How can we improve public confidence in the legitimacy of recently instituted police forces in a divided society affected by violent conflict? And can public perceptions of clan representation within the police force encourage public engagement with law enforcement? It is generally understood that public confidence in domestic security sector institutions is integral for stability and consolidation of states affected by prolonged warfare. However, in deeply divided societies, building such confidence can be difficult. Accordingly, advocates argue that improved demographic representation within domestic security institutions can help improve residents' engagement and cooperation with security forces. The current study tests this prediction relying on community survey data collected in Kismayo, Somalia. The authors find that residents who perceive the local police to be representative of local clans are more likely to believe the force is legitimate. In turn, residents who believe the force has more legitimacy are more willing to cooperate with and empower police with greater discretionary authority, while perceptions of clan representation maintains an indirect and significant impact on residents' willingness to empower officers.
In extant scholarship on intergroup conflict, perceived threat is portrayed as either positively linked with conflict occurrence or neutralizable by individuals' internal psychological inhibitors, such as feelings about a past experience or encounter or pre-existing dovish disposition. Yet, conflict avoidance is possible even in the absence of such internal guardrails against destructive responses to threat. This comparative qualitative study of two similarly structured communities in Jos, Nigeria's ethnic conflict hotbed, reveals that while perceived threat may create aggressive dispositions, as established in extant scholarship on intergroup conflict, conflict avoidance remains possible in the absence of both internal inhibitors and external coercion. The compared Jos communities, Angwan Doki and Dadin Kowa, are similar in terms of widespread fear of the outgroup and significant willingness to respond aggressively to threat. Yet, conflict avoidance was possible in the latter because its community leaders both wittingly and unwittingly confronted the underlying threat that drove people's violent dispositions. Past variability analyses omit this dynamic of external malleability of perceived threat outcomes - aggression and violence. Generally, the findings show that low-tech threat management interventions are more effective at mitigating intergroup conflict in weak states than interventions that seek to forcefully suppress the threat.
In understanding conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), the notion of how sexuality and sex are naturally linked to power is gaining traction in IR discourses. There is, however, little contextual or empirical evidence that accounts for the various forms of CRSV against men, or how offenders exploit power dynamics in conflict and post-conflict settings to achieve their sexual desires. As a result, we rely on ethnographic accounts from survivors/victims, NGO workers, and security personnel on the front lines of the counter-terrorism campaign in the Lake Chad basin, particularly in Northeastern Nigeria. Long-term terrorist violence, we argue, creates material imbalances in men and boys and increases their vulnerabilities, providing platforms for individual perpetrators to exploit their vulnerable status or engage in sex-trafficking rings to satisfy their sexual urges. Therefore, this article adds conceptually and empirically to the nature and motivations of wartime sexual violence, as well as the gendered dynamics of armed conflict. It challenges the popular masculinist notion that men are immune to sex trafficking and sexual violence. The study emphasises the importance of effective IDP camp management and prosecution in preventing would-be offenders.
ABSTRACT Academic literature on post-conflict peace-building and democratisation has established the important relevance of rebel-to-party transformations on the one hand, and of the political engagement of individual former combatants on the other hand. Yet, little is known about the interrelation between these two dimensions. This paper aims to address this knowledge gap, by proposing a framework to scrutinise former rebel parties’ ways of mobilising their former combatants politically. Based on a review of theoretical and empirical literature, we suggest three broad mobilisation strategies: the employment of material incentives, control and coercion, and strategies to nurture a sense of identification or even groupness. Given that this last dimension is less tangible than the first two, we further explore and conceptually dissect it, by discussing – what we argue to be – three of its main inherent components: ideology, emotions and patronage. By doing so, we hope to conceptually guide and inform future empirical research on the topic.
This article empirically deepens understandings of the relationship between everyday ex-combatants and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone. It asks, what are the agentic implications of this victim-centred model of justice among its designated perpetrators (everyday or ordinary ex-combatants)? This article advances criticisms against the participatory limitations of the victim-centred model of justice in truth commissions. It applies the concept of friction to analyse the theft of agency produced by Sierra Leone's TRC among everyday ex-combatants. It analyses the contradictions between everyday ex-combatant hopes for the TRC against institutional expectations set for this population to reveal the agentic effects of this sticky engagement. In so doing, this article exposes the agentic theft produced by compound frictions which interact to deny agency among those designated as perpetrators by the material engagement and frictional travels of transitional justice. It argues that the primacy placed on the restoration of victims' dignity within truth commissions comes at a particularly heavy cost for the population of everyday ex-combatants, who experience multiple processes of exclusion as a result.
