This study explores aspects of J & uuml;rgen Habermas's ideas in relation to papers published in the Philosophy of Education Working Group (WG) of the National Association of Graduate Studies and Research in Education (Anped) from 2010 to 2017, focusing on discussions about ethics. The central research question is: What do the authors who submitted papers to the Philosophy of Education WG during this period say about J & uuml;rgen Habermas's thinking from an ethical perspective? The main objective is to examine the debate surrounding ethics through the lens of Habermas's ideas within this key forum for philosophical dialogue in Brazilian education. The findings suggest that schools, as spaces fostering intersubjective relations grounded in communicative rationality, are inherently tied to this ethical dimension, contributing to human development.
Foucault's theoretical stance is situated in the context of the critique of the modern philosophy of subject, for him, an anthropological illusion. It is a philosophy marked by the "centrality of the subject" that can be overcome by showing its radical finitude and inability to achieve full transparency. Human sciences only appeared in Western culture when human beings established the centrality of the human subject in knowledge. In this context, reason, implemented as a human science, was transformed into a faculty of observation and control. The most radical consequence is the emergence of a "society of discipline" that finds its model in prison.
In this paper, we intend to study the mystical aspect of the early writings of Albert Camus (1913-1960), namely in L'envers et l'endroit (1937) and Les noces (1939). We try to highlight the relationship between mysticism and nature as a characteristic present in Camus' early writings that allows us to think of a particular experience of unity that can be characterized from the perspective of a wild mysticism. Therefore, we are guided on the analyses of Roger Bastide (2006) and Michel Hulin (2007).
This article has as the theme the relationship between modernity and Martin Heideggers philosophy, specifically in his critique of technology and Western Metaphysics. Supposedly Heidegger carried out, in a radical way, the philosophical critique of modernity that had been open since the end of nineteenth century, and established parameters for postmodern, but not anti-metaphysics, reading. Starting from his ontological approach to History of Being, it aims to reconstruct Heideggers critique of modernity interpreting it as an offshoot of Western metaphysics. The methodology employed is based on a bibliographic review of the main works of Heidegger and commentators, highlighting the evolution of these ideas from Being and Time to his late writings. The development of the text follows the following course: [a] the indication of the senses through which modernity is visualized in its thought; [b] the need for a historical-ontological perspective from which modernity must be viewed to liberate its metaphysical horizon; and [c] the general and fundamental ontological traits present in the way modernity is consolidated as metaphysics.
The central objectives of these reflections are to show how Jacques Lacan presents, develops and explains one of the central concepts of his theory, namely, the concept of object a (object a) and the dynamics between desire (d & eacute;sir) and delight (jouissance) that is established as a consequence of the fomulation of the object a in the constituted subject. We understand that the concept of object a is central in Lacan's theory, especially in his theory of the constitution of the subject. The metapsychological foundation of the object a allows us to understand how it arises and how it operates in the constituted subject, also allowing and understanding of how it will come to operate in the face of the dynamics between desire an delight. The desiring subject finds both satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the same time and enjoys such a realization that at the same time is a frustration and that, in a way, drives him in the search for the next object.
The aim of this article is to carry out a comparative analysis of the analogy between speech and the soul's health in the texts of Gorgias and Plato. We intend to: 1) examine how such an analogy is present in these authors, specifically in the texts Encomium of Helen and the dialogue Gorgias; 2) to argue in favor of the hypothesis according to which the mobilization of the comparison between discourse and the soul's health fulfills, in such authors, (at least) one same function, acting as a rhetorical tool of validation of the discourse itself.
This article explores Peer Support intervention as a therapeutic tool for displaced individuals affected by conflict, from a psychoanalytic perspective. Conducted as part of a Clinical Psychology doctoral project at ISPA-Lisboa, the study uses a qualitative approach involving interviews with seven displaced people from Syria, Lebanon, Brazil, Iran, Palestine, and Jordan. Participants, some with physical war injuries, served in peer support roles regardless of their injury status. Using the Free Association Narrative Interview (FANI) method, the study examines themes of Naming, Identity, and Identification to access deep intersubjective processes. Findings suggest that Peer Support fosters identity redefinition and self-positioning within social bonds, addressing the unique identity needs of displaced individuals. This method of intervention offers a therapeutic function by creating a relational "self-other" axis, helping individuals reclaim identity and psychological stability amid forced displacement.
