Abstract There is wide agreement on the entailment thesis, according to which if S knows that p, then S believes that p. Some philosophers, however, have attempted to present counterexamples to the entailment thesis, where subjects know that p without believing p. Proponents of the entailment thesis have typically responded to such cases by arguing that the subjects have the required prior beliefs, and therefore, the cases in question do not constitute genuine counterexamples. Unfortunately, this line of reply seems untenable when the counterexamples involve subjects who have clearly not formed the relevant beliefs, making it impossible for proponents to appeal to prior beliefs. I therefore propose a different approach by demonstrating the lack of knowledge rather than arguing for the presence of belief. My approach is based on KNA-Suff, which states that if S knows that p, then it is proper for S to assert p. By applying KNA-Suff, I show that the subjects in the putative counterexamples lack knowledge, since it would be improper for them to assert the relevant propositions. Hence, the putative counterexamples fail, and the entailment thesis survives the challenge.
Abstract Can predictable impairments of epistemic performance constitute injustice in the absence of harassment, manipulation, or prejudicial credibility deflation? I use this question to examine a case drawn from ordinary intellectual exchange: in mixed-sex settings, some male speakers may be distracted by the perceived attractiveness of a female interlocutor, with consequences for how their arguments are received. I argue that, in the stipulated case, the man has not suffered an injustice and the woman has not wronged him. The philosophical puzzle is why that verdict is correct, given a tempting inferential pattern in recent work on epistemic injustice from patterned epistemic disadvantage, especially when identity-linked, to an injustice verdict. I argue that injustice ascriptions require epistemic harm, wrong-making features, and accountability. The resulting framework distinguishes epistemic misfortune and thin unfairness from genuine epistemic injustice and helps assess contemporary disputes about the scope of the concept.
One of the central divides in epistemology is between internalist and externalist theories of justification. As 'justification' is a normative term, one might wonder if work in semantics on normative terms can resolve the debate. Contextualism, saying that normative terms have hidden parameters fixed by the context, is a popular view in semantics. I will argue that much of the internalism/externalism debate about justification in epistemology can be dissolved by contextualism.
On many topics of common interest, there are multiple scientific experts who are more-or-less equally reliable as far as most laypeople can tell. In such situations, it would generally be a bad idea for those laypeople to form or update their opinions by deferring to the opinions of individual experts; rather, when possible, they should consider the more general distribution of opinions among all the experts. Building on this thought, this paper argues that scientific experts themselves should ideally not simply report their own opinions on topics within their expertise; rather, if possible, they should provide information about expert opinion distributions more generally, for example, by communicating that a majority of their fellow experts take such-and-such position on a topic while the minority has a contrary view - even when they are themselves in the minority. I go on to trace some important implications of this argument, for example, that scientific communities have an epistemic obligation to periodically gather data on expert opinion distributions regarding topics that are of interest to the general public.
Abstract Consciousness-raising groups were an integral feature of the second wave feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s, and they are credited with finding a way to break through the epistemic barriers to a robust understanding of gender-based oppression. Consciousness-raising is therefore often used by feminist philosophers to explain how it is possible to arrive at knowledge about injustice and oppression in light of a variety of epistemic barriers. However, the process itself is rarely properly explored in its own right. It is therefore often unclear what it consists of and how it is meant to work. In this article, I seek to establish a philosophically rigorous account of consciousness-raising. I first unpack what consciousness-raising consisted in, as described and analysed by second-wave feminists. I then isolate what I take to be its core tenets and the mechanisms that render it a powerful epistemic tool. Then, I respond to two objections, namely the ‘intersectionality objection’ and the ‘bad company objection’, in order to further clarify what this method consists in and what its epistemic potential might be.