This research explores the 2018 revolution in Sudan to assess the extent to which the adoption of non-violence led to a more successful revolution and set Sudan on a path of democratic governance. It investigates the revolution's main slogan, Silmiya, coming from the Arabic word Salam meaning 'peace'. Thus, the nature and function of non-violence as well as what motivates people to resort to nonviolence will be considered. The research acts as a point of departure from Fanon's theory of violence arguing that violence is revolutionary and liberating. Ultimately, the research challenges normative frameworks on the necessity of violence for social movements to succeed as Fanon theorises, sheds light on the power of non-violence, and highlights the importance of re-examining characteristics historically associated with non-violence, such as passivity or weakness.
This article examines how the conflict since 2011 in Sudan's 'Two Areas', the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, has been prolonged by a well-intentioned but counter-productive international response. The United States and other western countries, motivated by humanitarianism, imposed sanctions against Sudan's regime and provided aid to rebel regions. This western response was fostered partially by disinformation - about the genesis of the conflict, the regime's use of force, and the causes and extent of the humanitarian crisis. Western support incentivized the rebels to perpetuate their hopeless military campaign, which prolonged the displacement of an estimated one-third of civilians in the Two Areas. Only after the United States lifted some sanctions in 2017, and a popular revolution overthrew the regime in 2019, did U.S. officials belatedly identify rebel leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu as an obstacle to peace. The article concludes with lessons for ending the conflict in Sudan's Two Areas and mitigating such civil wars elsewhere.
The protracted chieftaincy conflict in Dagbon in the Northern Region of Ghana was recently resolved through an interplay of formal and informal resolution mechanisms, where the latter dominated the peace-making process with home-grown peace mechanisms. In the past, the state through formal liberal peace mechanisms like the law courts, committees and commissions of inquiry, interventions by NGOs/CSOs and peacekeeping operations failed to resolve the conflict. However, through the state support in the use of indigenous peace mechanisms by a Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC), a resolution of the conflict was made possible by the adoption of this hybrid dispute resolution mechanism. This article examines how the Dagbon conflict was resolved using a homegrown peace mechanism, the eminent peace approach. Drawing on related secondary data, we argue that empowering traditional leaders and strengthening home-grown conflict resolution mechanisms can play a pivotal role in resolving non-state conflicts. This article contributes to the hybrid peace literature that centres around the call for local-state collaboration in conflict resolution.
The security debate concerning the recent wave of migrants into Europe has been contentious. This article examines the impact of recent migration flows into Europe and assesses the veracity of political rhetoric that migrants from Muslim states were reputedly responsible for the uptick in terrorist attacks. After conducting a series of quantitative tests that control for a variety of factors, we find little evidence that the increase in the number of migrants corresponded to an increase in terrorism during the European crisis. Our findings, therefore, contain important implications in terms of migration policy and counterterrorism tactics.
ABSTRACT The Ethio-Eritrea border war, which took place from 1998–2000, was not formally resolved until the signing of a peace declaration on 9 July 2018. Known as a ‘fight between two bald men over a comb’, this conflict has long puzzled social scientists and political analysts. While the two countries provided different explanations for the conflict to rally public support and justify the price of war, the author argues that the conflict exceeded the logics of territorial integrity. Rather, he contends that given the colonial legacy of intentionally instituting borders to divide communities and ethnic groups, it is not possible to fully understand the border dispute without accounting for the transnational nature of the ruling ethnic groups. This is because the border and ethnic conflicts that have characterised post-colonial Africa have usually been linked to the creation of inter-ethnic groups, intra-ethnic competition and artificial boundaries between neighbouring nation-states. The Ethio-Eritrea border dispute is best understood through the lens of an ethno-linguistic struggle for supremacy disguised as a patriotic campaign against invaders. The paper concludes by reflecting on the durability of the 2018 peace declaration.
