The article discusses the ideologically conflicting coexistence of the principles of “amateurismˮ and “professionalismˮ in Soviet sports. It shows that modern sports, which originated in the European aristocratic environment as amateur sports, almost immediately acquired its antipode in terms of inevitably commercialized professional sports. However, the processes of industrialization, urbanization and the emergence of a significant proportion of the middle class in Europe at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries gave rise to the phenomenon of mass amateur sports. In pre-revolutionary Russia, the modern sports developed in a similar way: from aristocratic to mass, with the competitive coexistence of amateur and professional sports. After the 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks considered the existence of professional sports in the state of proletarian dictatorship unacceptable, regarding it unproductive and useless for society. Moreover, the Bolsheviks even initially reconsidered the idea of competition in sports, seeing in it a bourgeois manifestation of inequality, which contradicted, in their opinion, the revolutionary slogans on the equality of working people. Everyone participates, but no one wins – these were their early ideas about mass proletarian amateur sports. It was only in the mid-1930s that they abandoned such a vulgar interpretation of equality in the USSR, declaring it a “petit bourgeois deviation.ˮ The egalitarianism was replaced by the “shock-working” movement, and record breaking athletes began to be considered as a kind of shock workers in sports. This created another huge problem – the inability of athletes to show worthy results without releasing them from their job at production site. The pursuance of records increasingly demanded the professionalization of Soviet athletes, in other words, their transfer from the status of amateurs to the rank of professionals with appropriate fi nancial support and monetary remuneration. But this clearly contradicted the ideological principles of the ruling Bolshevik regime. Based on memoirs and testimonies of those times, the article shows how the Soviet sports system found a solution to this problem. It consisted in the widespread practice of fictitious employment of athletes at enterprises where they received salaries while devoting all their working hours to sporting activities. As a result, an unspoken agreement developed between the authorities and professional athletes: they continued to publicly refer to the Soviet sports of setting records as “amateur sports”, while subtly keeping silent about its professional nature and the amounts of remuneration for athletes. The system of fictitious “amateurism” in the Soviet sports, which developed in the 1930s, lasted for many decades, almost until the end of the 1980s. The article concludes that the Bolshevik idea of creating a new proletarian sport based on amateurism turned out to be another social utopia. The pursuance of records inevitably required the professionalization of sports, and the Soviet government was unable to stop this trend, but it could skillfully imitate fictitious sports “amateurism”, when real professionals, including outstanding athletes, by unspoken agreement with the authorities, set up for “amateurs”.
The multidimensionality, dynamism, and interconnectedness of the socio-political processes of our time encourage us to take into account the specifics of participation in them and the real contribution of government and non-governmental institutions. The article is focused on the study of program guidelines and project activities of public associations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in the patriotic plane. The deepening of integration cooperation within the Union State under the influence of a combination of challenges and threats stimulates interest in the specifics of their involvement in the formation and promotion of the national and Union patriotic agenda. In internal and integration dimensions, they can contribute to the convergence of “state” and “grassroots” patriotism, increase socio-political support for integration and the idea of a “common Homeland”. The purpose and objectives of the study were achieved based on the methods of case study, document study, comparison, and analysis of event data. The focus groups for the study have been identified, primarily the All-Russian National Front and the Republican Public Association “Belaya Rus”. The aspects of the creation and functioning of a number of other patriotic public associations that are fundamentally important from the perspective of the problem posed are analyzed. The coincidence of many plots of the patriotic agenda they broadcast has been revealed. The emphasis is on an active and broad-based interpretation of patriotism. Projects have been formulated to preserve and strengthen historical memory and truth. Other projects also involve the presence of a patriotic component in sports, economic, tourism and other areas. The materials of the official websites of the reviewed associations are representative, but the justification and information support for cooperation seem insufficient. The changes in the institutional design of the patriotic forces of Russia and Belarus at the current stage are shown. Various communications are being built in the Union State, primarily involving youth, children’s and youth associations. The practice of concluding agreements, developing and implementing joint projects is becoming widespread. However, as in other vectors of bilateral integration, additional union-level measures are required here.
