
This contribution revisits Joseph Weizenbaum’s reflections on the limits of ELIZA, the first chatbot intended as a provocative probe into human-machine communication (1966, 1976), and my own critical analyses of the same problem (Suchman 1987, 2007). Based in an associated critique of the project of artificial intelligence, I argue that across significant shifts in technologies and techniques the differences that matter between humans (and other beings) and machines (of our making) persist (see Dreyfus 1992). These differences turn on the capacity for generative (in the old sense of that term) co-construction of mutual intelligibility in and through the contingencies of the open worlds that we inhabit together. Crucially, those capacities are irreducible to their translation into digital input, the sensorial prerequisite for computation. This reflection reiterates the incomputable capacities that human interaction presupposes and that escape incorporation into the computational sensorium. The point is not to diminish the capacities of computational systems, but rather to demystify their operations, acknowledge their limits, and foreground the human agencies and political economies that are responsible for their consequences.
Despite its futuristic premise, the debate surrounding the potential punishment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has achieved remarkable intellectual depth and complexity over the years. In this paper, I aim to taxonomize the competing views on “AI punishment” through the metaphor of a courtroom trial in which an AI system stands as the defendant. Drawing on a real-world example, I imagine a conversational AI system that allegedly drove a user to take his own life being “accused” of “incitement to suicide.” Into this setting enter the prosecution and the defense, embodying two opposing strands of the literature, both grappling with (a) the criminal capacity question (is AI the right sort of entity to punish?), (b) the criminal liability question (can AI systems fulfill the actus reus and mens rea doctrinal requirements of criminal liability?), and (c) the punishment question (even if conceptually feasible, is it desirable to punish AI systems?). The short—and dominant—answer is currently “no.” Yet the debate is worth examining because it compels the interested parties in the trial to reveal their implicit philosophical assumptions as to the overarching purpose of criminal law and its concept of the responsible “person.”
This commentary examines the gap between the political promises attached to the European Chips Act and what the resulting investments can realistically deliver. Since 2022, the Act has subsidized 18 semiconductor investments worth €36 billion, justified repeatedly in terms of supply security, resilience, technological sovereignty, and autonomy. Yet most support has gone to front-end manufacturing, while Europe remains highly dependent on non-European capabilities in back-end production, equipment, materials, and design. Drawing on the structure of semiconductor global production networks, the article argues that additional production capacity in Europe can strengthen industrial capabilities and Europe’s position in the global industry but cannot by itself create secure or autonomous European semiconductor supply chains. This does not imply that semiconductor subsidies are necessarily misguided; rather, they should be assessed against more realistic objectives. Recent policy debate has begun to place greater emphasis on “strategic indispensability,” but the Chips Act 2.0 proposal largely adds this concept to the existing vocabulary of sovereignty, resilience, dependency reduction, and security of supply instead of replacing it.
Moderating online content is essential to ensure that digital communication is safe and enjoyable. Although automation is necessary to manage the substantial volume of content on large digital platforms, human expertise is deemed indispensable in decision-making processes, as well as in the design, training, and implementation of automated solutions. The “human-in-the-loop” (Hilo) concept is a key approach to integrating humans into (semi-)automated decision-making systems. However, its definition and implementation vary considerably across academic disciplines. Furthermore, the factors influencing the quality of such hybrid decision-making processes are not sufficiently well understood. This integrative literature review builds on previous conceptual work and identifies 14 factors that influence meaningful human involvement in (semi-)automated decision-making in content moderation. The findings provide an empirically grounded basis for evaluating existing and planned Hilo implementations. They will also support the design of socio-technical systems in which humans improve automated decision-making and will inform discussions on effective Hilo requirements. To this end, the review offers actionable insights to help platforms and policymakers enhance human–machine collaboration and decision-making quality.
This article argues that the political effects of digitalization in peripheral societies emerge from the relationship between platform properties and the social structures that receive them. It develops this claim by recovering Cardoso and Faletto’s concept of situations of dependency, which treats dependency as a configuration in which a mode of insertion into the world economy is internalized as a specific arrangement of alliances and conflicts among domestic groups and social classes. The article’s theoretical contribution lies in specifying what mediates the global tendencies of digital capitalism, namely, the political and class structures through which these tendencies are processed and which determine the form they take in a given society. To strengthen this argument, the article examines two Brazilian cases in which the same tendency, the drive to lock users into proprietary ecosystems, assumes divergent forms: the deadlock of platform regulation, where corporate interests attach themselves to the veto structure of coalition presidentialism, and the repurposing of Instagram as a labor platform in a market where informality is a structural component.