Fan Zhen’s 范缜 “Shen-Mie-Lun 神灭论” can be read as a debate between a physicalist and a dualist in the philosophy of mind. Many of Fan’s arguments found in the “Shen-Mie-Lun” correspond to contemporary physicalism in Western analytic philosophy. My aim in this essay is to bring Fan's “Shen-Mie-Lun” into conversation with contemporary physicalism in the following way: (1) offer an outline of Fan’s physicalism as presented in the “Shen-Mie-Lun” (2) map his view onto the key positions and concepts of contemporary physicalism, (3) show how his view is (a) incompatible with eliminative materialism, mind-brain identity theory, and behaviourism, but only (b) partially compatible with the supervenience/grounding of mind on body, and realisation of mind by body (functionalism), (4) argue that his view is best expressed as the symmetric ontological dependence of mind and body, and (5) resolve the key problem with this view – the ontological dependence of body on mind – before arriving at his view as a conjunction of symmetric existential dependence and symmetric covariant dependence, with mind as essential function and body as material basis of some kind.
Nāgārjuna’s arguments in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā rely extensively on modus tollens, yet this inference is invalid in the paraconsistent frameworks typically used to formalize the catuṣkoṭi. We develop a modal extension of Belnap-Dunn semantics to address this, expressed as: ¬□(v(P) = t) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = f) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = b) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = n). This formula applies self-reflexively, resolves longstanding interpretive debates regarding verses within Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Vigrahavyāvartanī such as his “no thesis” defense, and bridges interpretive gaps between traditionally designated Eastern and Western logical traditions, providing a Western analytical translation of Indian dialectic into symbolic modal logic that is system-agnostic across K, T, S4, S5, non-normal logics, and neighborhood semantics. The modal operators function classically while the four-valued structure is modalized, preserving modus tollens at the level of modal reasoning while accommodating paraconsistent valuation at the object level. Self-application produces a non-terminating regress that is virtuous rather than vicious: each application is self-contained, demonstrating the unavailability of stable ground rather than constituting a failure to find it.
Language and cultural barriers pose major obstacles to teaching Chinese philosophy to Western philosophy students. Without a cultural and linguistic background, students often struggle to read the original Chinese philosophical texts. Translation also involves issues of interpretation that are difficult to be settled in undergraduate-level courses. To address this situation, this paper introduces a question-oriented pedagogy called “intercultural questioning”. Instead of aiming at a comprehensive understanding of the entire Chinese philosophical tradition, the question-oriented pedagogy reveals the implicit assumptions in one’s conceptual frameworks and unexamined questions in Western philosophy through the East-West dialogue. Students can obtain philosophical insights from Chinese thoughts even with partial understanding of the tradition. This paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 introduces the gravity of linguistic barriers in teaching Chinese philosophy and the limitations of two mainstream approaches in teaching Chinese philosophy – textual analysis and comparative philosophy. Section 2 introduces the method of intercultural questioning and defines it as a question-oriented pedagogy of teaching Chinese philosophy. Section 3 evaluates the practice of the pedagogy of intercultural questioning in two courses conducted at Nanyang Technological University by the author of this paper. Section 4 proposes further improvements of the pedagogy in a new syllabus.
This paper examines the influence of the doctrines of the Three Obediences and Four Virtues on the moral thought of Vietnamese women in contemporary society. The study addresses the central question of whether and how these doctrines remain relevant within current social and cultural contexts. It traces the historical introduction and transformation of these doctrines in Vietnam. It analyses their dual impact on women’s moral values, highlighting both their enduring ethical contributions and their role in sustaining gendered constraints. The findings suggest that while certain elements of the Four Virtues have been reinterpreted and selectively integrated into modern ethical frameworks, the Three Obediences have largely lost normative legitimacy, though their residual influence persists in social attitudes and practices. By situating these developments within broader philosophical and socio-historical contexts, the paper contributes to ongoing discussions on the reinterpretation of Confucian moral thought in relation to gender equality in contemporary Vietnam. The study adopts a qualitative, philosophical approach, combining historical analysis with the critical interpretation of relevant texts and social data.