One of the directions of international research is the study of the causes of military victory. There are several approaches in the scientific literature that explain the success of States in military conflicts. The author examines in detail the material and nonmaterial determinants of victory in interstate wars. It is shown that the democratic regime was defined as one of the main factors determining victory in an armed conflict. Much attention is paid to the review of studies revealing the institutional characteristics that contribute to democratic victory. The author notes that the academic literature is dominated by the view that the victory of democracies is ensured by the participation of larger and more powerful coalitions. The purpose of this study is to determine the role of allies in the victory of democratic countries in military conflicts. To achieve this goal, the author uses the method of qualitative comparative analysis for data analysis. The sources of information for the study were data from the projects “Correlates of War”, “Polity IV” and the World Bank. This study has not empirically confirmed the prevailing view in the scientific literature that the success of democratic states in inter-State conflicts depends on the presence of military allies. It has been found that military coalitions cannot guarantee the victory of democratic countries, they can help, but they are not the only and sufficient success factor. It is shown that the victory of democracies in a military conflict is primarily determined by their higher level of military power and economic development. The practical significance of the research results lies in the understanding that military coalitions are not a guarantor of the victory of democracies in war.
The relevance of the study is due to the fact that in recent years, migration has acquired particular relevance in the national, regional and international political agenda. South America is the largest Latin American subregion, receiving large fl ows of migrants. The intensification of migration fl ows encourages South American states to search for effective mechanisms for managing migration processes. The article analyzes political and legislative innovations in migration management in South American countries in the context of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The author examines the main principles of the compact and their connection with the traditions of the subregion’s migration policy. It is shown that a simplified mobility and residence regime for intraregional migrants was created in South America, however, the national specifics of the political and legal regulation of mass migration fl ows may differ. The analysis of the evolution of migration policies of South American countries is conducted based on a review of legislation and a political analysis of institutional measures adopted by Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. The main migration management strategies, as well as the instruments and mechanisms used in the context of the mass exodus of Venezuelan migrants, are studied. The article provides a description of the factors influencing the formation of the migration policy of the countries in the subregion. It is noted that the approach combining state control and human rights protection is the main characteristic of migration management in South America. As a result of the study, it is concluded that the South American migration regime combines, on the one hand, the policy of control and protection of national security, and on the other hand, freedom of movement and protection of human rights.
This article explores the concept of impression management, defined as a system of manipulative technologies which aims at shaping public opinion through creation and dissemination of images that represent an artificial reality or post-reality. These images exert a powerful emotional influence on the public consciousness, compelling individuals to accept their authenticity. The author emphasizes that an integral element of impression management is the discourse of post-truth, which relies on the sensory experiences of mass consciousness, and employs various emotional impact technologies. The article further investigates the connections between the discourse of impression management and the discourses of post-journalism and post-history. It highlights the primary sociocommunicative functions associated with organizing and conducting mass political performances, which facilitates identifying a number of structural components within this discourse. The main objective of this study is to examine these structural components through a discourse analysis of the opening ceremony of the 2024 Olympic Games. The focus is on particularly striking episodes of this event that elicited mixed public reactions regarding their imaginative concepts and underlying values. The author notes that the organizers promotion of gender diversity values led to public controversies during women's boxing matches. Utilizing structural discourse analysis, this article identifies key components of impression management and their key communicative functions. In conclusion, the author expresses hope for transformative global values in contemporary politics, anticipating discourses surrounding the multipolar world will emerge as a dominant international discourse.
The research examines the practices of modern social ostracism as a method of political confrontation, focusing on the ethical and axiological dimensions in contemporary politics. The study primarily analyzes the roles of leaders from ruling parties and influential opposition figures as key actors in cancel culture. The materials for the article include speeches by politicians, articles, and a number communications from official channels related to canceling Russian culture in Poland and Germany. The selection of these countries is informed by their distinct historical interaction with Russia and their established assessments of the past, providing a basis for exploring the cultural and historical factors that influence cancellation practices. The analysis, grounded in a theoretical framework, leads to several important conclusions. 1. The goals and motivations of various actors differ significantly, making it inaccurate to refer to a monolithic “collective West” intent on canceling Russia. 2. In case of canceling large communities, the value factor is never predominant; while most German parties share the value discourse typical of cancellation actors, calls to cancel Russian culture remain silent in the German parliament. However, Law and Justice, which is a Polish right-wing conservative party, calls for that. 3. Canceling large communities often fosters consolidation within the “cancelled” group, reinforcing an “us versus them” mentality. 4. While complete cancellation of an entire community is unfeasible, calls for canceling Russian culture can restrict the influence of Russia on global culture. 5. Despite the ethical rhetoric employed, calls for cancellation often serve to address different pragmatic concerns of the involved actors, representing a form of fragmented censorship and a reaction to the current political agendas.
