
Explaining the form and structure of government in Islam from the perspective of the Quran and hadiths has always been one of the most challenging topics in Islamic political thought—a challenge that has gained even greater significance following the Islamic Revolution. In this context, the thought of Allama Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, a figure who comprehensively integrates philosophical, exegetical, and social dimensions, offers a distinctive framework for understanding this issue. The fundamental question of this study concerns how the form of government is explained within Allama’s intellectual system. Its main hypothesis is built on the premise that, according to Allama’s Quranic approach, Islam advocates a model of “religious social government” in which the form and executive structure of government are not fixed across time. Rather, they are variable matters determined by the requirements of time and place and shaped by the will of the people. To grasp this claim in depth, one must refer to Allama’s distinctive philosophical innovation: the theory of “constructed perceptions” (idrākāt-i iʿtibārī). He draws a clear distinction between real entities—which reflect fixed, ontologically objective realities—and constructed (or conventional) entities, which are products of the human mind created to meet vital and social needs. From Allama’s viewpoint, political affairs, the state, and government fall within the category of constructed entities. This means their essence and reality are rooted in mental agreements and human social necessities. Since constructed entities depend on environmental conditions and the historical evolution of humanity, the state cannot possess a fixed and eternal form. Its structure is continually reconstructed through a process of trial and error, in harmony with the rational development of society. In continuity with this discussion, the concept of “social sovereignty” emerges as the foundation of political legitimacy in Allama Tabatabai’s thought. He holds that sovereignty and political power are, in their essence, a shared and collective possession belonging to all members of society. Although throughout history tyrants have usurped this right by unilaterally employing the people and turning it into despotism, the true nature of social power has always originated from the community itself. Accordingly, any governmental structure that can secure the participation of a greater number of the genuine owners of power—that is, the people—in exercising this right draws closer to social justice. This perspective highlights the necessity of social dialogue and mutual agreement in determining the manner in which society is governed. Through his theory of “interactive realism” in epistemology, Allama emphasizes that truth is not the exclusive property of any individual or particular group. Human apprehensions of political reality arise from the interaction between perceptual faculties and the social environment. Therefore, the most desirable form of governmental structure can only be discerned through collective thinking and communal deliberation. At the exegetical level, Allama concludes from his examination of Quranic addresses that the addressee of Islam’s social rulings is the generality of believers, not the Prophet alone. God demands the establishment of justice, jihad, and prescribed punishments from the community of people as a whole, which reveals the distinctly social character of the religion. Islam is a social reality, so to speak, whose implementation has been entrusted to everyone collectively. Thus, political power derives from the will and consent of society. In the era of occultation, the matter of governance has been delegated to the Muslims themselves without any reservation, so that they may—following the practice of the Prophet and relying on the principle of consultation—appoint the ruler and supervise his performance. Although Allama critiques Western democracy for its materialistic foundations and exploitative spirit, he emphasizes a form of religious democracy in which the sound reason of society, within the framework of divine values, assumes responsibility for drafting executive laws and managing political affairs. In the final analysis, Allama Tabatabai’s political thought establishes a profound connection between human rationality and divine guidance. In his view, religion provides the best method for ordering society because it creates an internal mechanism of supervision and links worldly well-being to ultimate perfection in the hereafter, thereby restraining instinctive excesses and preventing social injustice. Nevertheless, religion does not impose a rigid or unchangeable structure upon government. Instead, it entrusts the management of unfolding events and the regulation of administrative and defensive systems to the discretion of the ruler, in consultation with the Muslims. The outcome of this approach is a model of governance that remains fully faithful to the principles of monotheism while being thoroughly flexible and dynamic, allowing society in every era to develop new managerial structures appropriate to its own level of advancement. This paradigm explicitly rejects any despotic concentration of power in the executive branch, places strong emphasis on the separation of powers and the dignity of the human being, and paves the way for the development of political knowledge and the realization of justice within Islamic societies. Thus, in Allama’s perspective, the form of government emerges as the product of the interaction between the collective reason of the believers and the guiding principles of the Sharia—an interaction that takes place within the domain of social constructs.
Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī, who during the Ottoman rule had adopted an approach of cooperation with the unjust Sunni ruler and did not issue a fatwa for confrontation, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the British mandate over Iraq, declared a fatwa for jihad against the infidels in the Islamic lands and for the independence of Iraq. Furthermore, while emphasizing the preservation of order and the elimination of chaos in society, he issued a fatwa for armed struggle against the oppression of the British occupiers. This study aims to elucidate the structure of Islamic governance in the political theory and practice of Mīrzā Shīrāzī following the victory of the 1920 revolution in Iraq and the absence of governance in the city of Karbala. In doing so, he emphasized elements such as the Islamic nature of the government, rejection of the sovereignty of non-Muslim rulers, Iraq's independence, and the people's consent. He placed the administration of the city in the hands of two councils, one scholarly and the other executive. On the one hand, he entrusted the tasks of policy-making, decision-making, and adjudication of disputes to a group of scholars from the region. On the other hand, responsibilities such as maintaining security, collecting taxes, and appointing city officials were assigned to seventeen qualified individuals. Considering his broad religious, social, and political authority, he also assumed the responsibility of supervising these two councils to ensure the Islamic nature of governance and to resolve potential conflicts arising from differences in opinion between the two councils, thereby preventing dual governance. This research seeks to answer the main question: What is Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī’s jurisprudential view on governance during the occultation of the last Shiite Imam, particularly concerning his contemporary circumstances? Using descriptive and analytical methods, the study demonstrates that the second Mīrzā Shīrāzī, while addressing various political orders in the occultation era based on different contexts, stipulated that the desired governance system includes, among other conditions, the existence of both scholarly and executive councils under Islamic rule. As a case study, he presented an indigenous interpretation of political order for the city of Karbala.
The present study investigates the nature of "faith-based justice" and its relationship with the indicator of "order." Through what mechanism does "Quranic justice" implement "order" within society? Based on the thematic discovery method of Sadr (2016), this research examines the nature of the "order" indicator within the network of "justice" verses, centered on Verse 135 of Surah al-Nisa. Drawing upon the words of Imam Ali, "That is the Quran; so make it speak," Sadr (2016) considers referring to the Quran to extract a Quranic theory regarding a specific issue as the best method for understanding and interpreting the Holy Quran. This study interrogates the issue of "order" by understanding the nature and position of the faith element of "justice" in the Holy Quran. The element of "justice" emerges within the context of faith-based human relations in society. In material civilizations, the external supervision of human law enforcers creates a power-oriented order (Kissinger, 2019; Newman, 1979). However, in the "monotheistic civilization/ Ummah" (Babaei, 2020; Ghasemi, Fattahizadeh, & Babaei, 2019), the internal supervision of people of faith gives rise to a "faith-based order." As "faith" increases—and consequently, as faith elements flourish within the body of society—a higher degree of order is established (Motahari, 2009, 2010). The presence of faith-based elements within the fabric of society reduces physical egoism, social pathologies, and disorder, while increasing altruism and social order (Motahari, 2009). One of the faith-based elements that constructs "order" is "justice." To the extent that "faith" increases in society, "justice" also flourishes within the social context. Consequently, "faith-based justice" creates a "faith-based order" in society. One of the significant verses expressing "faith-based justice" is Verse 135 of Surah al-Nisa: "O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives. Whether one is rich or poor, Allah is more worthy of both. So follow not [personal] inclination, lest you not be just. And if you distort [your testimony] or refuse [to give it], then indeed Allah is ever, with what you do, Acquainted." (cf. Tabatabai, 1996; Makarem Shirazi, 1995). According to this verse, the establishment of "justice"—even when it conflicts with personal interests or those of loved ones—takes shape within the framework of faith-based human relations. Based on Verse 135 of Surah al-Nisa, the characteristics of "faith-based justice" include: "universality," "internal supervision," "perpetual standing," "sincerity," "truth-orientation," "detachment from personal whims," and "piety-centeredness" (cf. Tabatabai, 1996; Makarem Shirazi, 1995; Fakhr al-Rāzī, 1999). Accordingly, within the "monotheistic civilization of the Ummah" (Babaei, 2020): 1) "Justice" possesses a faith-based origin. 