We explored the role of the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) and Canada Recovery Benefit (CRB) in shaping income distributions and household food insecurity prevalence during the first year of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Drawing on the 2018-2020 Canadian Income Survey, we found that in 2020 the CERB-CRB led to income gains at the lower end of the after-tax income distribution at the individual and household levels, but the gains were larger for lower-income individuals than for lower-income households. Gains were also present higher up in the income distribution of households than in that of individuals. Assuming no other programs would have offset households' employment income losses in 2020, household food insecurity prevalence could have been nearly 2 percentage points higher had CERB/CRB not been implemented. The lack of an increase in the official food insecurity prevalence estimate in the first year of the pandemic may have been a positive outcome of CERB/CRB.
Canada has consistently been estimated to be more socio-economically mobile than the United States overall, but the greater steepness of its rank-rank relationship below the 20th percentile of the parental income distribution has thus far remained unexplained. In this study, we use recent linkages between the Intergenerational Income Database (IID) and census data to resolve this puzzle. We show that the non-linearity in the rank-rank relationship observed at the bottom of the parental income distribution is almost entirely attributable to the very low adulthood incomes of Indigenous children who grew up in low-income families. We find that mobility is about two times lower for children from Indigenous backgrounds. While tax exemption for income earned on Indigenous reserve may partially account for the low levels of income observed in tax data, other factors may also be at play that warrant future investigation to better understand the causes and consequences of this intergenerational dynamic. We strongly encourage Statistics Canada to continue to update the IID by adding tax years as their data become available, integrating new birth cohorts, and linking to additional data.
Numerous studies have empirically investigated the efficacy of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines in Canada using national, provincial, or health region data. This article contributes to the literature by estimating the effects of vaccination rates on COVID-19 cases and hospital admissions by exploiting weekly variation across 140 Toronto neighbourhoods from November 2020 to August 2021. The use of neighbourhood-level data enables a credible assessment of whether the elasticity of case and hospitalization rates to vaccinations varies by local socio-economic and demographic attributes. Ordinary least squares estimates reveal average vaccination elasticities ranging from -0.05 to -0.26 with respect to cases and hospitalizations, depending on the specific time period. Results from instrumental variables regressions yield elasticities that are larger in magnitude, within a -0.28 to -0.44 range. In neighbourhoods in which a greater share of the population resides in overcrowded housing and has lower education, vaccines appear to be especially effective in reducing cases. We discuss the implications of this heterogeneity for government policy, particularly with respect to vaccine allocation.
It does so by integrating recent data on incomes, taxes, cash, and in-kind transfers via publicly funded health care with Statistics Canada's official demographic projections. Our results show major transfers from males to females, as well as larger transfers from rich to poor, than between generations. Still, Canada's projected population aging raises issues of fiscal sustainability. To address these fiscal imbalances, addressing projected cost increases in the health care sector are more important quantitatively than public pensions. Still, there are potentially feasible scenarios to address these longer run fiscal concerns without impairing either population health or the anti-poverty roles of public pensions.