Jing (敬) is often translated as “respect”. Some scholars argue for a “perception of worth” reading, conceiving jing as a deontic normative attitude akin to “respect” in the Western tradition. Others propose a “directing attention” reading, holding that jing is a virtue. This article clarifies the meaning and normative structure of jing, arguing that it has three dimensions: (1) a state of mind characterized by seriousness, (2) an intentional, respectful feeling, and (3) respectful conduct aligned with ritual propriety (Li禮). While the “directing attention” reading correctly identifies jing as a virtue, insisting that jing does not assume a Kantian framework of unconditional moral duty and claim-rights, it fails to account for its deontic dimension: the constitutive relationship between jingand ritual propriety. I clarify how commentators have conflated jing with Kantian respect for persons and Stephen Darwall’s account of respect. I address how jing might be conducive to a good life and how we can cultivate it in contemporary societies.
Ancient skeptics, both in the West and East, suggest their philosophy as a form of life. One reservation about living as a skeptic is that it turns us into political conformists—this is also Jonathan Ichikawa’s (2024) objection to philosophical skepticism. Skeptics take their own perspective on the world to be limited, and in this sense they will be hesitant to fully embrace a conservative ideology. But the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus recommends that in their actions, skeptics will follow existing laws and common moral beliefs. In this paper, I want to develop a different conception of skepticism based on the ideas of perspectivity and naturalness in the Daoist Zhuang-Zi. A skeptic can observe that there are a multitude of equally legitimate perspectives on a subject matter, with their own being only one among them. This viewpoint diversity makes it plausible that different subjects are also different in their nature. Skeptics can opt to simply follow his or their own nature; and if they are compassionate, they can feel an urge to allow others to follow their respective nature
Toleration is usually defined as a permissive attitude toward disagreement or dislike concerning diverse beliefs and practices. In philosophical education, toleration is emphasized both theoretically and in the way teachers and students practice it. Scholars and philosophers are familiar with the connotations and justifications of toleration attributed to Enlightenment philosophers. Toleration has often been regarded as a uniquely Western idea or virtue, rooted in the European Enlightenment values of individual rights and freedom of thought. Recently, however, this viewpoint has been challenged by scholars, who argue that the approaches to diversity in non-Western intellectual traditions should be taken into consideration. This article examines and compares the concept of toleration from the perspectives of the European Enlightenment and Confucianism, discussing its implications for education. It first provides a theoretical framework for understanding toleration, discussing key philosophical arguments and challenges associated with the concept. Through an analysis of classic texts from Enlightenment philosophers and Confucian thinkers, it then explores two approaches to difference and disagreement. Furthermore, it assesses how this observation can inform teaching practices in the context of philosophical education. Using the case of toleration, this article demonstrates that it is essential to expose students to philosophical texts and ideas from diverse traditions to foster an understanding of various perspectives and enhance their ability to conduct critical analysis.
This study examines critiques of logic articulated across diverse historical and cultural traditions within a comparative framework. The critiques developed in Islamic, Buddhist, Chinese, Indian, Zen, and modern Western philosophy do not, in the main, reject logic or reasoning as such; rather, they target the conceptualization of logic as a universal, context-independent, and singular normative standard. The analysis shows that objections raised at ontological, epistemic, linguistic, methodological, and political levels converge on a set of shared concerns rooted in the structural features of logic itself, most notably categorical determinacy, universalist assumptions, and claims of context-independence. At the same time, these concerns do not amount to a unified or homogeneous form of anti-logic. Instead, they give rise to parallel yet independently developed critical traditions, each shaped by its own historical and cultural context. On this basis, the study argues that the philosophy of logic should be understood neither in terms of absolute universalism nor radical relativism, but rather through a conception of context-sensitive universality that distinguishes (i) the cross-tradition shared deep structure of logical inference from (ii) the culturally and historically variable applications, semantic-pragmatic calibrations, and normative-authority claims that surround it. This dual-track formulation preserves the legitimacy of cross-tradition shared logical norms while making analytically visible the recurring tensions that arise when a single logical regime is universalized as an overarching tribunal for all forms of meaning and knowledge.