The article presents the fi ndings of research conducted on the mental landscape of the North Caucasian Federal District. Utilizing innovative methods to analyze social and political processes, the authors applied a mediageographical approach to explore sociopolitical realities. The analysis was grounded in big data, comprising statistical indicators that refl ect the Internet audience’s interest across Russian regions in the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict, as well as rating data that characterizes regional identities within the Russian Federation. The study employed media geography methods in political science to analyze the quantitative aspects of Internet behavior among residents of different geographical areas, addressing tasks crucial for government and political practice. The authors developed digital profi les of Russian regions that illustrate the anisotropy of the mental landscapes of the Russian Federation, with a particular focus on the republics of the North Caucasus, such as Dagestan and Chechnya, among others. A strong correlation has been discovered between macroeconomic factors, regional economic disparities, and the civilizational constants infl uencing self-identifi cation. Analysis and comparison of empirical data obtained from Google and Yandex suggest that, on a national scale, the interest in Israel and Palestine is relatively balanced across federal districts, with the notable exception of the North Caucasian Federal District. This deviation is attributed to ethno-confessional factors. Furthermore, a relative popularity of certain Telegram channels among Internet users from the North Caucasus – especially those operated by Western foreign policy propaganda and information warfare centers – highlights a substantial breach of information security in the region at the time of the escalating confl ict. This anisotropy in the mental landscapes of the North Caucasus reveals the underlying causes of the ethnopolitical crisis, offering practical recommendations for preventing similar crises in the future.
The article analyzes the doctrinal discourse of the Turkish political elite. The absence of Turkey’s doctrinal documents in the public domain highlights the relevance to study the works of leading Turkish politicians, where they express their thoughts and perspectives regarding the country’s role in the international relations system, as well as its tasks and opportunities. Ahmet Davutoglu’s work represents the fi rst attempt to conceptualize the country’s foreign policy thought; he was the one to introduced an idea that laid the foundation for the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and outlined its main directions. The perspectives of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fahrettin Altun indicate that within the framework of doctrinal discourse, Turkish politicians are shifting from a regional focus to a global one. For them, Turkey emerges as a key state on the international stage, tasked with participating in the formation of a new world order. Despite diverging from several Davutoglu’s ideas – such as the prioritization of humanitarian policy and soft power, the works of Erdogan and Altun complement the overall picture of the current foreign policy doctrine of the Turkish Republic, adding a more global dimension to Turkish political thought. At the discourse level, Ankara’s global ambitions are justifi ed through the lens of justice, positioning Turkey as a certain “stabilizing power”. In conclusion, the article discusses that, within the framework of the post-imperial syndrome characteristic of modern Turkey, foreign policy is becoming increasingly ambitious, with its implementation tools becoming more assertive.
The article examines the correspondence between representations of urban leisure in Soviet feature fi lms of the 1920s-1930s and state cultural policy. Twenty-one fi lms depicting modern urban life in the USSR were analyzed. The analysis focused on episodes unfolding in three key loci: the home, catering establishments, and clubs/houses of culture. The positioning of these loci within the framework of state cultural policy was reconstructed. In the 1920s, government rhetoric portrayed home leisure and public catering establishments in a predominantly negative light, while clubs were seen as instrumental in molding the Soviet individual. in the 1930s, a “conservative shift” in cultural policy led to a change in the expectations placed upon leisure activities. Home leisure was described in its positive manifestations, leisure in houses of culture and clubs shed their ideological function, becoming exclusively recreational, and an ambivalent attitude towards catering establishments emerged. The article analyzes the main leisure practices captured in fi lms, including individual home leisure, home parties, lectures, amateur performances, publishing wall newspapers, holidays in clubs and cultural centers, and meetings in cafes, restaurants or pubs. The representation of these practices generally aligns with to the identified dominants of state cultural policy. The exceptions are the depiction of clubs in the cinema of the 1920s and catering in the cinema of the 1930s, which partly depart from the images of these places constructed in cultural policy. Overall, the logic of the leisure representation can be described as follows: in the 1920s, there is a variety of screen images of free time, expressed both quantitatively and stylistically; in the 1930s, a few similar normative patterns crystallized.