S'appuyant sur les exemples historiques de l'& eacute;lectricit & eacute; et de l'informatique, l'article d & eacute;veloppe le cadre des 3R - remplacer, r & eacute;inventer et recombiner - comme outil permettant de comprendre comment les technologies & agrave; usage g & eacute;n & eacute;ral comme l'intelligence artificielle (IA) remod & egrave;lent les & eacute;conomies et la soci & eacute;t & eacute; au fil du temps. Le cadre fournit une feuille de route pour naviguer dans la r & eacute;volution de l'IA & agrave; venir et propose des outils pratiques et des exemples pour saisir les occasions de croissance qu'elle offre. Il est essentiel de noter que les plus grands b & eacute;n & eacute;fices de ce progr & egrave;s ne viendront pas simplement du remplacement des technologies existantes, mais de la r & eacute;invention des processus, des mod & egrave;les d'affaires et de secteurs entiers autour de l'IA. Pour tirer parti de ces avantages et prosp & eacute;rer dans l'& eacute;conomie des biens immat & eacute;riels, le Canada doit faire & eacute;voluer son paradigme en mati & egrave;re d'IA : il doit passer d'une approche ax & eacute;e sur la recherche et la promotion de champions nationaux de l'IA & agrave; la cr & eacute;ation d'une nation d'utilisateurs et de r & eacute;inventeurs de l'IA. L'article conclut en pr & eacute;sentant les politiques et les programmes n & eacute;cessaires pour b & acirc;tir une telle nation de l'IA et tire des enseignements des politiques mises en oe uvre par des pays comparables. Drawing on the historical examples of electricity and computing, this article develops the 3R framework-replace, reimagine, and recombine-as a tool for understanding how general-purpose technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) reshape economies and society over time. The framework provides a map for navigating the coming AI revolution and offers practical tools for and examples of seizing its opportunities. Crucially, the greatest value will come not from simply replacing existing technologies but from reimagining processes, business models and entire industries around AI. To unlock these benefits and thrive in the intangibles economy, Canada must shift its AI paradigm from a focus on research and the pursuit of national AI industry champions to cultivating a nation of AI adopters and re-imaginers. The article concludes by outlining the policies and programs needed to build such an AI nation and draws lessons from the policies of peer countries.
We examine potential consequences of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption at post-secondary institutions. One driver for such adoption has been financial constraints resulting from policy changes that have reduced international student enrollment and curbed tuition fees and government funding. Drawing on a prior analysis of higher education decision-making algorithms and an ethnographic case study of a large Ontario college, we consider the introduction of AI technologies for several purposes, including student retention, resource allocation, and program planning. Although these systems may offer efficiency, they may also introduce risks of bias, surveillance, and opacity, particularly for marginalized student populations. We argue that AI adoption in higher education calls for sector-specific regulation, human oversight, and equity-centred design, drawing on international models such as the European Union's AI Act. The analysis underscores the urgent need to align educational AI systems with democratic values of fairness, transparency, and accountability.
Governments are seeking to rapidly adopt "trustworthy" artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance productivity and efficiency. However, little legislation or guidance exists for AI use in Canadian public services, and there is very little knowledge in the public sector about how AI should be adopted. This article proposes a framework for flexible AI adoption in public service through targeted pilot projects that integrate efforts to build trust from the beginning to build up capacity, knowledge, and case studies to better inform continued adoption and potentially to inform future legislation and standards development for AI in public service contexts. Whereas the Silicon Valley motto of "move fast and break things" has been shown to do just that-breaking things irresponsibly without consideration of those affected-this framework seeks to move deliberately and build long-term systems and processes that are integrated with public trust in institutions and embedded in democratic principles.
L'intelligence artificielle (IA) a le potentiel d'entra & icirc;ner des changements profonds dans les & eacute;conomies & agrave; tous les niveaux. Cet article soutient que l'IA peut & ecirc;tre consid & eacute;r & eacute;e comme une innovation en mati & egrave;re de services, capable d'apporter de la valeur ajout & eacute;e gr & acirc;ce & agrave; des cadres r & eacute;glementaires efficaces. Le niveau r & eacute;glementaire pertinent pour la prolif & eacute;ration de cette innovation de service, et la valeur de service qui en r & eacute;sulte, est consid & eacute;r & eacute; comme la combinaison d'une & eacute;chelle op & eacute;rationnelle appropri & eacute;e, d'une capacit & eacute; d'application et d'une agilit & eacute; dans les consid & eacute;rations de conception, comme le montrent des exemples du gouvernement f & eacute;d & eacute;ral canadien comme la Directive sur la prise de d & eacute;cisions automatis & eacute;e, le Code de conduite volontaire visant un d & eacute;veloppement et une gestion responsables des syst & egrave;mes d'IA g & eacute;n & eacute;rative avanc & eacute;s, et la Strat & eacute;gie en mati & egrave;re d'intelligence artificielle pour la fonction publique f & eacute;d & eacute;rale. En outre, le mod & egrave;le pr & eacute;sent & eacute; de cocr & eacute;ation de valeur de service d & eacute;montre que les cr & eacute;ateurs, les organismes de r & eacute;glementation et les utilisateurs finaux des syst & egrave;mes d'IA peuvent tous tirer profit d'une coop & eacute;ration relative aux valeurs fondamentales d'une conception et d'un d & eacute;ploiement s & ucirc;rs et responsables de l'IA, tout en op & eacute;rationnalisant de mani & egrave;re ind & eacute;pendante la valeur de service dans leur propre contexte organisationnel gr & acirc;ce & agrave; des cadres r & eacute;glementaires autonomes. Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to usher in profound changes across economies at all scales. This article argues that AI can be viewed as a service innovation with the ability to bring service value through effective regulatory frameworks. The relevant regulatory level for the proliferation of this service innovation, and the resultant service value, is seen as the combination of appropriate operational scale, enforcement ability, and agility of design considerations as seen in Canadian federal government examples such as the Directive on Automated Decision-Making, the Voluntary Code of Conduct on the Responsible Development and Management of Advanced Generative AI Systems, and the AI Strategy for the Federal Public Service. Furthermore, the presented model of service value co-creation demonstrates that producers, regulators, and end users of AI systems can all benefit through cooperation around basic values of safe and responsible AI design and deployment while independently operationalizing service value in their own organizational context through autonomous regulatory frameworks.
L'article examine comment les technologies & eacute;volutives affectent l'& eacute;conomie, la politique et la soci & eacute;t & eacute; civile. Historiquement, ces technologies ont eu un effet domino : les entreprises dominantes engrangent des profits colossaux, utilisent ce pouvoir & eacute;conomique pour influencer les lois en faveur des acteurs en place, et finissent par aggraver les in & eacute;galit & eacute;s sociales et & eacute;roder la coh & eacute;sion sociale. L'intelligence artificielle (IA) suit ce sch & eacute;ma, mais ajoute des impacts de premier ordre en remodelant directement la conduite politique et le discours civil. Je propose un cadre r & eacute;glementaire ax & eacute; sur le moment et la mani & egrave;re d'intervenir. La r & eacute;glementation de l'IA devrait & ecirc;tre inexistante ou minimale au stade du d & eacute;veloppement, et ne s'appliquer que lorsque l'& eacute;chelle & eacute;conomique augmente et que des externalit & eacute;s n & eacute;gatives sont g & eacute;n & eacute;r & eacute;es. Les principales exigences r & eacute;glementaires, comme l'interop & eacute;rabilit & eacute; et la portabilit & eacute; des donn & eacute;es, seraient probablement r & eacute;serv & eacute;es aux tr & egrave;s grands syst & egrave;mes d'IA. Cette approche moins interventionniste, ax & eacute;e sur la surveillance de la port & eacute;e et de l'exposition, s'inspire de la r & eacute;glementation bancaire macroprudentielle. Elle offre un juste milieu entre la loi europ & eacute;enne sur l'IA (qui pourrait agir pr & eacute;matur & eacute;ment et d & eacute;courager l'innovation) et la politique de concurrence am & eacute;ricaine (qui agit g & eacute;n & eacute;ralement trop lentement). Enfin, je soutiens que, comme les externalit & eacute;s se manifestent au moment de l'engagement des utilisateurs, la r & eacute;glementation devrait cibler les applications plut & ocirc;t que les mod & egrave;les sous-jacents. Elle doit & eacute;galement s'adapter & agrave; la r & eacute;alit & eacute; du contr & ocirc;le limit & eacute; du Canada sur les plateformes d'IA dans d'autres pays. This article examines how scalable technologies affect the economy, politics, and civil society. Historically, these technologies have triggered a cascading effect: dominant firms earn massive profits, leverage that economic power to influence laws that favour incumbents, and ultimately drive social inequality and erode social cohesion. Artificial intelligence (AI) follows this pattern but adds first-order impacts by directly reshaping political conduct and civil discourse. I propose a regulatory framework focused on when and how to intervene. AI regulation should be non-existent or minimal at the development stage, triggered only when economic scale increases and negative externalities are generated. Major regulatory requirements such as interoperability and data portability would likely be reserved for very large AI systems. This light-touch approach-focused on monitoring scale and exposure-mirrors macro-prudential banking regulation. It offers a middle ground between the European Union's AI Act (which may act prematurely and discourage innovation) and US competition policy (which typically acts too slowly). Finally, I argue that because externalities manifest at the point of user engagement, regulation should target applications rather than underlying models. It must also adjust to the reality of limited Canadian control over AI platforms in other countries.
