The formation of the U.S. military budget has traditionally been shaped by both the country’s current and long-term foreign policy priorities. This relationship has become particularly evident in the current period, which is characterized by growing uncertainty regarding the foreign policy approaches of the U.S. leadership amid an increasingly unstable international security environment. The purpose of this article is to examine how the national security priorities of the Trump and Biden administrations have influenced the U.S. military budget and the structure of defense spending. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the doctrinal foundations, strategic priorities, and quantitative benchmarks of budget planning under both administrations. The analysis shows that, during Donald Trump’s first presidential term, military budget allocations were primarily driven by the intensification of great-power competition and the America First doctrine, whereas under the Biden administration the concepts of integrated deterrence and multilateral cooperation came to the forefront. The author also identifies and compares the key trends in the military budget policies of the two administrations, including their dynamics, structural characteristics, and principal funding priorities for strategic initiatives. The findings demonstrate that, despite differences in rhetoric and tactical approaches, both administrations consistently pursued increases in defense spending, reaffirming great-power competition as the central paradigm of U.S. national security strategy. At the same time, the analysis of the logic and dynamics of defense spending illustrates the evolution of U.S. military policy. Whereas the Trump administration prioritized the rapid expansion of combat capabilities through substantial increases in arms procurement and the acceleration of nuclear modernization programs, with a particular focus on countering Russia, the Biden administration emphasized the development of a more technologically advanced, coalition-based deterrence architecture centered primarily on the Indo-Pacific region.
Following the outbreak of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Eastern Europe has undergone a significant transformation. To better understand the nature of this shift, it is necessary to examine both its conceptual foundations and its practical implementation through a range of programs and operational activities. Particular attention is devoted to the so-called Resistance Operating Concept, according to which U.S. SOF should function not merely as combat units but also as architects of a comprehensive regional security architecture. This approach emphasizes the creation of resistance networks, the organization of rear-area support structures, and the coordination of operations in the information and cyber domains in the event that an adversary occupies the territory of a NATO ally. Against this background, the article examines the principal areas of U.S. SOF activity in Eastern Europe, including engagement with civil society, cyber, information, and psychological operations, as well as coordination among different branches of the armed forces. The author argues that the primary objective of the U.S. SOF strategy in Eastern Europe is to establish a decentralized and flexible deterrence system capable of self-organization even in the event of the disruption of key decision-making centers. The effectiveness of this system depends less on the number of military units involved than on the degree to which they are integrated into the national security and civil defense structures of allied states. At the same time, implementation of this strategy faces both objective and political constraints. In particular, some European governments are concerned that the promotion of asymmetric methods of warfare by the United States could undermine the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and create institutional risks for domestic political stability. Nevertheless, Washington continues to promote the integration of U.S. SOF into the defense structures of NATO’s eastern flank. According to the author, this enables the United States to pursue two strategic objectives simultaneously: first, the creation of a distributed resistance network capable of sustaining prolonged asymmetric warfare in the event of direct military confrontation; and second, the preservation of substantial influence over European defense policy by limiting the emergence of alternative concepts of collective security.
Illegal drug production in Afghanistan constitutes not only a national problem but also a serious threat to regional and international security. Despite this, its origins remain relatively understudied. This article aims to identify the complex interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors that contributed to the emergence and expansion of illicit drug production in Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s. The first section analyzes the socio-economic conditions that laid the groundwork for the spread of the drug trade in Afghanistan on the eve of the civil war. It argues that the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector, the archaic system of land tenure, and rising rural poverty increased the attractiveness of illicit sources of income compared with legal but low-yield forms of livelihood. The second section demonstrates how the intensification of domestic political conflict and the weakening of central state institutions gradually led to the expansion of the shadow economy and the decline of the agricultural sector, thereby fostering the growth of the drug industry. The third section examines developments in the international illicit drug market. It argues that the expansion of drug production in Afghanistan was facilitated by the spread of illicit trafficking networks in Pakistan, rising demand for opiates in Western countries, and shortages resulting from declining supplies from Iran and Southeast Asia. The author concludes that the escalation of the political crisis in Afghanistan, together with the deployment of the limited Soviet military contingent, should be regarded not as the primary cause of the expansion of the drug economy but rather as a catalyst that intensified an already existing combination of adverse endogenous and exogenous trends, ultimately contributing to Afghanistan’s transformation into one of the world’s leading centers of opiate production by the 1990s.
