The article is devoted to the problem of development of critical thinking. The essence of critical thinking is investigated and its meaning is rethought as an evaluation stage of intellectual action. The value of critical thinking in comparison with analytical is clarified. The definitions and conditions of critical thinking, the difference between critical thinking and non-critical thinking are analyzed. An increase in the quality of thinking in critical thinking, carried out according to logical norms, has been found out. The reflexive nature of critical thinking as thinking of the highest order, its difference with respect to understanding, is determined. The stage of critical thinking is characterized as metacognition, which causes effective communication. The importance of critical thinking in curbing egoism is investigated, thanks to developed intellectual abilities, conscious use of criteria of objectivity and truth. The special importance of critical thinking in overcoming logical errors, making the right decisions is noted. The difference between critical thinking and analytical thinking, as well as the stages of critical thinking, is determined. Developed opinion on the meaning of understanding in critical thinking, the use of hermeneutic logic as a tool for understanding and interpretation. Established features of strong and weak criticism, «blind» or «unreasonable» criticism, «false refutation», etc. The connection between logical methods and emotional intelligence is clarified; practical, creative and emotional critical thinking. The actual tasks in the development of critical thinking in the system of logical education in higher education for increasing the level of development of intellectual abilities and educational tasks for improving the critical approach in the analysis of scientific texts, critical thinking, in particular, in the context of hybrid warfare, as metacognition and anti-trolling tool are indicated. It focuses on intellectual virtues in critical thinking. Perfect criticism is characterized by intellectual courage, which involves intellectual freedom and courage, intellectual independence and sincerity, intellectual perseverance, adherence to intellectual standards, trust in reason and faith in truth. Intellectual virtues oppose egocentrism and intellectual arrogance, intellectual limitation, and false points of view in communication.
The article examines cross‑media communication as a factor of political online communication in the context of the transformation of the contemporary digital environment. The purpose of the study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of cross‑media communication on the structure, dynamics, and effectiveness of political communication, as well as on the specific features of interaction between political actors and audiences. The methodological framework of the study is grounded in general scientific and specialized methods, including analysis and synthesis, generalization, comparative approaches, as well as elements of structural‑functional and systems analysis. These methods made it possible to conceptualize cross‑media communication as a complex political‑communication phenomenon. The study identifies the essence of cross‑media communication in the political dimension and outlines its key characteristics as a factor of political online communication, specifically multichannel dissemination, integration, adaptability, and interactivity. It reveals the transformation of political communication models toward networked interaction, analyses cross‑media strategies of political actors, and examines their role in audience segmentation and engagement. The research evaluates the influence of cross‑media communication on the formation of public opinion, political mobilization, and processes of fragmentation within the informational environment. The theoretical significance of the study lies in broadening scholarly understanding of cross‑media communication as a political‑communication phenomenon and in clarifying its role in the transformation of contemporary political discourse. The practical significance is reflected in the potential application of the findings to the development of effective communication strategies for political actors within the digital environment. The scientific novelty of the study consists in considering cross‑media communication not merely as a media‑related phenomenon, but as a systemic factor of political communication that shapes the logic of political space in the context of digitalization. Future research prospects include empirical analysis of cross‑media practices in specific political contexts, as well as the examination of the impact of algorithmic mechanisms of digital platforms on political communication.
This article is devoted to the reconstruction of the concept of the Open Universe in the philosophy of Karl Popper as a coherent metaphysical position that cannot be reduced to the purely methodological program of falsificationism, but instead functions as an ontological precondition of critical rationalism. The point of departure of the study is the thesis that the problem of the ontological status of scientific reality and its openness is directly connected with the fundamental issues of determinism and indeterminism, the nature of causality, and the possibility of rational cognition, as well as with the contemporary tendency toward the rehabilitation of metaphysics within the philosophy of science. In this context, it is shown that Popper’s idea of the openness of being can be understood as a form of rationally controlled ontological assumption: it does not claim the status of an ultimate first philosophy, yet it establishes the conditions for the meaningfulness of scientific criticism, explanation, and the growth of knowledge. The article argues that Popper’s central argument against Laplacian determinism is directed not merely against a specific physical model, but against the very idea of the complete predetermination of reality, which implicitly undermines the possibility of novelty, the creative formulation of hypotheses, and the genuine cognitive role of error. It is demonstrated that Popperian indeterminism is not a simple negation of causality; rather, causality is reconceptualized as an open form of causation in terms of propensities, which describe the structure of the possible and a spectrum of alternatives, rather than a fatally necessary chain of events. From this perspective, the Open Universe becomes ontologically relevant for epistemology: falsification presupposes the real possibility that events might unfold otherwise and, accordingly, the real possibility of refutation; error acquires a constructive status as a mechanism of theory selection; and the growth of knowledge appears as an evolutionary process whose outcomes cannot be deduced in advance from initial conditions. Special attention is paid to the relationship between the concept of the Open Universe and the theory of the three worlds, within which the autonomy of the world of objective knowledge reinforces the thesis of the multi-level openness of reality: the logic of the development of problems, theories, and arguments cannot be reduced to physical determinism, and therefore the openness of being manifests itself also in the sphere of rational activity and culture. On this basis, the article proposes an interpretation of the Open Universe as a non-classical ontology of science compatible with contemporary programs of scientific and naturalized metaphysics, which acknowledge the inevitability of ontological commitments while simultaneously emphasizing their accountability to scientific practice and rational criticism. The paper also outlines the main lines of reception and criticism of Popperian indeterminism and points to the problematic nature of certain epistemological consequences. It is emphasized that within the Ukrainian academic discourse the metaphysical dimension of the concept of the Open Universe remains insufficiently developed, which актуalizes the need for its systematic reconstruction and further theoretical integration into research in ontology and the philosophy of science.