The exclusion of non-Western philosophies from university curricula has been a persistent feature of academic philosophy, both in the United States and Europe. This marginalization reflects an enduring assumption that philosophy is a uniquely Western enterprise, originating in ancient Greece and developed exclusively within European traditions. This article challenges that assumption by arguing that the teaching of intercultural philosophy is not merely a pedagogical issue, but an urgent necessity in the context of globalization and cross-cultural exchange. Focusing on the limited presence of non-Western philosophical traditions in Spanish university programs, the article first analyzes the structural asymmetry in the historiography of philosophy. Then, it presents guidelines for the Introduction to Philosophy course at the University of Málaga, designed to engage students in intercultural dialogue and expose them to multiple philosophical perspectives. The aim is to move beyond dogmatic and one-sided approaches to philosophical education and toward a more inclusive and pluralistic understanding of philosophical inquiry.
Interdisciplinary approaches to teaching China in Western academic contexts often reproduce Eurocentric frameworks that reduce Chinese philosophical and cultural traditions to subordinate objects of analysis. This article proposes an alternative model grounded in intercultural philosophy and the Filosofías del Sur, arguing that China should be approached not as a distant object of representation, but as an epistemic interlocutor capable of transforming philosophical education. The article develops this argument through the recovery of the República del Reino de la China, included in the 1595 edition of Repúblicas del Mundo, as a key example of early intercultural mediation from the European South. Although shaped by Christian categories and mediated Iberian sources, the text presents China as a coherent political, moral, and educational order. Its ambivalence makes it a valuable pedagogical archive for examining how China was interpreted, translated, admired, and partially misrecognized in sixteenth-century Europe. By connecting this forgotten Iberian archive with Chinese philosophical concepts and intercultural pedagogy, the article shows how higher education can move beyond the East-West dichotomy and foster more dialogical, historically situated, and globally inclusive ways of teaching China.
The philosophical discourse has been dominated by Western perspectives, an approach that continues to influence curriculum design and delivery in higher education. The historical dominance of the Western philosophical canon in university curricula has contributed to the marginalisation of other equally significant philosophical traditions from Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Indigenous cultures. This approach has contributed significantly to the narrow and limited scope and relevance of philosophy as an academic field globally. Rather than advocating for the dominance and superiority of the Western-centred curriculum, this paper acknowledges the centrality of integrating global philosophical perspectives in the philosophy curriculum and discourse in Africa and beyond, using a theoretical and analytical approach. The paper advocates for an inclusive and multicultural approach that enriches philosophical inquiry. Drawing on multicultural and intercultural perspectives, the paper challenges the historical dominance of the Western philosophical canon and proposes strategies for decentring philosophical education. The paper argues for the importance of promoting intercultural dialogue and multicultural inclusion, curriculum diversification, and the need to rethink the teaching and learning pedagogies in tertiary education. By challenging the alleged traditional assumptions of the superiority of Western philosophical traditions and arguing for inclusivity and diversity, the paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on the need to reform, decentre, and decolonise the philosophy curriculum in Africa and beyond.
This paper argues that functional organization alone is not sufficient for phenomenal consciousness or the existence of a unified subject of experience. While many contemporary accounts of artificial consciousness assume that replicating the causal or computational structure of the brain would be sufficient for subjective experience, this paper identifies a deeper constraint: consciousness depends on organismic unity. The argument proceeds through a triangulation of conceptual, empirical, and metaphysical considerations. First, Zuboff’s thought experiment shows that functional organization can be preserved while the unity of the subject dissolves, suggesting that causal pattern replication alone cannot secure subjectivity. Second, findings from neuroscience indicate that conscious states depend on highly specific biological organization, including interoceptive and autonomic regulation, rather than abstract causal structure alone. Third, phenomenology and enactivism explain these findings by characterizing consciousness as an embodied, self-maintaining activity enacted by living systems. Finally, cosmopsychist approaches clarify that even if consciousness is fundamental, its individuation into a subject requires a unified, self-organizing structure. Together, these considerations support the conclusion that consciousness is not a transferable computational pattern but an embodied phenomenon grounded in the self-maintaining organization of living systems. Artificial systems may simulate cognitive functions, but they do not thereby constitute subjects of experience.