In recent years, Italy has witnessed a resurgence of nationalist sentiment characterized by appeals to national greatness, the image of a ‘humiliated’ nation, and the need to ‘restore justice’. In this context, the rise to power of the Fratelli d’Italia party in 2022, whose program combines elements of right-wing populism with the legacy of the neo-fascist movement, is particularly noteworthy. However, similar trends, in which nationalist, chauvinistic, and imperial narratives serve as the basis for constructing new political myths, are currently unfolding far beyond Italy. From this perspective, the Italian case allows for broader generalizations by identifying key cultural features that make right-wing populist discourse appealing to a significant segment of contemporary society. This article traces the evolution of the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Italy between 1861 and 1945 through the lens of the concept of strategic culture, demonstrating how enduring patterns in elite perceptions of the historical past influence contemporary foreign policy decision-making. The first section defines the concept of strategic culture and assesses its analytical potential from the perspective of international relations theory and foreign policy practice. The second section traces the evolution of the Kingdom of Italy’s strategic culture from the Risorgimento to the establishment of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist regime. It shows how the irredentist narrative of the gradual unification of Italian lands evolved into a nationalist doctrine of territorial expansion, which became a central element of the country’s strategic culture. The third section identifies the defining features of Italian strategic culture under the Fascist dictatorship. It argues that the myth of imperial grandeur employed by the Fascist regime in constructing national identity conflicted with the country’s actual capabilities, which were insufficient to sustain an expansionist foreign policy. The author concludes that a strategic culture that fails to take account of the state’s objective interests can become a destructive factor, hindering a realistic assessment of national goals and policy priorities. Furthermore, the author argues that the legacy of fascism has not been fully addressed by Italian society or its political elites, making the debate over whether contemporary Italy might repeat the mistakes of the past all the more relevant.
The changes currently unfolding in international relations have become the subject of intense scholarly debate. One of the central questions concerns how these changes should be interpreted: as manifestations of a qualitative transformation of the world political system as a whole, or as yet another shift in the balance of power within its existing framework. At the same time, the very concept of development remains surprisingly understudied in International Relations (IR) theory. As a critical review of the major approaches in contemporary IR theory — including neorealism, liberal institutionalism, synergetics, constructivism, critical theory, world-systems analysis, the transcendent approach, and the English School — demonstrates, none offers an operationalizable criterion for distinguishing between the routine functioning of the international system and its development.Drawing on dialectical methodology, existential philosophy, and emergence theory, the author formulates the concept of the transcendence of the new, which describes a form of systemic change whereby the system transcends its own causal constraints and generates content that is ontologically irreducible to its previous state. The explanatory potential of this concept is then illustrated through the emergence of international law as a fundamentally new element of the international system. To demonstrate the heuristic value of the proposed concept in explaining qualitative changes in the legal regulation of relations among actors within the international system, the author compares it with alternative interpretations derived from realism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism, critical-genealogical approaches, and the English School. Particular attention is devoted to applying the concept of the transcendence of the new to an assessment of the contemporary state of international law. The author argues that, while international law continues to reproduce the logic of the existing international system, its post-Second World War institutional form is undergoing a crisis as it gradually gives way to a more polycentric configuration. In conclusion, the author maintains that the proposed interpretation of the category of development is not intended to be universal but may stimulate further philosophical reflection on this phenomenon within IR theory.
