ABSTRACT In Southeast Asia, propaganda has historically been part and parcel of governance, prompting authoritarian controls while also entrenching oligarchic dominance. But the relationship between propagandists and propaganda audiences is far from top‐down; the public, at times, endorses and actively participates in state‐orchestrated campaigns. The question to be asked is why. What are the conditions driving public reception of propaganda? What sustains their infrastructure despite changing contexts? How has the advent of digital technologies changed the patterns of influence operations? Featuring emerging Southeast Asian scholars across diverse disciplines, including communications, political science, and economics, this special issue addresses these questions beyond simply identifying the actors and tactics of manipulation. Seven articles focus on four Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines—representing a vibrant information ecosystem, a major tech market, and a geopolitical hotspot, while situating the region in the global context of rapid technological change. Most importantly, this special issue advances ways in which we can collectively address these emerging challenges to information integrity.
ABSTRACT Governments have increasingly turned to economic statecraft to address negative security externalities resulting from economic interdependence. How have governments attempted to shape the behavior of firms, and how have firms responded? This article examines Japanese economic statecraft in response to the 2010 Chinese rare earths export ban, COVID‐19 pandemic supply chain disruptions, and semiconductor supply chain vulnerability. The Japanese government has used a wide range of tools to influence firms, focusing predominantly on positive incentives to encourage innovation, structural reform, investment, and relocation rather than negative incentives such as export controls. The government has turned its traditional levers of economic policy to new purposes to deal with changing security threats, reflecting varying goals such as bolstering resilience and promoting competitiveness. Government policy has been most effective in shaping firm behavior and mitigating negative security externalities in the case of rare earths.
ABSTRACT Widely discussed across disciplines, autonomy is often used in ASEAN studies to describe what actors associated with ASEAN seek. Yet its meaning remains underspecified and differs from dominant approaches of international organization autonomy. This article conceptualizes autonomy in the ASEAN context by reviewing ASEAN studies and relevant international relations literature on autonomy, structured by three questions: autonomy for whom, from whom, and for what, supplemented by brief case illustrations. It shows that ASEAN autonomy can be characterized not as organizational autonomy but as an aspiration, primarily pursued by member states, to secure the autonomy of the Southeast Asian regional space from external actors. It also argues that ASEAN autonomy is not reducible simply to independence or to being free from external interference; it may also involve managing external engagement on ASEAN's own terms. This perspective highlights a misalignment between the actors that pursue autonomy and what is treated as autonomous.
ABSTRACT This study examines Indonesia's securitized response to the COVID‐19 pandemic, driven by concerns over economic instability and state function disruptions. Using securitization theory, it analyzes governance mechanisms and the expanded roles of security forces, including the military, police, and intelligence agencies. The deployment of security personnel to enforce health protocols, maintain public order, and prioritize economic recovery over public health raises concerns about the normalization of security roles in civilian sectors. This article critiques the broader implications of this trend, particularly its impact on human‐centered governance, civil liberties, and democratic principles. It highlights the challenges of balancing public health priorities, economic stability, and governance within a securitized framework, questioning the long‐term consequences of this approach on Indonesia's democratic resilience.
ABSTRACT Conventional wisdom argues that more powerful states inevitably dictate the foreign policy of small states, but there is a growing body of evidence that suggests otherwise. This paper argues that small states, like Malaysia, can still exercise agency when interacting with bigger states. Using the renegotiation of the East Coast Railway Link (ECRL) as a case study, this paper examines how Malaysia exercises its agency and elucidates several factors that increased Malaysia's bargaining power. First, Malaysia holds intrinsic value for China. Second, the ECRL's status as a key project in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lends it wider geopolitical significance. Third, the purpose of the ECRL as an alternative trade route creates a significant ongoing economic imperative for China to see the project concluded successfully. Furthermore, Malaysia's ability to cultivate positive relationships with other major powers through the adept political leadership of Mahathir increases the country's leverage.