L'acc & egrave;s & agrave; des donn & eacute;es de haute qualit & eacute; dans le domaine de la sant & eacute; reste un d & eacute;fi d'importance en raison des pr & eacute;occupations li & eacute;es & agrave; la vie priv & eacute;e, de r & eacute;glementations strictes et de la fragmentation des syst & egrave;mes de donn & eacute;es. Les donn & eacute;es synth & eacute;tiques constituent une technologie prometteuse pour le renforcement de la protection de la vie priv & eacute;e, capable de faciliter l'innovation tout en pr & eacute;servant les informations de sant & eacute; sensibles. Les donn & eacute;es synth & eacute;tiques d & eacute;signent des ensembles de donn & eacute;es g & eacute;n & eacute;r & eacute;s artificiellement qui ressemblent statistiquement & agrave; de v & eacute;ritables donn & eacute;es de sant & eacute;, mais ne contiennent aucune information de sant & eacute; identifiable ou personnelle. Le Canada ne dispose pas de d & eacute;finitions juridiques claires pour les donn & eacute;es d & eacute;personnalis & eacute;es, anonymis & eacute;es et synth & eacute;tiques, ce qui entra & icirc;ne une incertitude en mati & egrave;re de gouvernance. Il est n & eacute;cessaire d'& eacute;tablir des lignes directrices claires sur l'& eacute;valuation des risques pour la vie priv & eacute;e et les cadres de mise en commun des donn & eacute;es. Pour tirer pleinement parti des donn & eacute;es synth & eacute;tiques, le Canada doit moderniser ses lois sur la protection de la vie priv & eacute;e et les aligner sur les meilleures pratiques internationales. La confiance du public doit & ecirc;tre renforc & eacute;e gr & acirc;ce & agrave; une gestion transparente des donn & eacute;es et & agrave; une sensibilisation aux avantages des donn & eacute;es synth & eacute;tiques pour la s & eacute;curit & eacute; des mod & egrave;les d'intelligence artificielle (IA) et l'am & eacute;lioration du syst & egrave;me de sant & eacute;. En adoptant ces strat & eacute;gies, le Canada peut favoriser l'innovation en mati & egrave;re de soins de sant & eacute; fond & eacute;e sur l'IA tout en continuant & agrave; prot & eacute;ger la confidentialit & eacute; des donn & eacute;es de nature d & eacute;licate, et conserver ainsi son leadership dans le d & eacute;veloppement & eacute;thique de l'IA. Access to high-quality health data remains a major challenge because of privacy concerns, strict regulations, and fragmented data systems. Synthetic data are a promising privacy-enhancing technology that can facilitate innovation while safeguarding sensitive health information. Synthetic data are artificially generated data sets that statistically resemble real health data but contain no identifiable or personal health information. Canada lacks clear legal definitions for de-identified, anonymized, and synthetic data, leading to uncertainty in governance. Clear guidelines on privacy risk assessment and data-sharing frameworks are needed. To fully leverage synthetic data, Canada must modernize its privacy laws and align them with international best practices. Public trust must be built through transparent data stewardship and education on the benefits of synthetic data for artificial intelligence (AI) model safety and health system improvement. By adopting these strategies, Canada can enhance AI-driven health care innovation while maintaining privacy protections, retaining its leadership in ethical AI development.