Following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the country has remained a source of heightened terrorist threats to other states in the region. In this context, particular attention should be paid to the terrorist organization Islamic State — Khorasan Province (ISIS–K). Although its activities are concentrated primarily in Afghanistan, they often extend beyond the country’s borders. This article aims to examine the nature of ISIS–K in the context of the threats the group poses at the national, regional, and global levels. The first section identifies the causes of the emergence of ISIS–K in Afghanistan, highlighting the inherently contradictory nature of the organization as both a transnational movement and a nationally oriented group. The second section examines how ISIS–K has adapted to the gradual weakening of its position within Afghanistan amid the consolidation of Taliban rule, as well as to changing international political conditions. In this regard, ISIS–K’s use of modern information and communication technologies, which gives the group’s terrorist activities a truly global dimension, is of particular concern. The article concludes that ISIS–K represents a glocal phenomenon, combining subversive activities within Afghanistan with transnational terrorist methods. The author argues that the complex nature of ISIS–K poses risks both to Afghanistan’s domestic political stability and, even more significantly, to regional and global security through cross-border terrorist threats that require a coordinated international response.
From 1973 to the present, Afghanistan has experienced continuous political upheaval, coups, and armed conflict, exacerbated by external intervention. The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 did not fundamentally reverse these trends, with Afghanistan remaining a source of regional and international instability. In this context, the political settlement strategy developed during the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan merits particular attention. This article traces the evolution of the Soviet Union’s strategy for resolving the intra-Afghan conflict. It demonstrates how, as political instability within Afghanistan intensified, the USSR gradually shifted from providing economic and technical assistance to the Afghan government to the direct use of military force against the opposition. The article also examines the circumstances surrounding the Soviet leadership’s decision to deploy a limited military contingent to Afghanistan. It argues that this decision, taken despite warnings from military leaders and the armed forces’ objective lack of preparedness for combat operations in unfamiliar terrain, only worsened the situation within Afghanistan and damaged the Soviet Union’s international standing. Influenced by these factors, as well as by Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power, the Soviet leadership recognized by the mid-1980s the futility of pursuing a military solution and was compelled to develop a phased strategy for political settlement. This ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the implementation of which is examined in detail in the final section. The author argues that the Soviet strategy contained an inherent contradiction: Moscow sought to achieve a political settlement and establish a stable and legitimate Afghan state through the large-scale use of military force. In this respect, the Soviet experience demonstrates that even a state possessing technologically advanced armed forces cannot necessarily secure victory in an asymmetric war against irregular forces supported by the local population. The study of this experience remains important for understanding the relationship between military force and political settlement in the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts.
Upon taking office in 2025, the second Trump administration declared the Western Hemisphere its highest foreign policy priority and reaffirmed the region as an area of exclusive U.S. interest. In particular, the Panama Canal, owing to its strategic location, has become an increasingly important arena of interstate competition. This article aims to identify the key factors shaping the second Trump administration’s approach to the ‘Panama issue’ amid the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The first section examines the principal priorities and directing principles of the 47th U.S. president’s policy toward the Western Hemisphere. The author argues that this policy represents not so much a revision of the traditional U.S. approach to strengthening its influence in the region as a reinterpretation of that approach in the spirit of the America First doctrine. On the one hand, this policy has been driven by China’s rapidly expanding presence in the Panama Canal area, reflected both in the growing participation of Chinese companies in infrastructure projects on the isthmus and in Panama’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative. In this context, the situation surrounding the Panama Canal has provided the second Trump administration with an opportunity to test its reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and to demonstrate resolve through diplomatic pressure on Panama. On the other hand, the Trump administration’s hard-line approach to the Panama Canal issue can also be interpreted as an attempt to reaffirm campaign commitments to its electoral base and thereby strengthen domestic political support ahead of the midterm elections. The author concludes that the second Trump administration’s strategy regarding the Panama Canal has thus far proved effective, enabling the United States to secure what may be described as a ‘psychological’ victory in its strategic competition with China in the LAC region. At the same time, the author notes that, despite its deliberately confrontational rhetoric, the U.S. leadership has demonstrated both a willingness to recognize the objective constraints and potential costs of a more aggressive policy toward Latin American and Caribbean states and a readiness to make pragmatic concessions when necessary. In this respect, the strategy developed by the second Trump administration regarding the Panama Canal may serve as a useful model for countering Chinese influence elsewhere in the region.