The trend of uneven social and economic development persists not only at the global level – the gap between the rich North and the poor South is noticeable in many regions of the world, including Europe. Of course, a similar disparity reduces the investment attractiveness of the less developed countries and their individual territories and, as a result, limits their economic development. However, there are external partner states that are ready to provide support. One of these accelerators is the People's Republic of China. The purpose of this article is to show the impact of the participation of European countries in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the development of their regions. The research is based on the concept of transregionalism and a systematic approach. The structural and functional analysis allowed to consider the features of the relationship between the participants in the process. Analysis of the informative materials and other resources devoted to infrastructure projects in European regions, implemented with the support of the People's Republic of China and the Belt and Road Initiative, was carried out. By methods of generalization, comparative and comparative analysis, the results of the participation of regions in the BRI are revealed, positive and negative effects of interaction at the regional level are shown. The results of the analysis of cooperation between the regions of Greece, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, North Macedonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy with Chinese investors are presented. The key infrastructure projects implemented in the regions of fifteen European countries within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative are shown. The most attractive territories and industries for investment have been identified. The conclusions drawn from the results of the study may be useful for further analysis of transregional relations between Europe and Asia, in particular, within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.
The primary objectives of this article are to demonstrate that strengthening of the strategic partnership between Russia and China in the fi eld of education serves as a crucial instrument for enhancing the soft power of intergovernmental organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the SCO) and the BRICS alliance (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This study formulates key tasks that need to be addressed in the near future; it examines basic theoretical approaches to studying soft power in Russian-Chinese educational cooperation, and framework documents from the SCO and BRICS covering both issues of education and intergovernmental relations. In addition to that, the study further investigates the activities related to academic exchanges, educational integration, and inter-university programs, implemented within strategic educational projects of both the SCO and BRICS; it carries out an analysis of a new university ranking initiated by BRICS, which is based on the “Mission of the Three Universities” project. The main tasks identifi ed for strengthening the strategic partnership in the educational sphere between the SCO and BRICS members include: 1) the continuation of theoretical research aimed at developing a concept for enhancing the educational soft power of the SCO and BRICS member countries; 2) given the emergence of a new geopolitical landscape marked by intensifi ed competition between “the collective West” and those advocating for a multipolar world, special attention should be given to developing alternative soft power rating models for the SCO and BRICS states; and 3) one of the primary strategic directions for coordinating the SCO and BRICS activities should be the establishment of a unifi ed informational and digital system for both alliances. The methodologies employed in this research include a comparative approach, axiological approach, content analysis, classifi cation and ranking methods, and forecasting methods.
This article is devoted to the study of the causes of the strengthening of patrimonial and neopatrimonial trends in the modern world. The author focuses on the content of M. Weber’s concept of patrimonialism and the possibilities of its modern interpretations. The article examines the features of various forms of patrimonialism and the mechanisms of “routine charisma” that contribute to the emergence of modern neopatrimonial regimes. The author analyzes various definitions of the concept of “neopatrimonialism” and classifications of neopatrimonial systems developed by modern scientists. Special attention is paid to the differences between “regulated” and “predatory” forms of neopatrimonialism, as well as the concept of “developmental neopatrimonialism”. The author proves that the modern patrimonial “wave” is caused, fi rst of all, by the global crisis of the capitalist system and the unprecedented growth of socio-economic inequality. It was the awareness of these problems that led to the growth of political traditionalism and increased support for charismatic leaders embodying this global trend. In this regard, many authors note the growth of “authoritarian populism” even in countries with developed liberal democratic systems, including the United States, Great Britain, Israel and others. However, to describe these processes, the opposition “authoritarianism-democracy” must be supplemented by the Weber dilemma “traditional – rational”. This approach, in our opinion, is the most appropriate for understanding the causes and direction of the ongoing political transformations. A striking example of the effective application of neopatrimonial practices is modern Russia, whose experience is actively used today by other countries in solving complex problems of state and national construction.
In recent years, many countries have experienced alterations in the level of institutional trust, signifi cantly infl uenced by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has strengthened state control over society; on the other, it has aggravated the problems faced by governmental institutions. There is a noticeable trend toward a decline in trust in the government and its agencies, leading to social tension and impacting a stability of both the government and society. This instability may manifest in the form of increased social contradictions, a rise in protests and demonstrations, and in deterioration of social security, among other issues. A particular group whose trust necessitates special attention is the youth. As the most fl exible social and age group, they play a crucial role in determining the future trajectory of the state and have the potential to alter the course of historical events through their radical actions. These issues have also emerged in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was the fi rst to confront the challenges of the pandemic, thereby intensifying problems existing within the functioning of the Chinese regime. The restrictions imposed during the fi ght against COVID-19 and the costs associated with post-pandemic economic recovery have been shaped by the unique characteristics of China’s political system and political culture. Primarily these challenges affected the most vulnerable social group – youth – resulting in a shift of their trust level towards governmental authorities. The analysis reveals the negative dynamics of youth trust in China towards the state, and identifi es the main factors contributing to this process: lack of media transparency, abuse of power by offi cials, limited channels for expressing public opinion, and an increase in the urban population. The author argues that the Chinese government has implemented retaliatory measures that have proven insuffi cient to alleviate rising tensions. Under these circumstances, the issue of youth trust towards Chinese governmental bodies, as an critical factor in the functioning of a stable society, may become one of the destabilizing elements of the Chinese political system.
