolving the conflict between the monopolization and dissemination of knowledge necessitates a critical re-reading of the philosophical and regulatory foundations of intellectual property through the lens of social justice. Intellectual property operates as a regulatory tool equipped with social obligations rather than an absolute private entitlement. To align the legal framework with equitable standards, specific structural reforms are imperative. The scope of fair use must be redefined by incorporating systematic standards, such as evaluating the commercial nature of the use, the significance of the portion utilized, and the impact on the original market. Transparent executive regulations must be established to facilitate compulsory licenses, prioritizing essential medicines. Implementing an equitable compensation system for the utilization of prior works is essential to maintain innovation incentives while facilitating public access. Adopting complementary policies, including tax incentives for preferential pricing and the integration of shared governance and open-access models, will mitigate existing structural inequalities. Transitioning to this holistic paradigm is an urgent necessity to ensure sustainable legitimacy and practical efficacy, transforming intellectual property into a responsible institution committed to collective human advancement.
Context & Objective: In recent decades, numerous legal systems have encountered the inflation of criminal law, defined as the exponential proliferation of statutes, expanded criminalization, and unprecedented growth in prison populations. This shift indicates that criminal law frequently functions as a mechanism of power to maintain social order and manage marginalized populations. The primary objective of this research is to trace the philosophical roots of this phenomenon within the epistemic and ethical frameworks of modernity. The central research question investigates whether the inflation of criminal law constitutes an unintended policy-making error, or if it represents an inevitable outcome of modern rationality. Specifically, the study explores how the two dominant currents of modern Western moral philosophy—retributivism, derived from Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism, rooted in Benthamite consequentialism—have practically facilitated the unbridled expansion of penal interventions. Method & Approach: The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology, utilizing a library and documentary approach for data collection. Disciplinarily situated within the philosophy of law, with a specific focus on the philosophy of punishment, the study adopts an interdisciplinary framework. It integrates concepts and empirical data from penal sociology and critical criminology to address the multifaceted nature of penal inflation. The level of analysis focuses on philosophical root-tracing rather than purely empirical sociology or abstract ethical theorization, striving to link philosophical argumentation with institutional and historical evidence. The analytical framework is structured across three layers: describing the concrete manifestations of penal inflation, reconstructing the intra-discursive arguments of retributivism and utilitarianism, and analyzing the relationship between these philosophical traditions and their institutional applications within the modern state. Findings: The inflation of criminal law materializes across three interconnected institutional levels: economic, racial, and technological. Economically, it manifests as a transition from a welfare state to a carceral state, where public resources are diverted from social support to penal infrastructure, effectively criminalizing poverty. Racially, the phenomenon reproduces structural discrimination, functioning as a continuous institutional bias from initial policing to sentencing, disproportionately impacting minority groups. Technologically, penal inflation transcends the physical boundaries of the prison through the pervasive expansion of digital surveillance, electronic monitoring, and predictive algorithms. Philosophically, these manifestations are rooted in the fundamental dichotomies of modern ethics. Kantian retributivism emphasizes the absolute duty and intrinsic necessity of punishment. When transposed into the modern state apparatus, the concept of autonomy is reduced to absolute penal responsibility, providing legitimacy for stringent penal enforcement in the name of respecting free will. Conversely, Benthamite utilitarianism, operating on the logic of maximizing collective utility and employing law as an instrument of social engineering, justifies the continuous expansion of preventative control mechanisms under the guise of efficiency. Conclusion: Criminal law inflation is not a transient legislative error, but rather the concrete manifestation of the internal paradox of modernity. This paradox is situated in the perpetual tension between freedom and control, autonomy and social engineering, and deontological duty and utilitarian consequentialism. The modern state simultaneously enacts punitive strictness in the name of individual freedom and expands pervasive surveillance networks in the name of collective security. Consequently, retributivism and utilitarianism function as a structural duality that mutually reinforces the expansion of the penal apparatus. A fundamental critique of penal inflation cannot be reduced to technical policy reforms; it necessitates a profound reexamination of the epistemic foundations of modern ethics and the institutional mechanisms of the contemporary state, requiring a redefinition of human freedom beyond the inherent crises of modern rationality.