The 40th anniversary of the beginning of Perestroika and ‘new political thinking’ has revived debates on the specifics and mechanisms of the late Soviet Union’s foreign policy. In this context, researchers typically focus either on the views of M.S. Gorbachev and his associates or on the ideology of the ‘liberal wing’ of the party elite. However, they overlook the fact that, as early as the early 1970s, the USSR had engaged in a dialogue with the so-called Club of Rome, which developed and actively promoted the concept of ‘common challenges to humanity’ or global threats. The author hypothesizes that it was these ideas of the Club of Rome, which resonated strongly with the sentiments of the then Soviet leadership pursuing a course of detente and gradual rapprochement between the USSR and Western countries, that largely paved the way for the emergence of the ‘new political thinking’ concept in the mid-1980s. To test this hypothesis, the author examines the process of rapprochement between the USSR and the Club of Rome, which involved the internalization of the latter’s ideas by the Soviet scientific community and a part of the political elite. The article demonstrates how an entire network of institutes and laboratories engaged in research aligned with the ideas of the Club of Rome gradually developed in the USSR. From the outset, these studies, marked by a liberal-globalist orientation, constituted an intellectual counter-current to the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. Under their direct influence, the concept of ‘nuclear winter’ and the idea of prioritizing universal human interests over national ones became firmly embedded in the Soviet official rhetoric. Thus, this research not only highlights the ideological affinity of detente and ‘perestroika’ but shows that the latter was a logical consequence of the entrenchment within the Soviet leadership of the ideas about the necessity of ensuring humanity’s survival in an era of global threats for the sake of which it was deemed justifiable to sacrifice national interests.
The book under review is a new monograph ‘Russia and Eurasian integration in a multipolar world’ by L.E. Slutsky, M.I. Krotov, and V.I. Muntiyan, published in 2025. The reviewer notes that the authors, who are directly involved in developing practical measures aimed at advancing Eurasian integration, have presented a truly comprehensive study. This study covers a wide range of integration processes in Eurasia, with a special emphasis on the role of the Russian Federation. The reviewer emphasizes that the authors provide a detailed analysis of the institutional structure of Eurasian integration. Such an analysis allowed them to convincingly substantiate their recommendations regarding priority areas for the further development of integration processes in Eurasia, i.e., adding a full-fledged parliamentary dimension, as well as deepening interaction among all organizations of the Eurasian space (CIS, CSTO, EAEU, and SCO). As for the challenges facing Eurasian integration, the authors rightly note the destructive role of Western countries, which actively attempt to hinder any forms of integration processes in Eurasia, especially those where Russia plays a leading role. At the same time, the authors note that Russia does not exploit the full potential of its monetary policy tools. In this regard, they stress the need to strengthen the role of strategic state management to ensure the possibility of sustainable development for the entire region. This development is inextricably intertwined with the process of deepening cooperation with China and India, which should be complemented by new joint international formats.
The concept of ‘South-South cooperation,’ which dates back to the Cold War, has received a new impetus in the 21st century. In this context, China occupies a unique place, as its very identification with the Global South under modern conditions is a subject of intense debate in the academic and political circles. The PRC asserts that its foreign policy is largely determined by the historical experience of Third World countries oppressed by the North. Therefore, it is inherently close to and aligned with the interests of the Global South. The Belt and Road Initiative serves as the foundation of this ‘South–South cooperation with Chinese characteristics’ model, with so-called forum diplomacy as an important instrument for its practical implementation. A striking example is the China — Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum, which is celebrating its 10th anniversary this year. To assess the results of this forum’s work and identify the specifics of the PRC’s interaction with Latin American countries, the author first examines the process of institutionalizing China — Latin America relations, primarily through the China–CELAC Forum ministerial meetings, and then identifies the main problems that hinder the full use of the potential of ‘South–South cooperation’ in this context. The author focuses on the policies of Donald J. Trump’s administration, which seeks not so much to establish contacts with Latin American countries as to drive a wedge between them and China. Meanwhile, China is now demonstrating much greater persistence in implementing its projects in the region than ever before, positioning itself as a voice of the Global South. All this poses new challenges for Latin American states, narrowing the space for maneuvering and implementing a policy of equidistance. Nevertheless, South–South cooperation with China could not only bring economic benefits to these countries but also, especially with the consistent realization of the potential of forum diplomacy, enhance their political agency on the global ‘chessboard’.
