The article analyzes Namibia’s prospects for participation in BRICS formats and seeks to identify the factors that constrain or, conversely, strengthen its chances of rapprochement with the grouping. The study proceeds from the assumption that the potential level of involvement of small African states in BRICS is determined by a combination of their economic scale, political and diplomatic compatibility, and proximity on key issues of the international agenda. The purpose of the study is to assess Namibia’s correspondence to the principal parameters of potential participation in BRICS. To this end, the article examines three dimensions: the relationship between Namibia’s economic indicators and those of BRICS members and partners; the degree of proximity between Windhoek’s foreign policy orientations and official rhetoric and the self-positioning of the grouping; and the extent to which Namibia’s voting patterns coincide with those of BRICS countries, Africa, Latin America, and the G7 in the United Nations General Assembly. Methodologically, the study relies on a comparative analysis of World Bank statistical data, official BRICS and Namibian documents, speeches by Namibian leaders, materials from international organizations, and UN voting records. The article demonstrates that, despite its limited economic and demographic scale, as well as the absence of a level of institutional engagement comparable to that of BRICS member states, the foreign policy principles and objectives enshrined in Namibia’s official policy documents are largely compatible with the core principles and agenda of BRICS. At the same time, the study identifies several areas of practical interest for Namibia’s cooperation with BRICS countries, including transport and logistics infrastructure, the uranium sector, oil and gas projects, and green hydrogen initiatives. The article concludes that such political and diplomatic compatibility, together with Namibia’s growing functional significance, creates additional opportunities for the country to expand cooperation with BRICS within a partnership format.
Nigeria’s paradox of poverty in the midst of plenteous mineral resources is as legendary as that of the African continent as a whole. The explanation does not lie in the once propagandised “resource curse” in the Western literature about Africa. This article demonstrates that the poverty is attributable mostly to the lack of domestic mineral beneficiation, leading to the entrenched loss of sovereignty (economic, technological, and intellectual), underdevelopment, and widespread insecurity for most Nigerians. Drawing insights from “Development Criminology,” a specialism in General Criminology, the article posits that for Nigeria, a resource-rich country, to rise from these predicaments, it must earnestly ramp up the beneficiation of its mineral resources. Critical for Nigeria is to address the deviances and criminalities in its resource-related political economy as they manifest in policy poverty, infrastructure deficiency, financial incapacity, and technological dependency. The fundamental solution resides largely in reorienting its regulatory responses to its subsoil use, leveraging local and continental synergies to address financing gaps, prioritising mineral beneficiation as a national security strategy, and fostering innovative contributions of the academia to induce technological self-reliance through specialized human capital development. The broader appeal of the article is in demonstrating that “mineral beneficiation is destiny,” not just for Nigeria but for Africa generally. Further, it invites more scholars to advance the “Development Criminology” specialism into a full-fledge theoretical framework for illuminating the nuanced intersection between mineral resources and critical political economy, with particular focus on sovereign domestic mineral beneficiation as a game changer.
This article examines the impact of internal wars and civil conflicts on the tourism and hospitality industries using the town of Lalibela, Ethiopia, as a case study. Based on literature review and factual data, this article provides a detailed analysis of the impact of internal wars on tourism and the hospitality industry globally, in Africa, and in Ethiopia and its regions. Lalibela is world-renowned for its rock-hewn churches that are UNESCO World Heritage Sites and a magnet for tourists and religious pilgrims from around the world. Tourism is the backbone of Lalibela’s economy, and its development is crucial to the town’s well-being. The crisis in the town’s tourism industry began with the 2020 pandemic and was further exacerbated by a series of internal civil wars in Ethiopia. To examine the impact of war on hotel revenues in Lalibela, panel data from eleven sample hotels in the town for the period of 2018–2023 were used. The research methodology includes descriptive and correlation analysis, as well as the construction of a fixed-effects model with cluster-robust standard errors. Econometric analysis demonstrates that the number of tourists and employees has a statistically significant positive impact on hotel revenue. During war, hotel revenues decline to a greater extent than just due to the reduction in tourist influx and forced staff layoffs. This may be due to lower room rates to attract tourists or a decrease in overnight stays during unrest. To revive Lalibela’s tourism sector, it is necessary to resolve the conflict through dialogue, strengthen security to increase tourist confidence, begin the restoration of cultural sites and the reconstruction of hotels, and seek support from international institutions.
This article examines changes in Uganda’s foreign policy over the past decade and the place of BRICS in the country’s current foreign policy. The article aims to identify the rationale behind the country's foreign policy behavior, the reasons for its growing interest in BRICS, and the economic and security priorities that the country intends to address through integration into this group. The authors consider that the cooling of Uganda’s relations with Western partners and the expansion of cooperation with non-Western states have increased the importance of BRICS for Kampala as a platform for foreign policy diversification and strengthening regional security. Particular attention is paid to the combination of traditional foreign policy guidelines with Uganda’s new areas of international activity. Uganda’s instruments of participation in BRICS are presented separately, identifying the institutions responsible for BRICS policy and significant events within the association with Ugandan participation. A key part of the article is the presentation of initiatives promoted by Uganda within BRICS, including proposals to create added value on the African continent and secure Uganda’s status as a “regional security hub,” and an analysis of these initiatives within the context of the country’s foreign policy priorities. The study’s novelty lies in its examination of BRICS's significance for Uganda from a combination of political, economic, and security perspectives, as well as its interpretation of the country’s participation in BRICS as a state strategy for strengthening regional agency.
The paper offers an analysis of Nigeria’s contemporary foreign policy and foreign economic strategy in the context of its accession to BRICS as a partner country. The authors proceed from the assumption that Nigerian elites tend to avoid making foreign policy decisions within a zerosum game logic, which would imply abandoning cooperation with the West in favor of alignment with the Global South, or vice versa. The central focus of the research is to determine which behavioral model—soft balancing or soft bandwagoning—better characterizes Nigeria’s current strategic orientation. Special attention is paid to Bola Tinubu’s foreign policy doctrine and economic reforms aimed at strengthening the state’s strategic autonomy by attracting investment and technology, enhancing national security, and reducing dependence on financial and humanitarian assistance. In this context, Nigeria views BRICS primarily as an instrument of economic development, diversification of international partnerships, and strengthening of its bargaining position in the international arena. This makes it possible to reduce the risks of unilateral dependence, while its partner status should not be interpreted as a direct political challenge to Nigeria’s traditional Western partners. In order to identify the distinctive features of Nigeria's foreign policy, the analysis covers and compares two areas of its cooperation with BRICS and Western countries: economic cooperation and elements of “soft power.” The latter are examined through the example of Nigerians’ migration preferences; the comparative attractiveness of different countries’ educational systems and opportunities for transition from education to employment; and the role of the diaspora and its remittances. The economic dimension is illustrated through an analysis of foreign trade statistics, in particular the problem of dependence on oil exports and petroleum product imports, debt structure, and investment inflows. The article concludes that partnership with BRICS enables Abuja to expand its room for maneuver in foreign policy while maintaining pragmatic ties with the West.