The article presents the fi ndings of an etude sociological survey, conducted using semi-structured interviews focused on perceptions and memories of Soviet sports. The informants were residents of a Russian megacity aged between 24 and 75 years. The interviews were held without prior preparation, allowing respondents to demonstrate what is referred to as “spontaneous memory” of Soviet sports. The study revealed a signifi cant “generation gap” between the provisionally named “Soviet generation” (those born before 1980) and younger respondents – the “post-Soviet generation” – in their perceptions of the role and social signifi cance of sports in the USSR. For the former, Soviet sports primarily evoke nostalgic memories of its mass popularity and accessibility for ordinary people, as well as being almost the only form of organized collective leisure activity. In contrast, the latter view Soviet sports mainly as a calculated state policy aimed at cultivating strong, disciplined individuals capable of physical labor and military service, as well as demonstrating the advantages of the socialist system through sports. The article emphasizes that sports are metaphysically connected to war, serving as sublimation of conflict in peacetime. Therefore, it is not surprising, that in recent years, the Russian government’s efforts to shape national identity based on a militarypatriotic narrative have encompassed sports themes, which is particularly evident in the emergence of a sports historical film industry. However, the survey results indicate that the collective memory of Soviet sports has a rather weak potential for establishing a military-patriotic narrative of national identity among current and future generations of Russians.
In recent years we have been experiencing a pressing need for a comprehensive reevaluation of the USSR legacy and a reassessment of the role that Soviet practices and value systems play in the realm of offi cial historical policy. The article has been designed to present an analytical review of the collective monograph titled “Mediatized Model of Soviet Society in the Magazines ‘Pioneer’ and ‘Koster’ (1970–1980s)”, prepared under the guidance of Tatyana V. Dubrovskaya, Doctor of Sciences (Philology), Professor. The authors of this monograph explore the multifaceted nature of the Soviet society model, focusing on the socio-cultural specifi cs, as well as political and legal aspects of the media landscape in the USSR. By examining the magazines Pioneer and Kostyor, the researchers identify and analyze the features of mediatization in both internal and foreign policy during the late Soviet period. They also defi ne the discursive strategies, linguistic tools, axiological foundations and moral guidelines used to construct and represent the model of Soviet society within the context of children’s media. Particular attention is given to the discursive tactics and linguistic means employed to actualize and disseminate the offi cial policy regarding the memory of the Great Patriotic War within these children’s periodicals. The analysis reveals that Pioneer and Koster can be regarded as mnemonic actors that shaped and implemented the offi cial discourse surrounding the memory of the Great Patriotic War, specifi cally adapted for a young audience. In conclusion, the Soviet children’s press of that time served not only as an informational and educational resource, but also contributed to formulating the conceptual fi eld of Soviet identity, as well strengthening the historical and cultural sovereignty of the USSR.
The article examines postcolonial discourses within the historical policies of the post-Soviet countries, with a particular focus on the domestic policy of Russia. The primary vehicle for conveying these postcolonial discourses is educational literature, which serves as a “privileged narrative” shaped by state historical policy, alongside public discussions and commemorative practices. The study emphasizes historical events that are instrumental in constructing national identities. The theoretical framework is grounded in the concept of postcolonial nationalism, which posits that nations are constructed through a confrontation with the empire as a hostile “other”. In nearly all post-Soviet countries, national histories highlight the colonial oppression experienced under the Russian Empire, positioning this imperial period as a foundational model for the development of postcolonial discourses. In its completed form, postcolonial nationalism weaves together the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation into a continuous narrative of “colonial oppression”. The article analyzes case studies from Ukraine, Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) and Russian regions with distinct national specifics (the North Caucasus and the Volga region). Ukraine serves as a compelling case study that exemplifies a comprehensive trajectory, evolving from the dominance of postcolonial historical narratives in educational literature to the formation of an anti-Russian identity. In Central Asian states, a predominantly negative perception of the Russian Empire and the USSR prevails, although certain aspects of the “colonial period”, particularly Soviet modernization practices, may be viewed positively, depending on the relationship of a particular country with Russia. In the North Caucasus and Volga regions, postcolonial discourses are largely marginalized in the public sphere. They exist in a latent form instead, manifesting in conflicts related to memorial practices and regional interpretations of collective memory.