The positive effects of communication technology on the developmental process of a nation have been demonstrated in the literature. In this paper, we argue that communication technology may also have an adverse effect, by examining its impact on the presence of conflict. Using Indonesian subdistrict surveys from 2011 and 2014, we find that regions with stronger communication signals are more likely to experience conflict. The econometric estimates show that the presence of a strong base transceiver station (BTS) signal is associated with a 0.8 per cent higher likelihood of local conflict, while a weak signal is associated with a 0.7 per cent higher likelihood of local conflict. A better communication signal is also associated with the number of conflict events. Our findings suggest that the signal reduces conflict casualties. Our estimates also justify the need for government interventions in the form of tax or control policies, to minimise negative, technology-led externalities.
Post-war political transitions may open up opportunities to advance the political participation of marginalised and disadvantaged groups. In Nepal, after a decade-long armed conflict, representation of disadvantaged groups in parliament has increased significantly through a parallel mixed, first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional (PR), electoral system. However, economic and political subordination of marginalised groups in the parliament has continued. This article analyses one of the mechanisms through which this has occurred, showing how the allocation of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) had a negative impact on political inclusion. The exclusive provision of the CDF to FPTP MPs, mostly men from privileged groups, allowed them to strengthen their patronage networks. Voters saw FPTP MPs as delivering development, while considering PR MPs weak. As a result, PR MPs, which account for the vast majority of MPs from disadvantaged groups, had limited opportunities to strengthen their position within political parties. Finally, the CDF hindered the implementation of the new federal system and endorsed a centralised mentality, with a negative impact on the agenda for inclusion.
United Nations-led Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes have increasingly included female ex-combatants; however, the contribution of such DDR programmes to female ex-combatants' empowerment and reintegration, as well as to peace-building, remains debated. Drawing on 77 semi-structured interviews with female ex-combatants and DDR officials in Liberia and Nepal, this article explores the potential of political reintegration to better support female ex-combatants' reintegration and the building of an inclusive, positive peace. This article contends that political reintegration can provide female ex-combatants with peaceable means to address grievances and bring together ex-combatants and non-combatants to work towards peace. Political reintegration support should not be a substitute for economic and social reintegration or physical and mental health support, but rather should work to compliment these. To be meaningful to female ex-combatants and to peace, political reintegration support must prevent a 'triple burden' of productive, reproductive, and peace-building/political labour. Lastly, this article argues that UN-led DDR has potential to contribute to or undermine building an inclusive, positive peace if it were to provide reintegration support to female ex-combatants.
ABSTRACT This paper examines the evolving state-building conversations in Ethiopia and the role of political settlement thereof in charting a pathway for durable peace and strong state. The paper argues that costly mistakes in state and nation building, the radicalisation of the Ethiopian Student Movement coupled with Marxism–Leninism and ethno-nationalism polarised and fragmented the state-building conversations of the country leading to civil war in the 1970s and 80s. This led to an exclusionary victor settlement in 1991 when the TPLF/EPRDF militarily defeated other political groupings and the Derg. Consequently, the post-settlement in the Ethiopian state has been exclusively forged by the winning coalition sidelining competing narratives about the Ethiopia state including its history and the place of various groups therein. This historically veracious, violent, and exclusionary state and peacebuilding conversation undermined the post-1991 political settlement and the transition towards a durable peace and state. The outbreak of war in Ethiopia in November 2020 (which is not the core focus of this paper) is deeply connected to this violent and exclusionary conversation on the nature and future direction of the Ethiopian state.
'Do No Harm' or 'conflict-sensitivity' has been mainstreamed into the planning and implementation of development-humanitarian interventions in conflict-affected situations. An umbrella term encompassing a range of frameworks and tools, all approaches involve analysing conflict dynamics in order to minimise negative impacts and maximise support for positive change. Most, however, treat conflict analysis as largely technical, requiring external expertise, and while all espouse participation, it is not inherently embedded in any. This paper explores the practice and ideals of conflict-sensitivity, and promising, more participatory advances in the 'critical peacebuilding'/'local turn' literatures, to argue the case for more genuinely participatory, grassroots conflict analysis to augment existing analysis underpinning the planning and implementation of development-humanitarian agency projects. Concluding that none yet offer tools to facilitate participation of marginalised poor, often functionally non-literate locals, into the actual analysis of conflict, it then presents and reflects upon the trial of a new, highly participatory conflict analysis approach, developed by the authors to complement a specific, highly participatory development programme in Myanmar.
