Nimrod Muhumuza, Children’s rights and climate action: Assessing the suitability of South Africa’s domestic normative framework (Prawa dzieci a działania klimatyczne. Ocena adekwatności krajowych ram normatywnych Republiki Południowej Afryki), „African Human Rights Law Journal” 2026, vol. 26, no. 1, s. 1–33, https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/muhumuza-n
The article provides a critical analysis of the Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) concept as a mechanism for ensuring human oversight over artificial intelligence systems under European Union law. The study aims to assess whether the presence of humans in the decision-making process genuinely fulfils the requirement of real or meaningful oversight, or whether it remains merely formal in character, giving rise to the so-called illusion of control. The analysis is based on both doctrinal and functional methods, including an interpretation of the provisions of the AI Act and the GDPR, particularly with regard to the obligation to ensure human oversight and the right to human intervention in automated decision-making processes. The article argues that in many practical applications, HITL performs a largely symbolic function, often limited to the passive authorization of algorithmic decisions without any real capacity to question or modify them. This phenomenon is reinforced by factors such as automation bias, informational asymmetry, and the cognitive limitations of human operators. As a result, there is a significant risk of violations of individual rights, including the right to a fair procedure and the right to an effective remedy. The article goes on to examine the legal implications of superficial oversight, particularly in the context of civil and administrative liability, and proposes criteria for assessing the effectiveness of HITL as a mechanism compliant with EU legal standards. It concludes by emphasizing the need to clarify the standard of “meaningful human control” and to introduce more stringent requirements regarding the actual role of humans in high-risk AI systems.
The issue of freedom of assembly is among the most significant aspects of how any democratic state ruled by law functions. One specific type of assembly that exercise the freedom stipulated in Article 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is assemblies organized on university premises. These constitute an important tool for communicating positions and opinions, primarily by members of the academic community. However, due to the distinctive conditions under which higher education institutions operate, including the principle of university autonomy, the legislator decided to adopt special solutions regarding the organization of assemblies on university premises in the Law on Higher Education and Science, which constitutes a lex specialis to the Law on Assemblies. The aim of this article is to analyse the rules for organizing assemblies on university premises, including determining the extent to which the legislator has provided for specific exceptions in the organization of such assemblies compared to the rules set out in the Law on Assemblies. In particular, the discussion will take into account the constitutional principle of university autonomy, including the position of the rector and their specific duties regarding the maintenance of order and safety on university grounds. The analysis presents the statutory framework for organizing assemblies at higher education institutions, as well as the permissible discretion of university authorities in establishing internal regulations to further clarify this procedure. For the purposes of this study, the formal-legal method was used to examine the content, scope, and relationships between the applicable norms, alongside an analysis of the relevant literature and case law.