The study addresses the ontological delineations present in the thought of Antonio Meneghetti (1936-2013). The perspectives open up in three examined spheres: the relationship between psyche and being; the delimitation of Being in existence; and the concept of ontological nexus. Respectively, they are the dimensions of pure ontology; of an existential doctrine and a gnosiology with an ontological source that are challenged. Meneghetti's ontological thought becomes unique because it considers the return of substantialist ontology to the discussion about the core of the human psyche, thus launching horizons that open up to the fields of metaphysics, psychology, ontopsychology and the theory of knowledge.
This paper aims to highlight some illustrative logical problems that arise from the challenges language can pose when applied to scientific purposes, in order to justify the emergence of the Philosophy of Language. The comments made here, however, are limited to the tradition of Classical Logic, emphasizing the contributions of Aristotle, Leibniz, and Frege. It also seeks to demonstrate that, subsequently, there was a significant increase in the complexity of the issues involved, given the deepening connection between Logic and Mathematics.
This paper deals with the image of God in Saint Alphonsus Liguori. Within the propositional studies of this Doctor of the Church, there is a historical-ideological contrast with another important theologian of his time: Jansenius. Here, it is proposed that St. Alphonsus' theology recovers the most important biblical aspect of the Gospels, God's s love for mankind, in counterpoint to the theological ideology predominant in academic discussion and in the practice of men in the 18th century, the rigorist Jansenism that imposed on men a life full of precepts and the fear of God above God's s love for man. Recovering this aspect, St. Alphonsus revalued the core of the Gospel of Jesus and proposed a morality of salvation and redemption of man, not of punishment and fear.
The paper examines a legacy from classical metaphysics to French phenomenology: the fascination with the invisible. It benefits, fundamentally, from the theses of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion, two great representatives of this phenomenology. If, for Heidegger, the question of God is linked to the destiny of metaphysics as onto-theology, and opening a new space of reasons, expanding and renewing metaphysical problems that continue to trouble humanity.
The aim of this paper is to elucidate the proof of God's existence, as outlined by Augustine of Hippo in book II of the De libero arbitrio. Firstly, the study delves into the criterion employed by Augustine to establish God's existence. Subsequently, the second phase scrutinizes Augustine's reflection on Truth as the common and unchanging object of human reason's comprehension. Lastly, the third part of this study explores the rationale behind the Truth's superiority to reason, thus motivating Augustine's perspective on why God exists.
The theme of the existence of God is presented by Saint Bonaventure through three ways that lead human thought to natural certainty, as a firm adherence to the truth that intelligence knows, whether according to eternal reasons or through demonstrative proofs. These three ways respectively consider the self-knowledge of the soul, the recognition of the external world in the relationship between creatures and the Creator, and the realm of immediate and self-sufficient evidence to engender indubitable truth. This paper will present the argumentative development of the proofs of the existence of God, according to Saint Bonaventure, in (1) the Commentary on the Sentences (I, distinction VIII) and, (2) the Disputed Questions on the Mystery of Christ (Q. I a.1), two works marked by the teaching activity of the Seraphic Doctor in the medieval university. I intend to show that these proofs, especially the third, owe much to the ratio anselmi, already known in medieval Latin scholasticism of the 13th century.
The question about God in Aristotle appears in the theory about the first unmoved mover, demonstrated in book XII of Metaphysics. Everything that moves is moved by something. Aristotle understands that in the universe there is an indeterminate series of moved and movers. Every movement has a prior cause. But it is not possible the infinity regress, because each and raising among researchers.
The present paper aims to analyze, from a psychoanalytic perspective, the relationship between the subject and his God to the extent that this is directly related to the very functioning of his psyche. In other words, for psychoanalysis the origin of this relationship is in the subject himself. In this sense, we will briefly portray the path taken by Freud regarding the passage from animism to religions and the importance of totemism as an example for what psychoanalysis called symbolic register. This record makes it possible to think the (F)ather as a metaphor and, therefore, place God in the symbolic place of the Father of all, omnipotent, omnipresent, who protects and at the same time punishes those who disobey his laws. The relationship with the Law internalized by the paternal metaphor is the fundamental mark of the neurotic structure that needs to manage the conflict between desires and deprivations. Finally, we move forward with the notion of Das Ding presented by Freud and developed by Lacan and which represents the reunion with what has always been lost. The subject will achieve some type of relationship with Das Ding through fantasy - an imaginary resource that covers the impossible with possibilities such as salvation, eternal life and many other divine promises.
