
This article offers an attempt at conducting a comparative analysis of the philosophical systems of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich August von Hayek. They are the subject of my research interest due to both thinkers’ shared view of the limited cognitive capabilities of humans acting in and exploring the surrounding reality. This view assumes that acquiring complete knowledge about the external world and its phenomena is impossible. After analyzing both philosophers’ positions, it becomes clear that despite their shared recommendation to maintain cognitive restraint when making judgments about the world, their philosophical views diverge in many respects. Not only in terms of human cognitive attitudes but also in their ethical choices and the role they should play in relation to themselves and others. The subsequent part of the comparative analysis considers the philosophers’ views on freedom, reason, the rule of law, and morality.
In this article, I reconstruct and analyze Bogusław Wolniewicz’s views on the problem of voluntary death (i.e. suicide and its variant called voluntary euthanasia). I frame Wolniewicz's views within the broader historical discussion of voluntary death. A central part of the article examines Wolniewicz’s criticism of the so-called biolatry. In the last part of the article, Wolniewicz’s views (expressed essentially in the admissibility of voluntary death, although after meeting certain conditions) and his criticism of biolatry are placed in reference to some current challenges that appear in discussions on voluntary death.
The article presents the concept of separative criticism as the most primordial and fundamental form of philosophical criticality, one that conditions the possibility of all reflection. Separative criticism, understood as the capacity for making distinctions and establishing boundaries constitutes the archaic source of philosophical activity and precedes both anti-dogmatic and epistemological criticism. Drawing on the research of Dariusz Kubok, the authors demonstrate that this rudimentary cognitive function organises our relationship to the world through a fundamental “cut”—an act of separation that renders cognition itself possible. The concept is then applied to the analysis of key problems in the philosophy of science, including demarcation and the inception of scientific knowledge, as well as to the interpretation of contemporary process philosophies, among them Thomas Nail’s kinetic materialism. Separative criticism thus emerges not merely as a descriptive category, but above all as a metaphilosophical instrument enabling the reinterpretation of both classical and contemporary philosophical positions through the lens of the originary act of distinction-making and boundary-determination.
This text focuses on presenting three compelling interpretations of Nietzsche’s theory of eternal recurrence, proposed by Żelazny, Klossowski, and Deleuze. However, the article is not limited to presenting the individual theses of the aforementioned authors, but also attempts to critically evaluate them. First, I focus on analyzing the philological aspect of Żelazny’s concept, according to which the correct understanding of the theory in question should depend on the specific definition Nietzsche uses in the source text. I then move on to discuss the existential-psychological dimension of the theory of eternal recurrence as conceptualized by the Polish philosopher. The second issue raised in the text concerns the concept of identity through the lens of which Klossowski interprets the significance of Nietzsche’s theory. The article concludes with an attempt to understand Deleuze’s interpretation of eternal return as a selective idea.
The teaching of Rene Descartes was an inspiration for many philosophical positions, being a point of reference, a reason to continue the themes and methods taken up in it, or finally provoking opposition and being subject to negation. The last case is in relation to the position of the contemporary Spanish philosopher Maria Zambrano (1904–1991). In her work, Descartes plays the role of the author of a harmful phrase of an epochal nature. While in her writings it is easy to see elements of criticism of modern rationalism—coming from the French philosopher—they lack an analysis thanks to which this phrase can be better understood using the theory of the ‘Dream-Creator,’ to which Zambrano devotes one of his books. This article is a form of confrontation of Descartes’s attitude and his choices with the aforementioned Zambrano criterion, and is such an analysis. The article also attempts to point out that the ‘poetic reason’ proclaimed by Zambrano, which had the character of a methodological tool, could have already appeared in Descartes himself and been consciously rejected by him. Therefore, the criticism of the father of modernity, carried out by the Spanish philosopher, is not only negative, but finds its continuation in her work, constituting its basis.