2) The establishment of "justice" is a public duty for all truth-oriented individuals. 3) The creation and maintenance of "justice" is not restricted to law enforcers at the societal level (external supervision); rather, all individuals—commensurate with their "faith" and through internal supervision of their own actions—implement a degree of "justice" within society. 4) The establishment of "justice" must be a continuous and uninterrupted standing. 5) The objective of implementing "justice" must be the fulfillment of a divine obligation, performed sincerely for God. 6) The practice and upholding of "truth" in society must serve as the criterion for "justice." 7) "Justice" must be pursued as the fulfillment of a divine duty, remaining detached from personal whims. 8) Striving to increase "piety" is the primary factor for achieving ever-increasing success in establishing faith-based justice. Justice possessing these characteristics establishes an order that transcends any material civilization. To the extent that "faith" increases within society, "faith-based justice"—and consequently "faith-based order"—also flourishes. In the "monotheistic civilization/Ummah," all truth-oriented individuals bear the responsibility for establishing justice. The responsibility of every person of faith toward practicing justice is commensurate with their degree of "faith." As an individual's "faith" increases, their responsibility for establishing "justice" likewise grows.
The period of Mongol dominance over Iran is considered one of the most turbulent and critical epochs in the history of this land, characterized by the collapse of former political and social structures. Within this context, Iranian elites and statesmen faced the fundamental challenge of "cultural and political survival" against a foreign, destructive, and non-Muslim sovereignty. Among these elites, ʿAṭā-Malik Juwaynī (623–681 AH), a prominent historian and bureaucrat, played a unique role. He not only served as an official within the Mongol administrative apparatus but also, in his monumental work, Tārīkh-i jahāngushāy, formulated a political theory aimed at both explaining the status quo and providing a framework for its management and reform.This research aims to extract and explain the principles of governance in the political thought of ʿAṭā-Malik Juwaynī. Adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, it addresses the fundamental question of how he designed a model of governance for managing society during a period of crisis by synthesizing Iranian-Islamic intellectual traditions with a realistic understanding of contemporary conditions. Although the book Tārīkh-i jahāngushāy is a historical work rather than a treatise on political philosophy, this article systematizes Juwaynī’s political ideas by extracting key concepts and recurring themes regarding the state, power, the ruler, and society.Findings indicate that Juwaynī’s political thought is built upon several pillars. To justify his cooperation with the Mongols and to establish stability, he attributes their rise to "Divine Providence," viewing it as the inevitable consequence of the moral and political decadence of Muslim societies. Consequently, Mongol rule, however oppressive, is a "legitimate destiny" that must be accepted and managed for a successful transition. The central axis of his thought is justice as the fundamental condition for the survival of both state and religion—a multidimensional concept encompassing the provision of security, the seeking of redress, a fair taxation system, and the selection of righteous officials. In his view, the ruler (monarch) is the "heart of the state" who must ensure the health of the entire political body through the promotion of justice, prudence, courage, receptiveness to counsel, and a commitment to the prosperity and welfare of the people. Rather than a total rejection of the new rulers, Juwaynī adopted a strategy of "reform from within." By skillfully synthesizing Sassanid bureaucratic traditions, Persian mirrors for princes (andarz-nāma), and Islamic principles, he designed a model of governance intended to educate and moderate the behavior of the Mongol Khans. Ultimately, ʿAṭā-Malik Juwaynī’s political thought is not an abstract theory but a practical strategy and an astute response to the profound crisis of his era. By presenting a model of governance based on justice and realism, he succeeded in establishing the intellectual and administrative foundations of the Ilkhanid state while preserving Iran's cultural and administrative structures, thereby ensuring the continuity of Iranian civilization. Thus, his thought stands as a prominent example of "resistance through cooperation" and crisis management in the history of Persian political thought.