There exists a paradox of the modern subject, who strives to attain autonomy, yet invariably becomes entangled in various systems of dependency. Sovereignty, inner self-sufficiency, and relative independence from external circumstances – qualities that were historically inherent to the human being – are gradually disappearing as a result of total immersion in systems of dependency formed within biopolitical reality. It is precisely in modernity that the «one-dimensional man» exists within systems of diverse dependencies of biopower, which continuously monitor and govern his intentions, actions, and behavior. However, the possibilities for preserving individual autonomy nevertheless remain due to the existence of various contemporary technologies, for example, those oriented toward the Foucauldian «care of the self». At the same time, through the cultivation of these techniques of the self, the individual has every opportunity to independently construct their autonomy, endowing it with traits of originality and uniqueness. Unfortunately, individual «technologies of the self» as practices of autonomy do not currently receive widespread dissemination among broad strata of the population. At the same time, what is becoming widespread is the involvement of individuals in singular, temporary, collective communities, in particular digital networks, which to some extent make it possible to overcome the total control exercised by contemporary neoliberal biopolitics. Emphasis is placed on a comparative analysis of the liberal biopolitics of M. Foucault, who focused on the governmentality of the state, that is, on understanding the phenomenon of governance as a universal principle of all and of each. This created zones of autonomy. On the other hand, it is shown that the neoliberal biopolitics of Empire and Multitude by M. Hardt and A. Negri, which transcends national and state borders, reveals significant dualistic contradictions in the formation of the autonomy of the modern individual. At the same time, fundamental contradictions in the formation of the collective political subject within the concept of Empire by M. Hardt and A. Negri are also identified. These contradictions make it possible to better assess the impact of digital technologies on temporary public gatherings and network communities, which, in turn, form an entire range of new social dependencies. This vividly demonstrates the attempts of individuals, in order to preserve their autonomy, to seek out new, sometimes marginal social communities or micro-communities, which they can join as full-fledged participants. However, this gives rise to a real threat of the complete loss of individual autonomy that was still characteristic of modern society. It is established that this may lead to a transformation in the very understanding of autonomy characteristic of individuals in modern industrial society. It is analyzed that in modern society biopolitics organically combined disciplinary techniques with technologies of biopolitics, which ensured state-guaranteed security for the population. This provided certain opportunities for the realization of independent intentions and desires in the life activity of individuals. It is traced that in the contemporary digital network society, the biopolitical strategy of the formation of subjectivity is undergoing radical transformation, which significantly affects individual autonomy. Therefore, as a perspective for further research, it is meaningful to investigate the dynamic changes in autonomy and dependency of the individual within temporary microsocieties, where the emphasis shifts from biopolitics to psychopolitics. It is precisely these new forms of social communities, characteristic of digital society, that rapidly generate spontaneous gatherings of individuals and immaterial professional collectives.
The article discusses the impact of empeiria on the quality, essence, and purpose of the philosophical job. Philosophical jobs at universities include teaching philosophical disciplines, writing articles, monographs, dissertations, preparing abstracts and papers at conferences, constructing concepts and conceptions, etc. The author of the article argues that a philosophical job, like any other scientific one, is based on empeiria, which is often confused with acquired sensory experience as the source of knowledge in Empiricism. In the article, based on the analysis of the concept of empeiria in classics of European philosophy Plato and Aristotle, the Empiricism of Francis Bacon, and the concept of experience in René Descartes, the author refutes two statements: 1) philosophical job is non-empirical, rational-abstract, and speculative job, therefore it is not scientific, 2) empeiria is identical to the acquired sensory experience. The appeal to the two ancient Greek thinkers is because that they were among the first to use empeiria as a concept and understand it as a source of knowledge; to the Empiricism of Francis Bacon, because the English thinker is the “father” of Empiricism and therefore it is important to understand what this “founder” means by “Empiricism”. In addition, the article argues that René Descartes did not shy away from empeiria. These analyses of Francis Bacon’s “authentic” Empiricism and René Descartes’ “hypothetical” Empiricism refute the philosophical cliché of dividing philosophers into rationalists and empiricists. The refutation of the speculativeness of the philosophical job and its non-empirical character is based on a rethinking of the concept of empeiria and Empiricism, that is, the epistemological theory of acquired sensory experience as a source of knowledge, as well as on the distinction between empeiria and acquired sensory experience. Moreover, the article also shows that conceptual engineering as a philosophical method of creating, adjusting, and implementing concepts into philosophical discourses, requires empeiria as authentic experience for successful work with concepts and construction of conceptions.
