The paralysis and death of Visegrad, the post-communist region's most successful inter-state cooperation format, between 1994 and 1998 is conventionally attributed to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and the anti-regional policies of Czech Premier V & aacute;clav Klaus and Slovak Premier Vladim & iacute;r Me & ccaron;iar. By contrast, Czechoslovak and Czech President V & aacute;clav Havel remains credited certainly as a major, even the primary figure in Visegrad's creation and life. This article disputes these views, claiming that for all his indispensable and admirable foreign policy innovations, Havel shares responsibility for Visegrad's collapse. The article contends that Havel engaged in what is here termed 'regional polygamy', precisely when Visegrad needed help to endure, and that he then engaged in 'regional neglect', a view substantiated by his lack of contributions to Visegrad during its paralysis and then to its relaunch at the end of the 1990s. That re-launch ensured Visegrad's continued and successful existence despite Havel. These arguments may also complement analyses identifying other paradoxes in Havel's writings, actions and even personality.
This article examines contemporary threats to democracy through a lens of political sociology and critical theory, exploring the rise of authoritarianism, the interplay of global and local inequalities, and the structural contradictions of liberal democracies. Its central aim is to analyse how democracy's internal vulnerabilities are exploited by far-right movements, facilitated by economic globalization, cultural conflicts, and environmental crises. Building on Karl Loewenstein's concept of militant democracy, that he first expounded in 1937, the article argues that the democratic rule of law must defend itself against the emotional mobilization techniques of fascism while cultivating democratic emotions such as hope and solidarity. The analysis integrates debates around post-democracy, backlash politics, and the mainstreaming of the far right, highlighting how affective polarization and structural inequalities fuel authoritarian tendencies.
The rule of law crisis in Poland was characterized by political interference against judicial independence and judicial resistance. This interference was critiqued on the European level, with numerous judgements of both the ECtHR and the CJEU. This article explores the judicial strategies adopted by Polish judges in response to the prolonged rule of law crisis. The main aim of the study is to analyse how judges balance constitutional values, respond to parliamentary bills contrary to the Constitution such as the 'Muzzle Law' which impeded their dialogue with European courts, adjust to a politicized system where their decisions impact their whole personal careers and, finally, uphold the interests of citizens seeking justice. This article thus examines how Polish judges adopted a whole spectrum of strategies to uphold the rule of law and implement European judgements. The research presented in this article uses qualitative analysis focusing on case law to identify patterns in judicial reasoning and the invocation of European legal norms (or lack of norms). The paper seeks to contribute to a broader European discussion on judicial resilience in an era of democratic backsliding. The aim of the article is to present the variety of tools but also the approaches of judges and their motivations at different levels of the judicial system and has particular relevance also for readers interested in the rule of law crisis in other member states of the European Union.
Education is considered a key determinant of EU support, as higher-educated individuals are more likely to benefit from European integration. Exposure to pro-EU curricula and socialization into cosmopolitan and European values also play a crucial role. In Hungary, however, the educational landscape has been shaped by unique circumstances since the Fidesz government took power in 2010. Political pressure, restrictive legislation, reduced school autonomy, and alleged ideological shifts in curricula and textbooks raise concerns about the political and educational context in which Hungarian secondary students form their EU attitudes. The present study draws on qualitative interviews with educators from Hungarian secondary schools to explore these dynamics, with a focus on the country's peripheries. Findings reveal a mixed picture. Discussing politics is widely seen as undesirable in the classroom, civic values and critical thinking receive little emphasis, and a pervasive fear of addressing politically sensitive topics is evident. However, there is no evidence of direct political control, and educators do not report feeling directly affected by curricular changes or textbook monopolization. These factors indicate significant obstacles to the development of informed EU attitudes but may also reflect broader systemic issues within Hungarian secondary education.
The actions of an authoritarian regime, especially through control, standardization and coercion, directed at educational institutions in order to maintain its power, pose a serious challenge to the rule of law and, in particular, to the preservation of academic freedom, democratic values and the advancement of civil society. This article aims to analyse and understand how the Belarussian regime undermines the rule of law, specifically, in higher education, and explores the sustainability of these institutions in the face of such repression. The focus of this study is the European Humanities University - Belarusian university, which was forced into exile due to its promotion of democratic values, liberal arts education and protection of human rights. The forced closure and expulsion of the university from Belarus demonstrates the wider consequences of such repression, especially its impact on civil society and intellectual communities. Despite all the difficulties, the university continues to provide education that upholds international standards and meets the mission of the university.
