Fraud and scams are some of the most common crimes in the world, inflicting staggering emotional, financial, health, and psychological suffering on millions of individuals each year. Despite this widespread and extensive impact, the psychological research on what renders some individuals more susceptible to fraudulent solicitations, what mechanisms scammers use to lure potential victims, what therapeutic programs can help victims, what educational/preventive programs can reduce compliance, what can be done to increase reporting, and what policies are needed to safeguard the public is just emerging. To address this pressing social problem, this article has several goals. First, it is designed to provide readers with state-of-the-art insights into fraud research: what has been done thus far and what is urgently missing. Its second purpose is to highlight the urgency of the problem and encourage researchers to conduct relevant research in their domain of expertise. Our primary goal, however, is to reach beyond the academic sphere. To fight fraud, we must unite forces with private and not-for-profit organizations, education providers, financial institutions, government entities, grassroots organizations, international organizations, law enforcement agencies, and many more. To that end, we hope this article draws the attention of a wide range of stakeholders and encourages collaborations that produce direct action.
Psychological approaches to the study of the politics of inequality are welcome and warranted because psychology is foundational to understanding inequality, including ways to rectify it. Whereas some approaches narrow political psychology's focus through a lens of a particular discipline and definition of inequality (Connolly et al., 2026), our focus is to center the public. That is, psychology is best situated to study the politics of inequality if it approaches the problem of inequality from a broader perspective: that of people-a perspective that goes well beyond a small handful of academic disciplines or socioeconomic strata. To accomplish this goal, we propose a pluralistic, unbiased, local, intersectional, and critical (PUBLIC) approach to the political psychology of inequality. A PUBLIC approach should be pluralistic in its application of evidence and ways of knowing; unbiased in the perspectives that it centers; local in its focus on psychology, politics, and impact; intersectional in its understanding of inequality and solidarity; and critical in its analysis of power and advantage. Implications for policy and collective action are highlighted.
The high level of inequality of income and wealth across individuals, groups, and nations is widely regarded as among the most fundamental problems facing humanity. Yet democracies often elect and reelect politicians who deliver policies that exacerbate rather than reduce inequality. We argue that this disconnect arises from three basic features of human social cognition that evolved for interpersonal interactions in small groups rather than for navigating the vast political, economic, and technological systems that shape contemporary life: a focus on local notions of equality and equity between socially connected individuals rather than across society at large; group identification, which directs attention to inequality between groups rather than "pure" inequality across the broader population; and what we call the "i-frame bias"-a tendency to explain social outcomes, including inequality, as the product of individual behaviors, taking the system within which those individuals operate as a given. We extend our analysis to examine how economic elites exploit these features of social cognition to shape the political and policy landscape and examine the role psychology can play in reducing inequality.
High-quality mathematics education not only improves life outcomes for individuals but also drives innovation and progress across society. But what exactly constitutes high-quality mathematics education? In this article, we contribute to this discussion by focusing on arithmetic fluency. The debate over how best to teach arithmetic has been long and fierce. Should we emphasize memorization techniques such as flashcards and timed drills or promote "thinking strategies" via play and authentic problem solving? Too often, recommendations for a "balanced" approach lack the depth and specificity needed to effectively guide educators or inform public understanding. Here, we draw on developmental cognitive science, particularly Sfard's process-object duality and Karmiloff-Smith's implicit-explicit knowledge continuum, to present memorization and thinking strategies not as opposing methods but as complementary forces. This framework enables us to offer specific recommendations for fostering arithmetic fluency based on the science of learning. We define arithmetic fluency, provide evidence on its importance, describe the cognitive structures and processes supporting it, and share evidence-based guidance for promoting it. Our recommendations include progress monitoring for early numeracy, providing explicit instruction to teach important strategies and concepts, implementing well-structured retrieval practice, introducing time-limited practice only after students demonstrate accuracy, and allocating sufficient time for discussion and cognitive reflection. By blending theory, evidence, and practical advice, we equip educators and policymakers with the knowledge needed to ensure all children have access to the opportunities needed to achieve arithmetic fluency.
When we use language to communicate, we must choose what to say, what not to say, and how to say it. That is, we must decide how to frame the message. These linguistic choices matter: Framing a discussion one way or another can influence how people think, feel, and act in many important domains, including politics, health, business, journalism, law, and even conversations with loved ones. The ubiquity of framing effects raises several important questions relevant to the public interest: What makes certain messages so potent and others so ineffectual? Do framing effects pose a threat to our autonomy, or are they a rational response to variation in linguistic content? Can we learn to use language more effectively to promote policy reforms or other causes we believe in, or is this an overly idealistic goal? In this article, we address these questions by providing an integrative review of the psychology of framing. We begin with a brief history of the concept of framing and a survey of common framing effects. We then outline the cognitive, social-pragmatic, and emotional mechanisms underlying such effects. This discussion centers on the view that framing is a natural-and unavoidable-feature of human communication. From this perspective, framing effects reflect a sensible response to messages that communicate different information. In the second half of the article, we provide a taxonomy of linguistic framing techniques, describing various ways that the structure or content of a message can be altered to shape people's mental models of what is being described. Some framing manipulations are subtle, involving a slight shift in grammar or wording. Others are more overt, involving wholesale changes to a message. Finally, we consider factors that moderate the impact of framing, gaps in the current empirical literature, and opportunities for future research. We conclude by offering general recommendations for effective framing and reflecting on the place of framing in society. Linguistic framing is powerful, but its effects are not inevitable-we can always reframe an issue to ourselves or other people.