Context & Objective: Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) acknowledges commitments made in favor of a fetus, recognizing a contingent capacity to enjoy civil rights. According to Article 957 of the Iranian Civil Code, this capacity becomes fully established upon the live birth of the child. While specific legal rights such as inheritance, testamentary disposition, and acknowledgment are explicitly granted to the fetus in the Iranian legal framework, legislators have remained notably silent regarding the legal status of Hiba (an inter vivos gratuitous gift) directed to an unborn child. This legislative silence extends to the civil codes of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Within the jurisprudential traditions, Imami jurisprudence lacks explicit rulings on this specific transaction, whereas the majority of Sunni jurisprudential schools, including the Shafi'i, Hanafi, and Hanbali traditions, have explicitly categorized it as an invalid contract due to the perceived absence of foundational validity conditions. The primary focus centers on resolving the doctrinal ambiguity surrounding this issue by addressing the fundamental legal question: Is the execution of Hiba to a fetus legally and jurisprudentially valid as a recognizable civil right? Method & Approach: The investigation utilizes a doctrinal legal method. The approach systematically examines the foundational concepts of the transaction and critically analyzes the jurisprudential arguments surrounding the purported invalidity of the contract. The analysis evaluates the legal mechanisms and evidentiary bases that support the legitimacy of the transaction, drawing upon comparative assessments of classical Islamic jurisprudential texts and the contemporary civil legislation of selected Islamic jurisdictions. Findings: The primary arguments advocating for the invalidity of the contract rest on four main jurisprudential objections. Opponents argue that the fetus lacks the capacity to execute qabūl (acceptance) and qabḍ (taking physical possession), which are considered essential elements of the transaction. Furthermore, the fetus is deemed fundamentally incapable of tamalluk (the capacity to acquire ownership) prior to birth. Critics also argue that the transaction inherently constitutes a suspended contract, conditional upon live birth, which violates the requirement for immediate certainty in standard contractual formulations. Finally, the unborn child is classified by some jurists as a legally non-existent entity. However, critical doctrinal analysis refutes these assertions. The requirement for acceptance and possession can be seamlessly fulfilled by the walī (legal guardian) acting as a legitimate substitute, directly mirroring the established legal mechanisms used for minors. The capacity for ownership is not absolutely precluded but is rather contingent and subject to a subsequent condition of live birth, identical to established mechanisms in inheritance. The objection regarding suspension is resolved by differentiating between the immediate decisiveness in the legal declaration and the valid suspension of the legal effect itself. Finally, the characterization of the fetus as non-existent is contradicted by its recognized wujūd ḥukmī (constructive or legal existence), which justifies its established rights to alimony and blood money. Conclusion: General evidentiary sources, including the Quran, Sunnah, jurisprudential consensus, and the established customary practice of rational individuals and religious communities, collectively affirm the widespread and historical legitimacy of gifting to an unborn child. By employing tanqīḥ-e manāṭ (the legal methodology of extracting and applying the underlying rationale of a ruling), the validity of a testamentary will in favor of a fetus can be directly extended to inter vivos gifts, as both operate on the shared foundation of gratuitous transfer. The contract in favor of a fetus is legally and jurisprudentially sound, provided the child is born alive. Among the surveyed jurisdictions, the Algerian Civil Code, explicitly in Article 209, unequivocally codifies the validity of this transaction.
Context & Objective: Following the movement of constitutional codification, legal systems frequently utilize diverse sources to design their constitutions, prominently drawing upon the constitutional experiences of other nations. The transfer of legal ideas from a foreign jurisdiction requires a definitive framework to ensure accurate execution, a phenomenon identified conceptually as constitutional borrowing. Proper execution of constitutional borrowing necessitates strict adherence to foundational prerequisites. While certain general principles govern this practice universally across all legal frameworks, jurisdictions sharing a unified structural basis—specifically a foundation rooted in religion—require specialized principles. Islamic countries represent a prominent example of systems sharing this religious foundation. Given the globalization of the Islamic religion as a civilizational competitor and the contemporary efforts of various nations to Islamize their legal systems, establishing these specialized rules is critical. Historically, one of the vulnerabilities of modern Islamic revolutions has been the uncritical adoption of non-Islamic models without rigorous evaluation. Consequently, Islamic nations must observe specific mandates when borrowing from either Islamic or non-Islamic foreign constitutions. The primary objective is to conceptualize this phenomenon accurately and address the core question: What are the imperatives of constitutional borrowing in Islamic countries? Method & Approach: A descriptive-analytical approach combined with a doctrinal methodology is utilized to address the central question. Library-based studies serve as the primary mechanism to systematically examine the concepts of constitutional borrowing and the defining characteristics of Islamic states, thereby establishing the precise normative framework governing the adoption of foreign constitutional elements in these jurisdictions. Findings: The realization of functional constitutional borrowing in Islamic countries is contingent upon the strict observance of 16 specific imperatives. A primary imperative is the preservation of the structural identity of the ummah (the unified global Muslim community), ensuring that borrowed elements do not undermine Islamic solidarity. Borrowing is exclusively permissible within the manṭaqat al-farāgh (the sphere of discretionary matters where Islamic jurisprudence permits human legislative choice), prohibiting the adoption of foreign rules where definitive Islamic mandates exist. The process requires a committee of religious experts and committed jurists operating under the supervision of Islamic scholars. Decision-makers must verify the authenticity of purportedly Islamic propositions to prevent the infiltration of alien ideologies. The framework expressly prohibits extreme imitation of secular models, mandating the pursuit of an independent socio-economic paradigm. Borrowing must not impede the globalization of Islam or facilitate foreign domination, aligning with the principle of nafī-e sabīl (the prohibition of non-Muslim authority over Muslims). Islamic states must avoid rigid adherence to existing colonial infrastructures. The centrality of Sharīʿat (Islamic law) must remain intact, and constitutional architects must reject the wholesale adoption of foreign structural totalities. Borrowed elements must be meticulously aligned with the muḥkamāt (the clear, foundational principles) of Islam. The foundational ideals of the political system must be generated internally, and drafters must actively engage in lexical innovation rather than relying on foreign terminology. Adopted elements must simultaneously secure both religious legitimacy and popular acceptability. Finally, mandatory indicators of an Islamic constitution—such as the recognition of Islam as the official religion, the requirement that the head of state be Muslim, and the designation of Islam as the supreme source of legislation—are fundamental identity markers entirely exempt from the borrowing mechanism. Conclusion: The realization of the normative goals of any political system relies heavily on the precise formulation of constitutional rules. Constitutional borrowing is not a mechanical imitation; rather, it constitutes an intentional mechanism that demands the active contextualization of foreign ideas. For a state to be genuinely classified as Islamic, it must fully base its political structure and governance on Islamic teachings rather than relying merely on demographic majorities. The application of the identified imperatives ensures that Islamic countries can benefit from accumulated human experience without compromising their ideological integrity. By adhering to these guidelines, states can prevent structural deviations, maintain the centrality of Islamic law, and actively facilitate the broader strategic objective of establishing a modern Islamic civilization.