This study examines the legacies of Indonesia’s 1965–66 killings, providing the first systematic data on mass awareness of and support for this violence, using a survey list experiment. We find that awareness of the episode is low overall, yet support for the past violence is high. We also investigate how knowledge and beliefs about the incident vary across demographic groups. Younger Indonesians are more likely than their older counterparts to know about the killings, and less likely to support the violence. Indonesians living in urban areas are less likely to know about the killings, but more likely to support them. We interpret these findings against the backdrop of Indonesia’s political history, concluding that collective memory of 1965–66 remains deeply fragmented across Indonesian society.
Why have Japan and South Korea, despite sharing the same US nuclear umbrella, developed distinct extended deterrence arrangements? Previous studies emphasize US-driven, supply-side explanations but fail to explain the persistent divergence between the two allies. I argue that extended deterrence is co-produced by junior allies’ demand, which is shaped by two key variables: external threat and domestic nuclear constraint. Developing a demand-side model and applying it to a comparative historical analysis of Japan and South Korea from the Cold War to the present, I demonstrate that South Korea’s higher threat perception and weaker nuclear constraints, in contrast to Japan’s lower threat perception and stronger domestic constraints, have generated divergent demands for extended deterrence. The study contributes to the literature by shifting attention to demand-side dynamics and offering a theory of differentiated extended deterrence within asymmetric alliances.
Foreign economic pressure does not always weaken the government of the targeted state. This article examines whether such pressure translates into electoral punishment of incumbent governments. China’s suspensions of Taiwanese agricultural imports provide an empirical setting for this question. I test whether localities more exposed to these restrictions recorded larger vote-share losses for the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party. Using agricultural production and trade data, election returns, and supplementary survey evidence, I find that several suspended commodities were concentrated in identifiable producing areas, depended on Chinese markets, and experienced major China-bound export disruptions. Yet greater exposure was not associated with larger presidential or mayoral vote-share losses for the DPP. The observable trade disruption did not produce corresponding electoral costs for the target government, suggesting that assessments of foreign economic pressure should distinguish economic disruption from electoral punishment.
Why do negative attitudes toward refugees remain widespread in South Korea despite little direct contact with refugees? Although previous explanations emphasize economic, security, and cultural threats, they do not fully account for the South Korean case. Using survey data collected in 2024, we find that neither objective information about refugees nor subjective perceptions is associated with these negative attitudes, but interest in refugee issues is, with more interest corresponding to more negativity. This association is strongest among individuals with strong ethnic identity and does not replicate among those with strong civic identity. These findings suggest that information and awareness campaigns are unlikely to reduce hostility when the dominant discursive environment is organized around exclusionary frames. Sustained engagement that challenges ethnic boundaries is more likely to shift entrenched attitudes.
Many scholars have examined how economic development affects political support in China, but few have specifically investigated the impact of economic failure. Such efforts are critical given China’s current economic troubles, the inadequacy of first-order analysis of economic development, and the democratizing pressure exerted by long-term growth followed by short-term failure. An obstacle to this endeavor is a shortage of data on both economic downturns and political support. We argue that economic slowdowns, rather than downturns, are a good indicator of economic failure in China, and that past opinion data at both national and subnational levels provide hidden insights into the political consequences of economic failure. In this study, we leverage all five waves of the Asian Barometer surveys in China and conduct matched-sample tests as well as both cross-time and cross-provincial analyses. We uncover strong evidence that economic slowdowns erode political support in China.