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is widely seen as a potential threat to election integrity and democratic participation. AI-enabled content creation and dissemination have not yet decisively changed election outcomes, but experimental evidence and real-world cases suggest that AI is likely to be a major challenge for democracy in Canada and globally. This article uses a multiple-streams framework to analyze potential policy responses in Canada. First, we clarify the problem of generative AI as a threat to democratic elections by specifying three harmful uses: deception, information system pollution, and harassment. Second, we examine potential responses in the policy stream in Canada and globally, which we categorize as disclosure measures, content prohibitions and takedowns, and comprehensive regulations for AI systems. We argue that a governance ecosystem, rather than a single policy, must be created to achieve substantial accountability for AI-enabled harms. Third, our analysis of the politics stream suggests that some disclosure and content-focused policies are politically feasible in the near term but that more comprehensive regulation is unlikely without a significant change in the political context.
This study investigates the factors associated with and productivity effects of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption among firms operating in Canada, leveraging a novel firm-level database linking the Survey of Digital Technology and Internet Use and firm-level administrative records. Using a range of econometric techniques, including difference-in-differences estimation, we assess the correlation between AI adoption and firms' labour productivity. Our results show that AI adoption is closely tied to complementary capabilities such as research and development investment, cloud computing, data analytics, advanced robotics, and information and communication technology training. Adoption rates are higher in the service sector, particularly in the information and cultural industries. Moreover, the likelihood of AI uptake follows an inverted-U-shaped pattern with firm age, peaking among firms at the pivotal eighth year, and rises steadily with firm size, indicating that larger and well-established firms are most likely to adopt AI. Although AI adoption is linked to higher productivity levels, this observed productivity premium may not be attributable to AI alone. Instead, it reflects complementarities between AI and broader innovation and digital transformation efforts. These findings underscore that the transformative potential of AI depends not only on adoption but also on firms' readiness and capacity to integrate the technology effectively into their operations.
L'& eacute;tude & eacute;value de fa & ccedil;on empirique la relation entre, d'une part, les mesures de la confiance des particuliers & agrave; l'& eacute;gard du gouvernement et, d'autre part, la vraisemblance que soient v & eacute;rifi & eacute;es des informations en ligne de toute nature et que ces informations soient partag & eacute;es sans en v & eacute;rifier l'exactitude. Les estimations par la m & eacute;thode des moindres carr & eacute;s ordinaires (MCO) issues de l'Enqu & ecirc;te canadienne sur l'utilisation de l'Internet (ECUI) de 2022 r & eacute;v & egrave;lent que les personnes ayant d & eacute;clar & eacute; faire confiance au gouvernement pour la gestion de leurs renseignements personnels sont plus susceptibles d'avoir v & eacute;rifi & eacute; de l'information trouv & eacute;e sur Internet, mais sont & eacute;galement plus susceptibles de d & eacute;clarer avoir partag & eacute; de l'information en ligne sans en confirmer la v & eacute;racit & eacute;. Les estimations par MCO issues de la s & eacute;rie d'enqu & ecirc;tes sur les perspectives canadiennes (SEPC) de 2020 indiquent que les r & eacute;pondants qui se sont appuy & eacute;s sur les agences gouvernementales de sant & eacute; comme principale source d'information pendant la pand & eacute;mie & eacute;taient plus susceptibles de d & eacute;clarer & laquo; v & eacute;rifier toujours ou souvent & raquo; l'information trouv & eacute;e sur Internet, quelle que soit leur source, mais l'estimation comparable pour & laquo; v & eacute;rifier toujours & raquo; n'est pas statistiquement significative. En r & eacute;sum & eacute;, bien que nous notions certaines preuves montrant l'importance de la confiance envers le gouvernement, compte tenu autant du manque de donn & eacute;es de meilleure qualit & eacute;, que la pr & eacute;sence de r & eacute;sultats contradictoires et de lectures causales divergentes, nos r & eacute;sultats doivent & ecirc;tre interpr & eacute;t & eacute;s avec une grande prudence. Nous estimons que les agences gouvernementales canadiennes devraient redoubler d'efforts pour collecter des donn & eacute;es sur la d & eacute;sinformation et la confiance au sein de la soci & eacute;t & eacute;. This study empirically estimates the relationship between measures of individual trust in government and the likelihood of verifying online information of any kind and sharing such information without checking accuracy. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from the 2022 Canadian Internet Use Survey reveal that individuals who reported trusting government with their personal information are more likely to have verified internet information but are also more likely to report having shared online information without fact checking. OLS estimates from the 2020 Canadian Perspectives Survey Series indicate that respondents who relied on government health agencies as their chief information source during the pandemic were more likely to report "always or often checking" internet information from any source, but the comparable estimate for "always checking" is not statistically significant. In summary, although we find some evidence for the importance of trust in government, given the lack of better data, conflicting results, and alternative causal interpretations, our results should be treated with an abundance of caution. We argue that more effort should be made by Canadian government agencies to collect data on misinformation and societal trust.