In recent decades, the strengthening of the international positions of Global South countries manifested itself, particularly in their growing willingness to question the justice of the existing world order. The energy transition agenda is not immune to this trend, with growing attention being paid to the structural imbalances of the existing energy system. In this context, the concept of ‘energy justice’ has gained currency in both political and academic discourses. The concept highlights the need to develop a global energy system that fairly distributes benefits and costs among actors and ensures representative and impartial participation of all countries in key decision-making. This article assesses the epistemological potential of this concept for studying interstate energy cooperation in a specific region. The Caspian region was chosen as a case study due to its crucial role in the modern energy architecture and a particularly complex interplay of interests between regional and external actors, exacerbating already acute contradictions between the imperatives of the energy transition and considerations of social-economic stability and environmental security. The first section of the article examines the development of the ‘energy justice’ concept, identifies its key dimensions (i.e., distributive, procedural, and recognition justice), and outlines the specifics of its application in studying energy production and consumption issues. In the second section, the author applies this concept to examine the energy policies of the Caspian states and their interaction mechanisms within the context of the global energy transition. The author emphasizes that the energy justice concept, while highlighting the common interests and interdependence of the Caspian states, can serve as a cover for promoting the commercial and geopolitical interests of Western financial institutions and governments. In this regard, the discourses of ‘energy justice’ and ‘just transition’ act not only as a normative framework but also as a tool of interstate political rivalry. In general, the energy justice conceptual framework highlights new important elements and aspects of energy cooperation among Caspian countries and, at the same time, shows that energy justice is not an abstract ideal but a necessary condition for sustainable development. The further dissemination and deepening of energy justice principles worldwide would make the global energy transition more inclusive and the energy sector a more humane and responsible sphere of human activity.
Under unprecedented sanctions pressure, the Russian Federation’s foreign economic activity is facing a number of fundamentally new challenges. This article examines how Russia’s economic diplomacy system is adapting to these challenges. The key strategies of this adaptation encompass the reconfiguration of trade flows and the diversification of export destinations, the development of parallel imports and new logistics routes, and the search for new foreign partners. The first section of the article examines the recent changes in the activities of key state departments and institutions responsible for Russia’s foreign economic policy. These include the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The network of Russian foreign missions, including trade missions, embassies, and consulates, receives special attention. The second section analyzes the activities of Russian state corporations as actors of economic diplomacy. In particular, the author examines the projects implemented by the Russian Export Center, VEB.RF, Public Joint Stock Company ‘Gazprom’, and the State Corporation ‘Rostec’. The author concludes that, under current conditions, the effectiveness of the Russian Federation’s foreign economic activity is determined not only by the scale of state support (recovery of costs, expanded measures for non-resource exports, development of special economic zones, programs by VEB.RF and the Russian Export Center) but also by the degree of institutional coherence among all key actors of Russia’s economic diplomacy. It is due to this coherence that the Russian Federation has managed, despite sanctions pressure, to promote preferential regimes of special economic zones, provide international investors with guarantees of political and legal support, and build negotiating positions for concluding industrial supply agreements.
Following the end of the Cold War, discussions about the moral obsolescence of traditional concepts regarding the organization of international relations became widespread in academic and political discourse. One of the main targets of criticism from developed Western countries and the Western-led international structures has been the principle of state sovereignty. In the wake of this criticism, the institution of international election observer recommendations emerged and quickly gained momentum. To identify the specifics of this institution as a distinct global phenomenon and, on this basis, assess the prospects for its development in the foreseeable future, the author examines it through the lens of M. Zurn’s theory of global governance. This article provides a detailed account of the development and legitimization of the institution of electoral recommendations as an instrument of liberal globalization in the 1990s. The author emphasizes that from the very beginning, the practice of electoral recommendations challenged the principle of state sovereignty: the benchmark for Western observers was not international treaties but norms adopted by supranational bodies independently, without approval by state representatives. Since the early 2000s, an increasing number of countries have begun to express dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency in the activities of Western observer missions and the peremptory nature of their ‘recommendations,’ either attempting to offer alternatives or simply sabotaging their implementation. In response, Western observer organizations created a diverse system of mechanisms to coerce states into implementing their commendations. This article provides an original typology of relevant instruments, including mechanisms of a political, economic, and pseudo-legal nature. The author concludes, however, that all these coercive measures have failed to ensure the effective implementation of international observers’ recommendations by states; instead, they have only worsened the crisis of this institution. A way out of this crisis is possible only through a compromise between states and transnational actors, but the position of Western international organizations so far leaves no room for such a compromise.
