* The original article can be found here: Paul, Darel E. 2026: The Gender Egalitarian Family Model: Empirical and Theoretical Problems. In: Comparative Population Studies 51: 403-426. https://doi.org/10.12765/CPoS-2026-17 This is a rejoinder to a paper published in this journal authored by Paul (2026). The paper to which this rejoinder refers takes aim at the gender egalitarian family model, and in places it makes points the field needs to absorb: the recent cross-national correlation between fertility and female labour force participation has lost some of its force; Nordic period and cohort fertility have declined in ways the framework may not have predicted; and the gendered attitudinal divergence between young men and young women is real. Yet the paper moves too readily from a critique of particular explanatory and predictive claims to a much broader rejection of the gender-egalitarian family model as a policy orientation. In doing so, it underplays an important normative and institutional strand of the literature, which has been concerned not only with demographic outcomes but also with equity and fairness as the conditions under which people can “write their own biographies.” The paper’s closing balancing act between liberal values and “the simultaneous interests of both the state and society in its own reproduction” as it is written makes me feel quite uneasy (Paul 2026: 420).
* A Rejoinder to this article is published here: Gietel-Basten, Stuart 2026: Gender Egalitarianism, Fertility, and an Attribution Error: a rejoinder on “The Gender Egalitarian Family Model: Empirical and Theoretical Problems”. In: Comparative Population Studies 51: 427-440. https://doi.org/10.12765/CPoS-2026-18 In the demographic literature, gender egalitarianism has become the leading prescription for successful family (re)production in highly developed countries. Recent trends bring into question the case for the gender egalitarian family model, however. Its empirical claims are dependent on the transient experience of the Nordic countries in the 1990s and 2000s as well as on an amalgamation effect in the comparative national data. Its theoretical basis is challenged by social processes including rising female childlessness and young male reaction against gender egalitarianism. A reckoning with the limitations of this family model is important for both social scientists and policymakers seeking explanations for contemporary low fertility and family decline in the advanced Western democracies.
The millennium fertility uptick of 2000 was seen in 29 out of 39 low fertility countries; those countries saw an average increase in TFR of 0.04. The pandemic uptick of 2021 showed a similar average TFR uptick of 0.04 across 31 countries. Those superficial similarities conceal considerable differences. The aim of this paper is to explore those differences at both a regional level and by individual characteristics of age of mother and birth order. Across Asia the millennium uptick was particularly strong, with Taiwan and Singapore each seeing a leap of 8 percent in births over the previous year. The “auspicious” Year of the Dragon was a likely driver of this boost. However, having a “millennium baby” also appealed to women across much of Europe. The USA posted an increase of almost 100,000 births; yet most other Anglophone countries saw a fall. The regional differences in the pandemic uptick were also stark. Across the Nordic, Central European and Anglophone countries, the uptick was universal; an increase in births of over 3 percent in 2021 compared to 2020 was seen in 12 countries, which marked a sharp reversal from six consecutive years of declining births. The majority of countries in Southern and Eastern Europe also saw fertility rates rise, but these were generally modest. In Asia only Singapore experienced a slight bounce. In addition to the regional differences, the contrasts by parity and age of mother are illuminating. The millennium uptick was driven primarily by first births and was spread across all age groups. By contrast, in the pandemic uptick, it was second and higher order births, particularly to older mothers, which boosted the fertility rate, with first births concurrently being subdued. This observation gives policy-makers an indication of potential measures that can temporarily boost second and higher order births; yet any panacea for boosting first order births remains elusive: new millennia are rare and even Dragon years seem to be losing their attraction for childbearing in Asia.
This paper examines how mobility biographies shape mental health in later life. Moving beyond the conventional migrant/non-migrant binary, we reconstruct complete internal, return, and international migration histories for individuals aged 50 and older across 20 European countries, linking retrospective life-history data from SHARE to repeated measures of depressive symptoms (Waves 4-9). Our results reveal three sets of findings. First, international migrants face a substantial and persistent mental health penalty, roughly five times greater than the modest disadvantage observed among internal migrants, while return migrants are statistically indistinguishable from stayers. Second, the cumulative toll of repeated mobility depends on migration type: each additional cross-border episode is associated with markedly worse mental health, while repeated internal moves carry limited consequences. Third, international migration in midlife is associated with progressively worse outcomes in later life, whereas the timing of internal moves bears no discernible association with mental health. These findings underscore the importance of treating migration not as a single event but as a cumulative biographical process, the mental health consequences of which unfold – and compound – across the life course. * This article belongs to a special issue on “Migration Trajectories Across the Life Course”.
A socio-demographic framework for understanding how global religious revivalism influences transition to adulthood in the Majority World remains limited. In post-Reformasi Indonesia (1998-present), the growing visibility of halal-centred narratives among Muslim middle-class young adults provides a compelling case for examining the intersection of deepening Islamic piety and intimate relationships. This study offers a socio-demographic perspective on halal love, examining how rising Islamic piety shapes young adults’ romantic relationships and family formation in Malang, Indonesia. We draw on an interdisciplinary literature review to propose a series of theoretical propositions on halal love, and qualitative insights from in-depth interviews conducted in 2019 with 28 young adults. We found that halal love appeals to young Muslims navigating diverse ideals and pathways to marriage. Religiosity – not just religion – has emerged as a key social identity marker, alongside class, family background, ethnicity, and geography. It shapes how participants engage with online and offline dating and marriage markets. Halal love narratives align with broader trends in publicly expressed Islamic piety, intersecting with aspirations for self-improvement, autonomy, consumption, and social mobility. The appeal of halal love does not necessarily lead to early marriage or a rejection of small-family norms. Rather, our participants shared hybridised ideals that combined pious ways of living with small-family aspirations. We argue that halal-love narratives are linked to increasingly protracted and precarious transitions to adulthood. These findings offer broader insights into how religious revivalism shapes youth identities and demographic trends in the Muslim world and beyond.