The present study has been aims to accurately explain the nature and scope of political jurisprudence in terms of its fundamental unit, namely the "jurisprudential proposition." I argue that the ambiguities and divergence of opinions existing in the definition of political jurisprudence and its demarcation from other disciplines, rather than being rooted in the ambiguity of the concept of "politics," result from a neglect of the epistemological nature of jurisprudence and an inattention to its propositional structure. Therefore, by adopting the "philosophy of" approach as second-order knowledge, this study attempts to provide a coherent framework for determining the identity of political jurisprudence through a logical analysis of the components of the jurisprudential proposition. In this process, it is first emphasized that political jurisprudence should not be viewed as a collection of empirical or descriptive issues within the political sphere; rather, its identity finds meaning only in the form of "prescriptive and normative propositions." In other words, political jurisprudence is a discipline that seeks to discover "divine legislation" for the regulation of political behaviors, and in this respect, it is distinguished from descriptive sciences that seek to explain "what is." Criticizing certain expansionist perspectives that equate political jurisprudence with the totality of political science, the author warns that such a conflation leads to the weakening of the epistemological foundation of jurisprudence and the destabilization of the validity of inferences. The fundamental pillar of this research is the precise distinction between three levels: subject identification, ruling-ology, and instance-identification in the process of inferring jurisprudential propositions. The author argues that subject identification (in the sense of explaining concepts such as the state, allegiance, or elections at the stage of inference) is an inseparable part of the jurisprudential operation, as the divine ruling is always subject to the scope of its subject. However, a fundamental distinction must be made between subject identification and instance identification. Instance identification—that is, determining whether a specific international treaty or a particular political behavior constitutes a specific jurisprudential title—is not jurisprudential in nature but rather belongs to the stage of "compliance" (imtithāl) and expert judgment. For instance, a jurist infers the general ruling of "negation of dominance" (nafy al-sabīl), but determining whether joining treaties such as FATF constitutes dominance requires extra-jurisprudential expertise in political science and international relations. Neglecting this distinction has led to expectations of political jurisprudence sometimes extending beyond its actual function, or conversely, its scope being restricted to traditional issues. In another layer, the article analyzes the types of divine rulings (prescriptive/declaratory and primary/secondary) and their implications for the nature of political jurisprudence. The author believes that political jurisprudence should not limit itself solely to "prescriptive rulings" (such as the obligation and prohibition of individual behaviors); rather, "declaratory rulings," which form the basis of institutional and legitimizing structures such as the "office of guardianship" (manṣab al-wilāya) or the "validity of contracts," constitute a large part of this discipline's scope. Furthermore, the distinction between primary and secondary rulings demonstrates that political jurisprudence possesses a dynamic capacity to respond to the changing needs of governance, provided that no conflation occurs between the "inference of a general secondary ruling" and the issuance of a governing decree (ḥukm ḥukūmī), the latter of which belongs to the category of application to instances. The findings of this research indicate that political jurisprudence can emerge as a coherent and efficient discipline in the realm of governance only when it remains faithful, on the one hand, to its traditional methodology (ijtihad based on the fourfold proofs) and, on the other hand, opens a systematic and organized channel of interaction with the humanities. This interaction does not mean the integration of jurisprudence into political science, but rather the utilization of data from descriptive sciences for more precise subject identification and more professional "instance identification." Finally, the author concludes that the nature of political jurisprudence is a function of the nature of its propositions, which revolve around "divine legislation and the relationship between the ruling and the subject. By adopting this approach, political jurisprudence not only remains immune to the danger of reductionism but can also, while maintaining its epistemological boundaries, undertake the normative guidance of the political system in a regulated manner and prevent the stagnation or baselessness of inferences when faced with modern phenomena such as digital or networked governance. Consequently, political jurisprudence, as a branch of public jurisprudence, is responsible for the inference of prescriptive rulings for political subjects; meanwhile, for the implementation of these rulings at the level of governance, it requires interdisciplinary teams and instance-identification protocols that establish a link between jurists and social science experts. This approach does not signify the end of the era of jurisprudence, but rather the beginning of a new chapter of knowledge-based governance in which jurisprudence maintains its central position in the normative engineering of society.