Penny-picking refers to the often-observed phenomenon of repeatedly taking negatively skewed risks and seems directly at odds with evidence on (positive-) skewness-seeking as observed in static settings. We show that penny-picking may not only occur despite skewness-seeking, but-seemingly paradoxically-because of skewness-seeking. With sufficient time available, risks with arbitrary negative skewness can be gambled in such a way that, overall, skewness is positive. Therefore, classical behavioral theories like prospect theory straightforwardly explain penny-picking. More generally, we show that the versatile dynamics of skewness reconcile apparent preference reversals concerning the avoidance and acceptance of (skewed and non-skewed) risks.
We study quality distortions when firms hold market power. We develop a model allowing for flexible functional forms of demand in order to extend Spence’s (1975) monopoly analysis to imperfect competition. We show that quality distortions are determined by a competition effect that captures the externality a firm exerts on its competitors when raising both its price and its quality, in addition to Spence’s (1975) effect related to the shape of total market demand. Our approach also allows us to analyze the effects of commodity taxation and technology shocks on the equilibrium allocation when firms compete in prices and qualities. (JEL D43, D62, H22, L13, L15, O31)
This paper examines efficient allocations in economies where consumers exhibit heterogeneous smooth ambiguity preferences and face model uncertainty with a common set of identifiable models. Aggregate endowment is ambiguous. We characterize economies where the representative consumer is of the smooth ambiguity type and derive efficient sharing rules. Heterogeneous ambiguity aversion leads to sharing rules that systematically differ from those in vNM economies. The representative consumer's ambiguity aversion differs from that of the typical consumer; this leads to more compelling asset-pricing predictions. We focus on point-identified models but show that our insights extend to partially identified models.
This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicate that the retailers have most of the bargaining power. Counterfactual simulations show that most-favored-nation clauses raise prices but would lower the profits of the publishers and Amazon. C78, D86, K21, L14, L42, L81,
I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an "ordeal"-that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lump-sum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity have an expected value for money that exceeds the average value by more than a factor of two. (JEL D63, D82, H23, I38)