Canadian policy-makers face a fundamental trade-off between protecting the public's privacy and fostering the growth of domestic start-ups that rely on machine learning algorithms for decision-making. Because the performance of such algorithms depends critically on the quality and accessibility of training data, information confined in institutional or sectoral silos represents substantial lost economic and social value. To unlock this value responsibly, governments can play a central role in developing public data exchanges that promote efficiency and innovation while maintaining public trust. This article contrasts the data exchange frameworks of China, the European Union, and the United States, examining how each jurisdiction manages the tensions between data access and control and between privacy and innovation. We argue that elements of China's approach merit closer consideration as Canada contemplates its own model for commercial data marketplaces that would enable firms to innovate responsibly while providing sufficient safeguards.
In March 2020, the Bank of Canada implemented the Government of Canada Bond Purchase Program, eventually purchasing approximately $340 billion of government bonds. In this article, we first analyze the impact of this program on financial market prices and yields. Using an event study analysis, we find that long-term government bond yields declined by between 10 and 20 basis points (bps) across these announcements. Because these announcements do not capture the full yield impact of the purchase program, we perform a back-of-the-envelope counterfactual and estimate that it may have had an impact of almost 80 bps on ten-year bond yields. Then, using a macrofinance model, we can map yield changes into impacts on gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation. In the scenario in which ten-year bond yields decline by almost 80 bps, there is a peak impact of about 2.8 percent on real GDP and 0.7 annualized percentage points on inflation. Nevertheless, there is a lot of uncertainty about the size of this impact.
Au lendemain de la pandémie de COVID-19 au Canada, de nombreux gouvernements et organismes fédéraux et provinciaux, ainsi que diverses ONG, ont publié des rapports sur les « leçons apprises » qui évaluaient les politiques mises en place pendant la pandémie. L'article propose des commentaires sur ces rapports en se basant sur une analyse situationnelle de leur contenu. Il constate que, si beaucoup d'entre eux examinaient les impacts sur diverses communautés marginalisées, les politiques liées au travail de l'industrie du sexe et les expériences de l'industrie étaient largement absentes. Notre analyse de ces lacunes met en avant l'expertise des travailleurs et travailleuses de l'industrie du sexe eux-mêmes. En prenant comme étude de cas la province canadienne de l'Ontario, nous traitons de trois domaines politiques clés : les mesures provinciales de confinement et les ordonnances de rester chez soi; les conditions d'admissibilité pour accéder aux aides économiques et financières d'urgence disponibles; et le plan de déploiement des vaccins. Le fait de mettre l'accent sur le travail de l'industrie du sexe permet de mettre en évidence les contradictions souvent ignorées entre les soins et le contrôle, les relations entre les politiques axées sur le maintien de l'ordre et les réponses pénales et judiciaires étant particulièrement tendues. Nous soutenons au contraire que les décideurs politiques peuvent tirer des leçons précieuses des initiatives d'entraide et de soins collectifs mises en place par les travailleurs et travailleuses de l'industrie du sexe, une leçon aux ramifications étendues.