The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) is an international intergovernmental organization representing a unique research center, whose activities encompass the broadest spectrum of nuclear science. The formation and development of JINR are covered in dozens, if not hundreds, of books and articles published over the institute’s 70-year history. However, the process of its creation as part of the development of Soviet science diplomacy has not yet been the subject of separate scientific studies. Meanwhile, analyzing the establishment of JINR through the lens of the concept of ‘science diplomacy’ appears to be an exceptionally relevant research task — on the one hand, due to the growing importance of this concept in instrumentalizing international scientific and technical cooperation, and on the other, due to the special role of this international organization in the history of the USSR and Russia. In this context, this article attempts to deconstruct the phenomenon under study along three vectors of the most common taxonomy of science diplomacy in the academic literature: ‘science in diplomacy,’ ‘diplomacy for science,’ and ‘science for diplomacy.’ The author notes that from the perspective of the development of Soviet science diplomacy, the JINR case represented a break with the previously established paradigm of integrating into the existing system of international scientific and technical relations and a move into a ‘zone of accelerated development’: for the first time, the country was creating a new, unique international platform on its territory. From the perspective of the ‘science diplomacy’ concept, the uniqueness of JINR lies in the process of radical internationalization of previously secret ‘mega science’ class facilities and the de facto formation of an international scientific program based on an existing national large-scale research infrastructure. In this respect, JINR became a non-standard, asymmetric, alternative response to the classical approach to international scientific organization, implemented, for example, at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). This experience and the feasibility of such large-scale tasks were subsequently used in the creation of other specialized international organizations with a leading role of the USSR, forming a distinct, Soviet model of science diplomacy.
Various forms of interregional cooperation are of increasing strategic importance in the contemporary global political context. To conceptualize them, IR scholars often employ the theory of interregionalism. While possessing significant epistemological potential, it is characterized by pronounced Eurocentrism. Its conceptual core and empirical foundation are based on the analysis of the interactions of the European Union or European countries with other regional organizations/groups of states. This naturally raises the following question: to what extent are the principles and implications of this theory relevant for studying the policies of non-Western actors? To answer this question, the author applies the theory of interregionalism to an analysis of the 25-year history of China’s economic cooperation with Central Asian (CA) countries. First, the author traces the development of theoretical research on the interregionalism phenomenon, identifying its key types and functional aspects. Building on this, the author examines the evolution of Sino-Central Asian economic cooperation since the early 21st century and distinguishes three stages in its development. The first stage (2001–2012) saw China attempt to form institutionalized interregional economic relations based on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, involving not only CA countries but also Russia. In other words, for this stage, it is more accurate to speak of Sino-Eurasian quasi-interregional interaction rather than strictly Sino-Central Asian. The second stage (2013–2022) was characterized by China’s efforts to elevate Sino-Central Asian economic cooperation to a transregional level, primarily through the active involvement of CA countries in the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. The third stage (2022–present) is associated with the beginning of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, which prompted China to return to the principles of quasi-interregionalism in its policy toward CA countries, though now without Moscow’s participation, in order to mitigate political and economic risks. Thus, this study not only demonstrates the applicability of the interregionalism theory to the study of non-Western actors but also provides a fresh perspective on a specific case of such interregional interaction — Sino-Central Asian economic cooperation. At the same time, there is a clear need to further refine the methodology of interregional research to better adapt it to various non-Western contexts.