O objetivo deste artigo é o de esboçar a prova da existência de Deus traçada por Agostinho de Hipona no segundo livro do De libero arbitrio. Tendo em vista tal fim, na primeira parte desta pesquisa, examinar-se-á o critério indicado pelo Hiponense para provar que Deus existe. Em seguida, isto é, na segunda etapa deste estudo, analisar-se-á a reflexão agostiniana sobre a Verdade como objeto comum e imutável do conhecimento da razão humana. Por fim, na terceira parte desta pesquisa, examinar-se-á por que a Verdade é superior à razão e assim mostrar-se-á por que, para Agostinho, Deus existe.
O artigo examina uma herança da metafísica clássica para a fenomenologia francesa: o fascínio pelo invisível. Beneficia-se, fundamentalmente, das teses de Emmanuel Levinas e Jean-Luc Marion, dois grandes representantes desta fenomenologia. Se, para Heidegger, a questão de Deus está atrelada ao destino da metafísica como onto-teo-logia, e, portanto, termina sendo uma questão “superada”, a fenomenologia do invisível, por sua vez, se pergunta se tal superação não é uma oportunidade para se retomar o problema de Deus para além do sentido do ser. Assim, quando todas as vozes são unanimes em proclamar que a metafísica perdeu toda credibilidade e legitimidade, a fenomenologia mantém vivo o fascínio pelo invisível, abrindo desta sorte um novo espaço de razões, ampliando e renovando problemas metafísicos que continuam inquietando a humanidade.
O tema da existência de Deus é apresentado por São Boaventura a partir de três vias que conduzem o pensamento humano à certeza natural, enquanto adesão firme à verdade que a inteligência conhece, seja segundo as razões eternas, seja por meio de provas demonstrativas. Essas três vias consideram respectivamente, o autoconhecimento da alma; o reconhecimento do mundo exterior, na relação entre as criaturas e o criador; e o plano da evidência imediata e suficiente por si para engendrar a verdade indubitável. Será apresentado neste artigo o desenvolvimento argumentativo das provas da existência de Deus, segundo São Boaventura, no (1) Comentário às Sentenças (I, distinção VIII) e, (2) nas Questões disputadas sobre o mistério de Cristo (Q. I a.1), duas obras marcadas pela atividade docente do Doutor Seráfico na universidade medieval. Pretendo mostrar que essas provas, especialmente a terceira, são devedoras da ratio anselmi, já conhecida na escolástica medieval latina do século XIII.
: O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar, sob o viés psicanalítico, a relação entre o sujeito e seu Deus na medida em que essa relação está diretamente ligada ao próprio funcionamento do seu psiquismo. Ou seja, para a psicanálise a origem dessa relação está no próprio sujeito. Nesse sentido, retrataremos de maneira breve o caminho percorrido por Freud acerca da passagem do animismo às religiões e da importância do totemismo como um exemplo para aquilo que a psicanálise chamou de registo simbólico. Tal registro possibilita pensar o (P)ai como metáfora e, portanto, situar Deus no lugar simbólico do Pai de todos, onipotente, onipresente, que protege e ao mesmo tempo castiga aqueles que desobedecem suas leis. A relação com a Lei internalizada pela metáfora paterna é a marca fundamental da estrutura neurótica que precisa administrar o conflito entre os desejos e as privações. Por fim, avançamos com a noção de Das Ding apresentada por Freud e desenvolvida por Lacan que representa o reencontro com o desde sempre perdido. O sujeito conseguirá algum tipo de relação com o Das Ding por meio da fantasia – recurso imaginário que reveste o impossível de possibilidades como a da salvação, da vida eterna e tantas outras promessas divinas.
A questão sobre Deus em Aristóteles aparece na teoria sobre o primeiro motor imóvel, demonstrada no livro XII da Metafísica. Tudo o que se move é movido por outro. Entende Aristóteles que no universo há uma série indeterminada de motores e movidos. Todos os movimentos têm uma causa anterior. Mas, não é possível regredir ao infinito, pois todos e cada um sempre dependeriam de outro. Por esta razão, conclui o Estagirita que é necessário que exista um primeiro motor imóvel que não seja movido por nenhum outro. Ora, se não existisse um primeiro motor absoluto, seria impossível o movimento gerado nos outros motores que compõem o universo. Neste estudo sobre a teoria aristotélica, que se tornou tradicional na teodiceia, apresentamos determinados passos da Metafísica com o auxílio de alguns comentadores sem, contudo, entrar em aporias importantes que o texto aristotélico vem suscitando entre os pesquisadores.