Five years after the beginning of the COVID pandemic, one thing is clear: The East Asian countries of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea outperformed the United States in responding to and controlling the outbreak of the deadly virus. Although multiple factors likely contributed to this disparity, we propose that the culturally linked psychological defaults ("cultural defaults") that pervade these contexts also played a role. Cultural defaults are commonsense, rational, taken-for-granted ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. In the United States, these cultural defaults include optimism and uniqueness, single cause, high arousal, influence and control, personal choice and self-regulation, and promotion. In Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, these defaults include realism and similarity, multiple causes, low arousal, waiting and adjusting, social choice and social regulation, and prevention. In this article, we (a) synthesize decades of empirical research supporting these unmarked defaults; (b) illustrate how they were evident in the announcements and speeches of high-level government and organizational decision makers as they addressed the existential questions posed by the pandemic, including "Will it happen to me/us?" "What is happening?" "What should I/we do?" and "How should I/we live now?"; and (c) show the similarities between these cultural defaults and different national responses to the pandemic. The goal is to integrate some of the voluminous literature in psychology on cultural variation between the United States and East Asia particularly relevant to the pandemic and to emphasize the crucial and practical significance of meaning-making in behavior during this crisis. We provide guidelines for how decision makers might take cultural defaults into account as they design policies to address current and future novel and complex threats, including pandemics, emerging technologies, and climate change.
What solutions can we find in the research literature for preventing sexual violence, and what psychological theories have guided these efforts? We gather all primary prevention efforts to reduce sexual violence from 1985 to 2018 and provide a bird's-eye view of the literature. We first review predominant theoretical approaches to sexual-violence perpetration prevention by highlighting three interventions that exemplify the zeitgeist of primary prevention efforts at various points during this time period. We find a throughline in primary prevention interventions: They aim to change attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge (i.e., ideas) to reduce sexual-violence perpetration and victimization. Our meta-analysis of these studies tests the efficacy of this approach directly and finds that although many interventions are successful at changing ideas, behavior change does not follow. There is little to no relationship between changing attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge and reducing victimization or perpetration. We also observe trends over time, including a shift from targeting a reduction in perpetration to targeting an increase in bystander intervention. We conclude by highlighting promising new strategies for measuring victimization and perpetration and calling for interventions that are informed by theories of behavior change and that center sexually violent behavior as the key outcome of interest.
Substance dependence is a prevalent and urgent public health problem. In 2021, 60 million Americans reported abusing alcohol within the month prior to being surveyed, and nearly 20 million Americans reported using illegal drugs (e.g., heroin) or prescription drugs (e.g., opioids) for nonmedical reasons in the year before. Drug-involved overdose rates have been steadily increasing over the past 20 years. This increase has been primarily driven by opioid and stimulant use. Despite its prevalence, drug dependence is one of the most stigmatized health conditions. Stigma has myriad negative consequences for its targets, including limiting their access to employment and housing, disrupting interpersonal relationships, harming physical and mental health, and reducing help-seeking. However, because research on stigma toward people with substance use disorders (SUDs) is relatively sparse compared with research on stigma toward other mental illnesses, the field lacks a comprehensive understanding of the causes and consequences of SUD stigma. Moreover, it remains unclear how, if at all, these factors differ from other types of mental illness stigma. The goal of this review is to take stock of the literature on SUD stigma, providing a clear set of foundational principles and a blueprint for future research and translational activity.
In this article, we summarize key findings from 20 years of research conducted at the intersection of developmental psychology and juvenile justice in the United States. We predominantly examine data from two large-scale, multisite longitudinal studies involving justice-system-involved adolescents-the Pathways to Desistance study and the Crossroads study. Topics of discussion include predictors of offending and desistance from crime; youth outcomes and psychosocial needs; and emerging research, programs, and policy initiatives. First, individual-level (e.g., age, psychosocial maturity) and contextual-level (e.g., antisocial peers, exposure to violence) risk factors associated with offending are explored. Second, we discuss short-term and long-term outcomes of justice-system contact for youths engaging in moderate offenses. We highlight main findings from the Crossroads study indicating that youths who are sanctioned by the justice system at their first arrest have worse outcomes than youths who are diverted from formal processing. Additionally, we discuss the high prevalence of youths' exposure to violence and mental health disorders as well as the differential treatment of youths of color in the justice system. Third, we extend the conversation to justice-system-involved young adults and discuss emerging, innovative legal solutions, including young adult courts. Last, we discuss real-world implications of these findings.