This article aims to conduct a comparative analysis of critical representations of Russia in the political discourse of parliamentary parties in Germany and Poland from 2014 to 2024. Through an examination of a diverse array of sources – including programmatic documents from Polish and German parties, parliamentary reports, and comments from party activists on the websites and in the media – three levels of critical images of Russia were identified: critical remarks, sanctions rhetoric, and elements of cancel culture. Employing the methodology of critical discourse analysis as proposed by Siegfried Jäger, the article analyses the discursive strategies used to criticize Russia at each level, alongside their evolution in relation to significant events in 2014 and 2022. Using Pierre Bourdieu's methodology, the study concludes that images of Russia are fragmented; distinct representations of Russia as a symbolic Other – encompassing economic, political, and cultural dimensions – are shaped by current trends in symbolic politics and the dynamics within the political fi eld. The research reveals that following the emergence of the Crimean crisis in 2014, the images of Russia acquired a distinctly critical tone, furthermore they became prominent within the discursive surrounding sanctions. The outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2022 shifted this trend, leading to a temporary alignment among German and Polish political parties regarding both domestic and foreign policy of Russia. In Germany, this alignment was refl ected in a notable similarity in the critical narratives across all parties represented in the Bundestag, blurring the lines between critical statements and sanctions rhetoric. For Poland’s Law and Justice party, which is particularly critical of Russia, this alignment manifested through elements of cancel culture within its anti-Russian discourse. The article also examines how European political elites often equate Russian politics with the fi gure of the Russian president, and how they position the conflict in Ukraine as a milestone in the Europe’s historical struggle against authoritarianism and dictatorship.
The research evaluates monitoring of human rights in Russia and globally, analyzing its future prospects for the development of the Russian legal system. It examines the theoretical foundations of human rights monitoring, including definitions and types of legal monitoring. The author defi nes monitoring of human rights as a comprehensive, systematic activity conducted by authorized entities to assess the human rights situation in a specific territory through the collection and processing of information using a clearly defined methodology. The present article addresses the challenges of developing effective methods for monitoring human rights based on existing practices, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches. It also examines the issue of information support for human rights monitoring. The author concludes that it is crucial to develop mechanisms for monitoring human rights at the level of intergovernmental organizations in the post-Soviet space. Additionally several directions for improving the Russian legal system regarding human rights monitoring are proposed: 1) institutionalizing human rights monitoring as a function of government bodies at the legislative level; 2) developing differentiated methods for monitoring based on types, functionality, and goals; 3) providing state support in various forms for studies conducted by non-governmental organizations; 4) enhancing collaboration between public authorities and NGOs in the implementation of human rights monitoring; 5) creating an information system to process and store data related to human rights monitoring in Russia.
The article examines the functions of anti-colonial rhetoric in contemporary discourse of the Russian President. It explores the conceptual foundations of the anti-colonial narrative and establishes logical connections between its key concepts based on the qualitative content analysis of texts sourced from the official website of the President of the Russian Federation (kremlin.ru). The study covers the chronological period from the onset of the Special Military Operation (February 24, 2022) to the date of November 1, 2024. The analysis reveals the structure of the anti-colonial narrative through four binary oppositions, such as “past vs future”, “westernization vs sovereignty”, “minority vs majority”, and “hierarchy vs equality”. The narrative integrates various elements from Soviet anti-colonial discourse with post-Soviet concepts such as “sovereignty”, “multipolarity”, and “civilizational identity”. Unlike “political postcolonialism” discourses prevalent in many post-Soviet countries, the Russian narrative asserts that the country has never been subjected to colonial policies. The central message emphasizes that Russia is not a victim; rather it highlights Russia’s dissatisfaction with the double standards employed by the beneficiaries of the contemporary world order and her position within the hierarchical international system they have established. Centered on cultural themes, the Russian anti-colonial narrative primarily addresses opponents through moral criticism, without claiming to revise the international legal foundations of the existing world order. The functions of anti-colonial rhetoric in the Russian presidential discourse can be categorized into three main areas: fi rst, this rhetoric aims to cultivate an appealing image of Russia among elites in various countries of the Global South; second, it seeks to reshape Russia’s macropolitical identity in response to its confrontation with the West; and third, it aims to undermine opponents, who have experienced colonial domination in their history and continue to struggle with unresolved conflicts related to this legacy.