L'article analyse les effets des stratégies d'activation – ou des interventions politiques visant à encourager et à réglementer la participation au marché du travail – ciblant les étudiants étrangers pendant leurs études. Il analyse la Base de données sur la dynamique canadienne entre employeurs et employés (BDCEE) de Statistique Canada pour révéler qu'une plus grande proportion d'étudiants étrangers que d'étudiants locaux occupent des emplois et travaillent dans des secteurs caractérisés par la précarité pendant leurs études, une tendance amplifiée pour les étudiants étrangers provenant de pays d'origine à faible revenu. Ces tendances sont devenues plus marquées après 2014, lorsque le Canada a introduit un permis de travail hors campus automatique pour tous les titulaires d'un permis d'études. L'analyse révèle également que les étudiants étrangers qui travaillent dans des secteurs caractérisés par la précarité pendant leurs études sont moins susceptibles d'obtenir la résidence permanente en temps opportun. Alors que le Canada adapte son approche en matière de réglementation de la migration scolaire, ces résultats suggèrent que des interventions politiques supplémentaires sont souhaitables afin de mieux protéger les étudiants étrangers en tant que travailleurs, avant et après l'obtention de leur diplôme.
La reconnaissance automatique des plaques d'immatriculation (RAPI) est un outil policier très répandu, mais les informations disponibles sur l'utilisation de cette technologie au Canada sont limitées. Une enquête menée auprès des services de police canadiens révèle que 57 % ( n = 74) des services ayant répondu déclarent utiliser la RAPI. L'utilisation de la RAPI par la police n'est pas normalisée au Canada, ce qui laisse à chaque service le soin d’élaborer sa propre procédure de RAPI. La plupart des services (n = 42) qui utilisent la RAPI n'ont pas élaboré de procédure écrite pour encadrer l'usage de cette technologie. Selon une analyse du contenu de 23 procédures de RAPI utilisées par la police canadienne, les principaux thèmes abordés sont les attentes liées au programme, les utilisateurs, les superviseurs, la sécurité et la conservation des données, la divulgation des données et les relations publiques. L'article considère ces thèmes dans le contexte de lignes directrices nationales et internationales relatives à la RAPI afin de soutenir l’élaboration de pratiques de RAPI normalisées à l’échelle du Canada. Une technologie policière largement utilisée devrait être utilisée de manière cohérente. Si la législation existante en matière de protection de la vie privée guide l'utilisation de ces technologies de surveillance par la police, un cadre favorisant la cohérence entre ces différents thèmes permettrait de renforcer la fiabilité des services de police.
La présente allocution, prononcée dans le cadre de la conférence commémorative Doug Purvis, pendant la 59 e réunion annuelle de l'Association canadienne d’économique en mai 2025, explore l’évolution, les avantages et les défis modernes liés au degré d'indépendance des banques centrales (IBC), surtout en ce qui concerne la Banque du Canada. Elle retrace le développement de la Banque depuis le début de ses activités en 1935 et compare son indépendance à celle d'institutions similaires. La conférence souligne comment l'IBC a soutenu la stabilité macroéconomique du Canada, même si la réponse de la Banque à la COVID-19 et l'inflation postpandémique ont remis en question sa légitimité. Afin de renforcer l'IBC, cinq mesures sont proposées : (1) codifier la stabilité des prix comme mandat principal de la Banque dans la législation; (2) formaliser la gouvernance de l'assouplissement quantitatif et du resserrement quantitatif; (3) renforcer la communication des orientations prospectives; (4) clarifier la coordination budgétaire et monétaire; et (5) mettre en place des évaluations régulières et indépendantes du rendement. Ces réformes visent à préserver la crédibilité de la Banque tout en renforçant la transparence et la responsabilité. Dans un monde marqué par l'augmentation de la dette et la politisation de l’économie, il reste essentiel pour la stabilité macroéconomique et financière que les banques centrales continuent d’être fortes et indépendantes.