Conciliatory views of peer disagreement (aka Conciliationism) have repeatedly been challenged on the grounds that they are epistemically self-undermining. Recently, Dixon (2024) argues that this challenge is worse than previously thought: it is (almost certainly) permanent, and this provides strong reason to abandon Conciliationism as (almost certainly) hopeless. In response, Justin (2025) argues that the self-undermining challenge and Dixon's arguments, at best, only apply to the belief suspension versions of Conciliationism but not to degree-of-belief (aka credal) versions of Conciliationism. Thus, not only can Conciliationists largely avoid the self-undermining challenge but, contra Dixon, this challenge also does not provide adequate reason to abandon Conciliationism as hopeless. This paper argues that not only can the self-undermining challenge be reformulated to apply to credal versions of Conciliationism but this reformulated challenge also extends and further supports Dixon's pessimism: because there (almost certainly) is or will be peer disagreement on any way of responding to this reformulated challenge, any response (almost certainly) be defeated by the very view it is attempting to defend. Thus, credal Conciliationism is also (almost certainly) permanently self-undermining and there is (almost certainly) still no hope for Conciliationism.
According to recent accounts of doxastic wronging, we can morally wrong others by the beliefs that we form about them. This paper shows that the case for doxastic wronging yields a novel moral argument both against beliefs about evil prevalent in theistic responses to the problem of evil, as well as against theistic beliefs that posit the existence of a morally perfect God. The moral risks incurred by these beliefs generate an additional epistemic argument against them. Various responses to these arguments are considered - denying doxastic wronging altogether, rejecting moral encroachment, or adopting a nondoxastic theory of religious commitments - and are found to be either unsuccessful in meeting both the moral and epistemic objections and/or to face several significant challenges of their own. The paper contends that the risk of doxastic wronging makes belief in a morally perfect God and beliefs instrumental in responses to the problem of evil more difficult to epistemically justify than previously thought.
Virtue epistemologists have analyzed individual intellectual virtues such as intellectual humility and perseverance, but intellectual generosity remains relatively under-explored. This may be because intellectual generosity seems simpler and less impactful than other virtues, but in this paper, I argue it is more complex and significant than it might first appear. More precisely, I use case studies from mathematics to show that sharing intellectual goods, the core activity of intellectual generosity, is often complicated and challenging, especially when sharing with large groups. Further, I show that intellectual generosity can have important and long-lasting beneficial consequences for entire research areas, both in terms of generating new discoveries and improving the intellectual climate. Additionally, I suggest a practical way for agents to cultivate intellectual generosity and show that there is a connection between intellectual generosity and intellectual courage in the context of mathematics.
Building on Nozick's (2001) work, I provided a novel invariantist account of scientific objectivity: the Counterfactual Independence Account (Reutlinger 2024). Despite its virtues, this account needs to be articulated in a more nuanced manner - regarding its scope, content, and consequences. My goal in this paper is to develop such a more articulated and improved version of the Counterfactual Independence Account in two steps. First, I will discuss two instructive dissonances between Nozick's version of invariantism and the Counterfactual Independence Account - dissonances concerning what concept of objectivity is addressed and how the key notion of invariance is characterized. Second, I will develop an argument for the claim that (epistemic) objectivity plays a productive role in scientific inference or, more precisely, that objective evidence is, in a sense to be specified, more evidence.
This article examines the debate about what non-experts can assess when determining who qualifies as an expert. We focus in particular on the debate about metacriteria for expertise that non-experts can rely on. We make three central claims about what non-experts can actually infer about experts: (1) metacriteria are not indicators of expertise; (2) instead, they are indicators of experience and lack of epistemic integrity, with the latter marking whether the preconditions for any meaningful assessment of expertise or experience are even given; (3) by reframing the discussion about metacriteria of expertise in this way, we situate the debate about the identification of experts within the broader debate on trust in science. We argue that indicators of experience and lack of epistemic integrity are best understood as indicators of epistemic trustworthiness. We also connect our analysis of these indicators of epistemic trustworthiness to questions raised in the context of epistemic trespassing. In particular, we argue that what distinguishes problematic epistemic trespassing from fruitful boundary crossing is that trespassing experts lack the required experience (i.e., specialist tacit knowledge).
Discussions on the relationship between science and society frequently advocate for direct engagement between scientists and lay people. While such engagement is often framed as a remedy for declining trust in science, it introduces a distinct set of ethical challenges. One such challenge concerns the risk of epistemic trespassing, the overstepping of disciplinary boundaries. Another arises when individual scientists, by virtue of their public role, are seen as representatives of "science" as a whole. These issues are further complicated by a less-discussed form of trespassing: the ethical tensions that emerge when scientists draw on non-epistemic sources of authority, such as charismatic or traditional authority (in the Weberian sense), to bolster their public claims. This paper argues that addressing these challenges requires a nuanced, context-sensitive approach. In some cases, the most ethically defensible strategy and pragmatically viable strategy may be not to communicate individually, but rather to contribute to collective efforts that facilitate responsible public communication. By reframing public engagement as a team task, scientists can mitigate the risks of trespassing while still fulfilling their role in fostering trust in science.