Sameness and difference are among the most fundamental and yet most tension-laden categories in philosophy, bearing directly on the conditions under which judgment, classification, and meaning become possible. This article critically reconstructs and compares two influential but methodologically divergent approaches to this issue in contemporary comparative philosophy. One is Brook Ziporyn's idea of coherence, which seeks to articulate a non-substantialist metaphysics as a response to tensions internal to the Western metaphysical tradition. The other is Bo Mou's enhanced account of relative identity, which revises both absolute and modern relative identity theories through a bottom-up, semantically grounded framework oriented toward cross-tradition identity judgment. This article argues that these two approaches represent not merely alternative theoretical answers to the issue of sameness and difference, but two distinct methodological trajectories in comparative philosophy. Brook Ziporyn strategically radicalizes Sino-Western difference by staging competing truth-claims, thereby challenging the hegemony of a single dominant conception of truth. By contrast, Bo Mou takes shared cross-tradition philosophical concerns as his anchoring point, enabling Chinese and Western traditions to enter into relations of mutual critique and complementarity rather than standing in principled opposition. It concludes that the philosophical significance of Chinese thought should not be confined to functioning as a self-contained alternative to Western traditions but should instead be activated through sustained engagement with jointly concerned philosophical issues, contributing to the ongoing reconfiguration of world philosophy.
In Zhu Xi's theory of cultivation, kun way-making (kun-dao (sic)(sic)) to cultivate the virtue of kun (kun-de (sic)(sic)) goes ahead to qian way-making (qian-dao (sic)(sic)), in which the virtue of qian (qian-de (sic)(sic)) is cultivated. In this theory, everyone is encouraged to cultivate kun way-making, which it happens that women represent. It is worth noting that the theory faces an issue of potential inconsistency between the "gendered" construction of qian-kun (sic) (sic) and the positive absence (kong-que (sic)(sic)), the pivot of the cultivating process, where the renegotiation of the virtues of qian-kun is attuned to optimal appropriateness (yi(sic)) with her wisdom (zhi (sic))at the endless end ofkun way-making. The distinction ofqian-kun in the whole cultivating process preempts the participation ofkun way-making in symbolizing both virtues; however, the symbolization is continuously renegotiated in kun way-making, where the equity of qian-kun is founded on her careful and flexible quan (sic) in the positive absence. If the inconsistency is recognized in Zhu Xi's theory of cultivation, then it becomes weak. But if his theory could be reflected from a progressive viewpoint, it may pose a potentially feminist critique of the dichotomy of qian-kun and propose instead an equity of qian-kun through quan in kun way-making. Therefore, it is an open question how Zhu Xi's resources can contribute to the feminist progressive project.
Building on observed similarities in uniqueness proofs for the empty set and the Necessary Existent (W & amacr;jib al-Wuj & umacr;d), this study engages the meta-methodological issue of cross-system commensurability. It identifies four instances of structural commensurability between Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice (ZFC) and Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Wisdom (Hikmat al-Muta'& amacr;liyah). First, identity principles: the Axiom of Extensionality provides a formal operational criterion analogous to the philosophical principle of identity through absence of distinguishing features. Second, multiplicity mechanisms: ZFC's constructor axioms (bottom-up construction) and emanation principles (top-down explanation) address analogous problems with inverse orientations. Third, transcending limitation: the Axiom of Infinity ensuring quantitative extensional infinity addresses a problem formally parallel to (though ontologically distinct from) principles of gradation and nobler possibility demonstrating qualitative intensive perfection. Fourth, foundation principles: the Axiom of Regularity and impossibility of infinite regress both prohibit vicious circularity and guarantee well-foundedness through comparable logical patterns. The results suggest constraints on rational frameworks: while ZFC and Transcendent Wisdom are ontologically distinct, this analysis demonstrates they are relatively commensurable regarding their problem-solving strategies for universal challenges (identity, multiplicity, infinity, foundation), despite radical differences in content and epistemological status.
