
This article analyzes dissenting opinions in Constitutional Court Decisions Number 1/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024 and Number 2/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024 from the perspective of judicial heroism. It examines the extent to which the opinions of Saldi Isra, Enny Nurbaningsih, and Arief Hidayat contain elements of judicial courage in protecting electoral integrity and constitutional democracy. This normative legal research uses conceptual, statutory, and case approaches. The findings identify elements of judicial heroism in linking the legitimacy of electoral results to democratic process integrity and protecting free and fair elections. However, the arguments face doctrinal limitations concerning causal links between violations and results, standards of proof, proportionality of remedies, and the potential expansion of the Court’s authority. The dissenting opinions in the 2024 presidential election dispute are therefore better understood as judicial arguments containing elements of judicial heroism rather than absolute forms of judicial heroism.
Although the Constitutional Court decision is final and binding, the Court has revised its constitutional interpretation in several judicial reviews of the Election Law, including Decision 116/PUU-XXI/2023 on the parliamentary threshold. In previous rulings, the Court treated the 4% threshold as an open legal policy, but in the latest, the 4% threshold applies only to the 2024 Election and is conditionally constitutional for future elections. This study examines why the Court reached this ruling and its implications for electoral reform. Drawing on electoral reform theory, doctrinal and normative analysis of Court decisions (2007-2023) and empirical indicators (the Pedersen Index, the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties, and party vote data (2004–2024)), the study finds that judicial restraint creates uncertainty in electoral reform. The threshold setting likely reflects the interplay between the Court’s rationality of representation and political party bargaining interests. This study contributes to understanding conditional constitutionality as a strategic constitutional mechanism and to interbranch dynamics that shape electoral reform.
Pelaksanaan kewenangan quasi-peradilan oleh Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Bawaslu) berpotensi menimbulkan problematika konstitusional karena Pasal 117 Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2017 tentang Pemilihan Umum (UU Pemilu) belum mengatur kualifikasi hukum bagi anggota yang menjalankan fungsi adjudikatif. Artikel ini bertujuan menganalisis ketidaksesuaian antara desain rekrutmen dan karakter kewenangan adjudikatif Bawaslu serta merumuskan norma kualifikasi hukum untuk memperkuat legitimasi kewenangan quasi-peradilan. Riset ini menggunakan metode yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan peraturan perundang-undangan, konseptual, dan komparatif terbatas. Hasil riset menunjukkan bahwa absennya standar kapasitas yuridis berpotensi memengaruhi konsistensi putusan, kepastian hukum, dan legitimasi penyelesaian sengketa pemilu. Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi, termasuk Putusan Nomor 104/PUU-XXIII/2025, memperkuat kedudukan adjudikatif Bawaslu sehingga memerlukan profesionalitas hukum yang memadai. Artikel ini mengusulkan penambahan norma kualifikasi hukum dalam Pasal 117 UU Pemilu secara aditif tanpa mengubah struktur dasar rekrutmen.
Penelitian ini mengkaji kesenjangan antara keterbatasan kewenangan MK dalam memeriksa PHPU dan kebutuhan untuk menjamin pemilu yang jujur dan adil. Permasalahan muncul ketika pelanggaran pada tahapan pemilu tidak dapat dijangkau melalui konstruksi kewenangan yang berorientasi pada hasil, meskipun berdampak pada hasil pemilu. Artikel ini menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif untuk mengkritisi pengaturan kewenangan MK dalam mengadili PHPU dan kaitannya dengan penerapan keadilan substantif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keadilan substantif dapat dikonstruksikan sebagai pendekatan korektif konstitusional yang memungkinkan MK menilai keterkaitan antara pelanggaran pada tahapan pemilu dan keabsahan hasil pemilu. Pendekatan ini tidak dimaksudkan untuk mengabaikan batas kewenangan maupun keadilan prosedural, melainkan untuk menjembatani kesenjangan antara lingkup kewenangan dan tuntutan konstitusional atas pemilu yang jujur dan adil sebagaimana diamanatkan Pasal 22E UUD NRI Tahun 1945. Keadilan substantif dapat menjadi instrumen konstitusional untuk memulihkan kemurnian suara dan memastikan hasil pemilu mencerminkan kehendak rakyat dalam kerangka demokrasi konstitusional.
This article examines the constitutional convergence of human rights and economic policy under Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution and how the Indonesian Constitutional Court (the Court) reconciles tensions between them. Their constitutional entrenchment, particularly under Article 33, places economic regulation and rights protection on an equal normative footing. Using doctrinal legal research, it examines constitutional texts, the history of constitutional drafting and amendment, and key decisions on economic legislation.The findings show that, despite early resistance to individual rights, economic and social rights were implicitly embedded in the Constitution and later developed through constitutional adjudication. The Court interprets Article 33 as containing these rights and requiring active state involvement in their fulfilment. However, its jurisprudence lacks a coherent standard of review. The article concludes that judicial review of economic legislation should be framed in the language of rights and supported by a relevant standard of review.