Abstract The literature on the political economy of development has lon g discussed variations in the impact of imperialism on postcolonial economic trajectories. However, it has generally not engaged with the classical Marxist literature on imperialism, which theorized mechanisms linking the development of capitalism in metropolitan and colonial societies. This article seeks to bridge these two literatures and their respective strengths, drawing on the analyses of Depression-era thinkers to compare US imperialism in Puerto Rico and Japanese imperialism in Taiwan. If defining ‘development’ in a physical sense (what Marxist political economy refers to as the ‘forces of production’), Japanese imperialism in Taiwan and US imperialism in Puerto Rico created very similar imprints during the first decades of the twentieth century. However, juxtaposing the analyses of Puerto Rico and Taiwan provides two important insights: (1) the social structures of the economies (the ‘relations of production’) that took shape in the two colonies were strikingly different, and (2) this difference was linked, in significant part, to the social structures of the metropolitan economies of the imperialist powers themselves. This comparison suggests that differences in the class structure of the metropole are linked to variations in the impact of imperialism on the development of capitalism in the colonies. Ironically, however, postwar industrialization brought patterns of capital formation that were exactly the opposite of those that held during imperialism in the early decades of the twentieth century: local capital was now much stronger in Taiwan than in Puerto Rico.
Abstract Performance-based public funding systems (PRFS) are widely adopted to distribute research funding among higher education institutions, yet evidence of their long-term effects remains limited. This study examines whether the UK’s Research Excellence Framework (REF) has led to sustained improvements in research productivity and impact in economics and business fields. Extending previous work that focused only on REF 2014, we analyse both REF 2014 and REF 2021 cycles to determine whether effects are transient or enduring. Using synthetic difference-in-differences with propensity score matching, we compare UK universities with synthetic US counterparts from 2001 to 2021. Key findings indicate that the REF significantly increased the number of publications and citations in UK universities post-2009. Specifically, UK institutions saw an average increase of 16.85 publications and 998.84 citations, corresponding to 42 and 46 per cent of the pre-2009 averages, respectively. However, measured individual research productivity per author declined, reflecting a structural shift towards collaborative research production rather than reduced researcher effort. Importantly, these benefits were unevenly distributed: Russell Group universities—a self-selected association of twenty-four research-intensive UK universities—saw substantially larger gains than non-Russell institutions, potentially exacerbating existing inequalities in the higher education landscape. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the REF’s sustained positive effects on institutional research performance while highlighting its differential impact across the sector. These findings provide valuable insights for policymakers considering the distributional consequences of performance-based funding in higher education.
Abstract Financialisation has given rise to a variety of financial profit forms that often obscure their underlying sources. This development has led a number of Marxist scholars to revisit the concept of ‘profit upon alienation’, which Marx is argued to have inherited from James Steuart, as a means of explaining profits generated in the sphere of exchange rather than in production. Yet this perspective appears to contradict Marx’s consistent assertion that all profit in a capitalist economy originates in production, while exchange merely redistributes it. This paper re-examines Marx’s interpretation of Steuart, along with Steuart’s own distinction, to clarify how the notion of profit upon alienation is understood in both. It further engages with Lapavitsas’s argument that interest derived from lending to workers for personal consumption represents a form of profit upon alienation, and argues that this claim loses relevance under financialisation, where such interest is more appropriately understood as a form of merchant profit—that is, a mere subdivision of surplus value produced in the sphere of production.
Abstract Elinor Ostrom’s work has been influential for a wide range of scholarly traditions, in part because of the promise it holds for the construction of emancipatory or liberatory local self-governance institutions. Yet Ostrom’s work also highlights the risk of coercive forms of local self-governance. In this paper, we critically analyse Ostrom’s theorisation of ‘local tyranny’. We distinguish several distinct forms of local tyranny, and argue that shortcomings in Ostrom’s metatheoretical apparatus limit her ability to adequately distinguish between some forms of local tyranny and normatively desirable forms of local self-governance. Our overarching claim is that Ostrom’s theoretical apparatus must be extended to better incorporate power dynamics and dissensus, if we are to realise the analytic and emancipatory promise of Ostrom’s work.
As the discipline of economics evolved, it relied on a variety of concepts that are now understood to be untenable. Three of these fantasies are of interest here: (1) economics is a value-free (objective) science; (2) economics is the science of choice; and (3) economics offers necessary truth rules for collective choices in the public sphere. Underlying these fantasies is the continuing preoccupation with the individual. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the elaborate and enduring contestation between Amartya Sen and Robert Sugden. The purpose of the above fantasies was to elucidate what the individual could do in the interest of wealth creation and resulting social bliss. The market was the instrument—the means—of that beneficial furtherance, while the individual was the agent of that furtherance. We could not help ourselves. Our every move was socially instrumental. Sen and Sugden wish to change the subject. No longer should economists concern themselves with how individual participation in the market serves to benefit society. Forget the marvellous contributions of the butcher and the baker and those who purchase their wares. Economists should turn their attention to the many ways in which participation in the market serves to benefit the individual. The butcher and the baker—and their customers—will derive enhanced capabilities and functionings. Their respective freedoms and autonomy will blossom anew. Importantly, their engagement in the market will reinvigorate their faltering virtues. Fantasies and fetishes endure.