This essay raises a novel objection against Kearns & Star's (Kearns S. and Star D. 2008. 'Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?' Ethics 119(1), 31-56; Kearns S. and Star D. 2009. 'Reasons as Evidence.' Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 215-42.) influential account of normative reasons - the Reasons as Evidence (short: RaE) view. The RaE view's basic idea is that normative reasons can be analysed in terms of another concept, namely evidence for ought-propositions. This view, I argue, faces an 'asymmetry charge'. That is, evidence for ought-propositions and reasons relate differently to (potential) ought-facts and behave differently in our deliberations about what we ought to 'do' (in a broad sense, including action and belief). On the one hand, normative reasons, if sufficiently strong, are connected to a determinate ought (statement). On the other hand, evidence for ought-statements, even if strong and assessed correctly, can be misleading. I consider potential replies to the alleged asymmetry of reasons and evidence for ought-propositions - either accommodating it or explaining it away. These replies, based on different (perspectivist and objectivist) accounts of 'ought', however, are inconsistent with the RaE view - or so I argue. This essay focuses on epistemic normativity, i.e. on reasons and oughts that are concerned with beliefs (not actions). I think, however, that similar arguments could be made about cases of practical normativity (concerned with action) as well.
In this paper, I argue against certain positive epistemic norms, that is, norms that state sufficient conditions for being obligated to believe something. In particular, I argue against positive epistemic norms where the sufficient conditions involve being in a position to know. Such norms face two kinds of problems: they make demands that exceed our cognitive capacity, and they yield obligations and permissions to believe that seem irrational.
Despite the vast literature on deliberative democracy, comparatively little has been said about the kind of journalism that best suits it. Drawing on insights from deliberative theorists and communication scholars, I suggest that the core function of deliberative journalism is to promote high-quality democratic deliberation. I then identify and explicate four key duties that journalists should honor to fulfill this function. The general duty of deliberative gatekeeping commands journalists to select the contents with the greatest potential to foster quality deliberation. The selection of issues is regulated by the duty to set a deliberative agenda, which requires journalists to report only on issues worth deliberating about. The selection and communication of information is regulated by the duty to explain, which commands journalists to make issues understandable to their audiences, and the duty to promote public reasoning, which commands journalists to actively stimulate their audiences' engagement in deliberations. Finally, to clarify the distinctiveness of deliberative journalism, I contrast this ideal with the ideals of objective reporting, partisan journalism, watchdog journalism, commercial journalism, and public journalism.
Many scholars have characterized conspiracy theories as self-sealing. That is, they are immune to disconfirmation, since conspiracy can always explain away counterevidence. This is thought to make belief in them irrational. However, the potential to escape disconfirmation by modification of a theory, or of related auxiliary hypotheses, is a feature common to all theories, including scientific theories. Further, attempts to rescue theories from disconfirmation often come at an epistemic cost. More specifically, such attempts, to the degree they seem ad hoc, tend to lower the theory's credibility. Those who characterize conspiracy theories as "self-sealing" tend to ignore the implication of this. Namely, the fact that conspiracy theories may theoretically resist refutation (a fact shared by all theories) does not mean that they are immune to all standards of evaluation. Individual conspiracy theories should be evaluated on their various individual qualities. This includes the degree to which a particular conspiracy theory depends on positing an implausible cover-up. Such a dependence is, indeed, a consideration that may potentially weigh heavily against that individual theory. But such a judgment will need to take into account the reasons given in support of the particular postulated cover-up, as well as other relevant considerations.