In recent years, Russian historiography on the colonial policies of the great powers during the interwar period has actively studied the strategy of the British Empire to preserve and strengthen control over dependent territories. The new monograph by S.G. Malkin, ‘Policing the Empire: Colonial control and the Britishmilitary thought during the Interbellum’, serves as a good example of this trend. The book provides a detailed analysis of the concepts for adapting the British colonial system to post-war realities. At the same time, the author notes that despite drawing on extensive literature and a broad source base, the monograph is rather a series of essays that do not claim to provide a comprehensive coverage of the subject. Nevertheless, the reviewer argues that the author managed not only to challenge the thesis, common to both the Russian and foreign historiography, about the effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s imperial policy after World War I, but also to formulate non-trivial thought-provoking conclusions on the theoretical and practical aspects of British colonial governance. Thus, reflecting on the military-theoretical foundations of British colonial policy in the interwar period, the author counterintuitively concludes that at the time the United Kingdom’s grand strategy was influenced by the ideas of C. von Clausewitz, despite the skeptical attitude of British politicians towards the latter. From a practical perspective, the author draws attention to the fact that Great Britain actively implemented counterinsurgency tactics and techniques in the fight against national liberation movements to preserve the imperial colonial system. The reviewer argues that the discourse analysis of doctrines and concepts aimed at consolidating the British colonial empire, carried out in the monograph, makes a significant contribution to Russian historiography on the issue and may be of interest to a wide range of readers, including academic researchers.
The end of the Cold War instilled confidence in a significant part of Western political and academic elites that the beginning of the 21st century would be marked by a radical transformation of the entire structure of world politics, including the entire international security agenda. These expectations were largelyembodied in the theory of securitization, which became one of the most dynamic research areas in the theory of international security. However, these expectations were not to be fulfilled: the number of international conflicts continued to grow, which, in turn, could not but call into question the basic tenets of securitization theory. This article focuses on the political ethics underlying securitization theory and the normative approaches to solving modern security problems advanced by its proponents. The author argues that the existing normative approaches in securitization theory can be divided into three research strands: deontological, universalist, and pragmatic, each with a number of distinctive features. Within the framework of deontological approach, developed in the works of the founders of securitization theory and their followers, desecuritization is considered the preferred moral-political strategy. The universalist approach seeks to create universal and generally accepted criteria for the normative evaluation of security practices. Finally, the pragmatic approach prioritizes practical knowledge about security’s value and ethics in its local manifestations and contexts. The author concludes that the formation of these approaches was intrinsically linked to the surrounding historical-political context. At the same time, all these approaches provide only a one-sided interpretation of securitization, marked by Westerncentrism, or, conversely, lack clear ethical guidelines. The author argues that although international security studies still hold potential, the very concept of security is limiting the possibilities for a development of a sustainable positive agenda in international relations. In this regard, turning to other concepts that could contribute to the formation of a more harmonious multipolar world seems useful.
The concept of ‘triangular diplomacy’, introduced by Henry Kissinger during the Cold War, acknowledged the specific character of relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. It was designed to establish such a balance of power that the USA would consistently maintain a strategic advantage by exploiting the differences between the other two vertices of the strategic triangle. In contemporary conditions, the interaction within the new Russia–U.S.–China strategic triangle acquired particular significance given the reconfiguration of international relations and the shaping of a polycentric world order. The author posits that the reinstatement of President Trump in 2025may give a qualitatively new meaning to the ‘Kissinger Doctrine’, with Moscow potentially acting as the counterweight within the Russia–China–U.S. configuration. To substantiate this hypothesis, this study identifies the key stages and determinants in the evolution of the ‘Kissinger’s triangle’ from the 1970s onward. It demonstrates that while the USA was the primary beneficiary of this trilateral dynamic during the Cold War, this balance gradually shifted to the advantage of China during the post-bipolar period, albeit with some reservations. The latter benefited from its cooperation with both Russia and the United States as their bilateral relations were steadily deteriorating. However, current developments indicate that Russia may now be poised to become the ‘counterbalance’ within this framework. The following factors support this conclusion: (1) a generally favorable background following the high-level Russian-American negotiations; (2) the significant potential of Russian-Chinese cooperation and convergence of the two countries’ positions on a wide range of international issues; and (3) the intensification of D. Trump’s efforts to contain China. Together, these factors could create new opportunities for Moscow to strengthen its international standing, including resolving the Ukrainian crisis and restoring the dialogue on nuclear arms control.