Despite the promises made in the peace agreement with the FARC-EP in 2016, bureaucratic obstacles, underfunding, and an apparent lack of political will has eroded the voluntary illegal crop substitution programme in Colombia. Armed forces are sent to the territories to forcibly eradicate the coca plants, causing violent confrontations and deepening the distrust between the state and peasant coca-leaf growers. Using qualitative data from 28 semi-structured interviews, this article analyses Colombian Army soldiers' opinions on manual eradication operations. Their voices suggest that not all the soldiers support coercive measures to fight the rising growth of coca crops, but these measures can encourage institutional corruption and incentivise a logic of an internal enemy that justifies violence against civilians. This article offers insights into obstacles to building legitimacy and trust in the state and its institutions after peace agreements.
ABSTRACT This paper does not directly engage the state-formation, political settlement and state-building debates in Africa but it foregrounds the notion of conversation as the lens through which to examine Rwanda’s state-building history. In particular, it explores an overlooked perspective from Rwanda’s state-building trajectory by focusing on a particular class of actors – women – whose voices also contributed to inter-elite and elite-society state-building from pre-colonial times. The paper examines how and why conversible spaces have been created in post-genocide Rwanda that are locally conceived yet given form by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) elites. It shows that these spaces are progressions of a long history of state-building conversations in Rwanda that pre-date colonialism. The paper asks how and why have conversible spaces for peace and state-building evolved over time? To what extent do their contemporary form have the potential for being genuinely transformative? What do these processes mean for future peace and state building in Rwanda? In addressing these questions, this paper foregrounds women’s agency and contributions to state-building in Rwanda over time. It shows that while there is evidence that women’s agency has evolved from covert to overt spaces, limitations to women’s influence of peace-building and state-building conversations still exist particularly for those whose visions of society diverge from that of the ruling party Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
ABSTRACT Addressing social issues that arise due to wars and how they impact on post-conflict reconstruction is an area of theoretical debate and policy interest. This article explores the social impact of the armed conflict which took place in Swat Valley, Pakistan from 2007–2009. Based on 28 in-depth interviews and six focus group discussions conducted in the valley, the article examines the damage to community life. The findings show that local institutions, societal values and social relations were dramatically impacted. The analysis led the researcher to term this impact social disruption, a phenomenon that is defined as an abrupt and forced change in the socio-cultural system. To reconstruct society, understanding and addressing social disruption holds a crucial position for local, national and international actors in the post-conflict period.
ABSTRACT This article is located in the wider discourse on the nexus of policy, research and practice of peace education for countering violent extremism (CVE) with a focus on learnings and insights from non-governmental initiatives in Pakistan. It presents an analysis of how the diverse and complex school education system in Pakistan ‘does’ and/or ‘does not’ respond to the challenges of an increasing scale and manifestations of violence, conflict and extremism in society. Moving beyond the discussion on the historical emergence, drivers, actors and characteristics of violent extremism in Pakistan, this paper engages with the erstwhile literature on the research-policy-practice nexus to examine nine peace education projects – mostly foreign-funded – in Pakistan. Considering the insights from these nine projects, the paper finds that there are several examples of successful stand-alone peace education for CVE projects but without a link to policy and research. Despite producing good quality CVE and peace education material, and applying these materials successfully in the diverse education setting of the country, many projects lacked sustainability due to over-dependence on foreign funding. Due to comparatively consistent external funding in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the organisations there are more successful in their peace education interventions than the ones in Punjab and Sindh.
Over the last decade there has been increasing attention within peace and conflict studies on the so-called ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding where the role of local actors, their agency and their relationship to international actors is strongly emphasised. Still, even with widespread academic optimism about the emancipatory potential of the local, strong caveats of ‘not romanticising the local’ are constantly repeated. By looking at the Balkan countries and their traditional practices of peacebuilding, this article asks whether the local has the potential to be the empowering agent or if such expectations are much too ambitious, both at the academic and policy level. Drawing on the research findings which show the persistence of coercive and noncoercive local peacebuilding practices, the article poses the Paris question once again: should liberal peacebuilding be saved, and if so, where are the locals in this rescue attempt?