In recent epistemology, introspection principles are commonly rejected. One of the central reasons for this is the adoption of Williamson's anti-luminosity arguments (1996, 2000) and the popularity of the associated epistemic externalist position. This rejection, however, comes with theoretical costs concerning the applications of introspection principles in epistemic and doxastic logic and modeling cooperative behavior. In this paper, I provide a way to solve this dilemma by arguing that the principle KB - expressing one's privileged knowledge of their beliefs - remains unscathed by Williamson's argument while saving the important theoretical applications introspective principles are used for. I propose a way of justifying KB and rejecting KK on principled grounds using Byrne's (Byrne, A. (2005). 'Introspection.' Philosophical Topics 33(1), 79-104., Byrne, A. (2018). Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) transparency account of introspection, improving upon a previous attempt by Das and Salow (Das, N. and Salow, B. (2018). 'Transparency and the KK Principle.' No & ucirc;s 52(1), 3-23.). This defense of KB, unlike many in the literature, is consistent with epistemic externalism and allows one to reject the problematic KK principle and maintain that non-introspective knowledge is guided by Williamson's margin-for-error principle.
Traditional philosophy of religion has been put under pressure to reform from different theoretical camps in the last few decades. One of the most salient charges is that the focus on belief as the mark of religion fails to capture a wide variety of religious phenomena and practices, particularly those outside of the Abrahamitic traditions. As a response to this challenge, this article proposes and develops the notion of religious alief as an additional analytical tool to conceptualize religious phenomena that elude characterization in terms of belief. This article first introduces religious aliefs as largely automatic, habitual mental states that influence behavior, feelings, and attitudes, even when a person does not hold an overt or tacit belief in the supernatural content involved. Subsequently, this article argues that religious phenomena such as apotropaic rituals, purification rituals, spontaneous prayer in crisis, jinx (and other folk-religious notions), certain taboos, and the recently coined Somethingism can be explained in terms of religious aliefs.
Moral disagreement is often taken to undermine claims of moral knowledge. Here, I try to show this widely held view is not true of all moral disagreements. Imagine you encounter MJ. MJ is devoted to excellence in basketball, and he excels at it in a way very few ever have. However, this single-minded pursuit blinds him to other considerations. He is indifferent to larger moral issues and expresses toxic masculinity in his interactions with others. He demeans and degrades others to win basketball games. Suppose you know that, even in ideal conditions, you would not agree on how to live. You have incompatible values. However, you do not think MJ is a fool or evil. You find his achievements to be inspiring. He has his faults but leads a good life. Now, imagine that MJ becomes familiar with your life. He is puzzled by your obsession with philosophy and thinks you are too morally sensitive. Nevertheless, he finds something to appreciate in your life. A person you admire with different fundamental values admires you. As long as you accept that there are better and worse ways of moral thinking, you can accept this moral epistemology regardless of your moral metaphysics.
While research on oppression has focused on the various ways in which oppressed or marginalized individuals are disadvantaged, standpoint epistemologists have long been arguing that the standpoints achieved from oppressed social locations can provide the marginalized with an epistemic advantage. While in themselves laudable, we venture, discussions of the advantage thesis tend to continue a tradition in mainstream epistemology that undermines the crucial role affectivity plays in disclosing facts about the world by framing the debate in purely epistemic terms. Bringing standpoint theory into conversation with contemporary philosophy of emotions, we argue, allows us to recognize the epistemic value of emotions and to see that some knowledge the marginalized can gain about the workings of oppression while cultivating their standpoint is at root fundamentally and irreducibly affective. This lends not only more credibility to the advantage thesis in general, but it also allows to arbitrate between two different readings of this thesis that are currently a matter of controversy: marginalized standpoints afford knowledge that is, due to its fundamentally affective nature, not just easier for the marginalized than the dominant to obtain, but in principle inaccessible to the dominant.
What grounds epistemic normativity? Or, in other words, why should agents follow epistemic norms? A popular view about the source of epistemic normativity is instrumentalism. This view holds that epistemic norms gain their authority by being conducive to other things we place value in, such as survival or practical reasoning. In this paper, I explore an alternative view, which is inspired by Christine Korsgaard's account of the source of moral normativity. This view claims that the authority of epistemic norms is grounded in the self-identities of agents and thereby ultimately in the value of humanity. I will argue that the account sketched in this paper enjoys crucial advantages over alternative accounts that have been proposed in recent literature - in particular those that develop Kant-inspired accounts of epistemic normativity.