To study a subject similarly represented in Eastern and Western cultures, I examine some classical theories of war strategy according to a new analytical method. This method is based on the recognition that the most important strategic theories are organized as theories essentially not deduced from axioms according to classical logic. Such theories reason through doubly negated propositions (DNPs), whose meanings differ from those of their affirmative counterparts. This corresponds to the use of intuitionist logic instead of classical logic. An inspection of the works of the texts of Sun Zi, Lazare Carnot, and Clausewitz reveals many such propositions, and in each case the ordered sequence ofDNPs suffices to reconstruct the core argument of the entire book. In particular, the analysis of Clausewitz suggests a new interpretation, markedly different from the standard one. A common logical style in strategic thinking ofEastern and Western cultures is thereby revealed. The results challenge the Western misconception of Eastern logic as primitive; rather, they suggest that Western culture should recognize intuitionist logic as equally legitimate not only in formal terms but also in the applications, particularly in the interpretation of Chinese thought.
The notion that the organization of large-scale social structures are rooted in domestic ones has a longstanding history in both Chinese and Greek classical political philosophy. Aristotle and Confucius independently reasoned that a good family, one with a strong father, mapped onto a good state, one with a strong king-though they differed on the details. While there is a strong literature juxtaposing these two titans, less attention has been paid to how their ideas compare with other philosophical traditions. This article provides an anthropological intervention to the comparative study of Confucius and Aristotle-while both autonomously argued that good politics are like good family, the notion of what constitutes a good family varies tremendously across cultures. Is it always father knows best? What about in a society where mothers are in charge? To answer these questions, I draw upon a study of the Great Law of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy, an Indigenous North American nation. Notably, the Haudenosaunee are matrilineal and matrilocal. This article juxtaposes Confucian, Aristotelian, and Haudenosaunee political philosophies, looking at the commonalities of modeling political structures on domestic ones, and how cultural differences across domestic spaces have resulted in subtle and profound distinctions across political practices. Taking "nation is family" as a conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), I suggest a dynamic nominalist (Hacking 2007) paradigm by which to consider how political and social ideas of the nation as family become mutually constitutive once entrenched within a philosophical tradition.
An examination of the nature of the human person provides a crucial foundation for understanding human life and identity. Conceptions of personhood have far-reaching implications beyond philosophy, influencing politics, ethics, religion, and epistemology. Beliefs about what constitutes a person shapes theories of rights, responsibility, and justice; moral views on duty and accountability; religious understandings of the soul and the afterlife; and epistemological reflections on the sources and limits of knowledge. Inquiry into human nature is therefore not merely abstract, but central to understanding social organization and individual conduct. This paper examines two influential accounts of human nature drawn from distinct philosophical traditions: Rene Descartes' account from the European (French) tradition and Alabi Oyeshile's interpretation of the African (Yoruba) tradition. Descartes presents a rationalist and dualist conception of the human person, sharply distinguishing mind from body and identifying reason as the defining feature of personhood. This perspective has profoundly shaped Western philosophy and modern conceptions of the self. In contrast, Oyeshile's account of Yoruba thought advances a holistic understanding of the human person, emphasizing the integration of physical, spiritual, communal, and ethical dimensions as mutually constitutive aspects of human existence. The aim of this paper is not to determine which account is more plausible, since such judgments depend on cultural and philosophical frameworks. Rather, it highlights how different contexts shape theories of human nature and argues that these accounts can be understood as complementary perspectives contributing to a richer understanding ofpersonhood across traditions.
This paper examines the philosophical coherence of B.R. Ambedkar's reconstruction of his (Navayana) Buddhism in relation to John Dewey's pragmatism. Building on Scott Stroud's reading ofAmbedkar as a Deweyan Pragmatist (2017, 2023), it argues that Dewey's evolutionary naturalism, his conception of growth, and pragmatic redefinition of concepts provide Ambedkar with the methodological tools for a naturalistic and socially reconstructive reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrines such as anicca (impermanence), dhamma (Buddha's teaching), nirvana (enlightenment), karuna (compassion), etc. Ambedkar transforms impermanence from a metaphysics offlux into an ethics ofprogressive growth, and recasts dhamma as a social morality grounded in fraternity and equality rather than individual salvation from the cycle of samsara (rebirths). Yet Ambedkar's emergentist account of consciousness departs from Dewey's organic model, inclining more toward ancient Indian materialism and resonating with early twentieth-century emergentist views. By integrating Deweyan pragmatism with a materialist ontology, Ambedkar creates a uniquely modern, emancipatory Buddhism that reconciles spiritual ideals with social democracy and places the experience of the oppressed at the center of philosophical inquiry.
