Abstract As former colonial powers begin to apologize for the past, the literature has examined these practices as strategic acts to maintain narrative authority, with a focus on the perpetrator’s side. It has inquired less into negotiations of the past as struggles over the power to narrate, which normatively structure world order. Conceptualizing negotiations of the past not merely as transactional bargains, but as sites where narrative authority is institutionalized, challenged, and possibly rescripted, this article proposes unilogical/hierarchical and multilogical/plural encounters as a central analytical framework. A comparative analysis of two rare cases of formal interstate negotiation over the past—between Libya and Italy and between Namibia and Germany—reveals a more fleeting encounter in the Libya–Italy process, driven by transactional interests, and a more sustained but incomplete move towards multilogue in the Namibia–Germany context. The latter has been driven by Namibian transnational activism and domestic pluralism, which have deeply challenged Germany’s power to narrate the past unilaterally.
Abstract Previous studies have documented that legislative behaviour in Africa is shaped by a combination of executive, partisan, and constituency incentives, but instances where these pressures sharply diverge are rare. The 2024 Finance Bill in Kenya represents one such critical juncture, where parliamentarians were caught between historic public outrage and unyielding institutional demands. Drawing on an original dataset of parliamentary speeches and votes, this article analyses both the discursive and behavioural dimensions of legislative activity during a period of crisis. The main finding is that even under severe public pressure, party affiliation powerfully shapes parliamentary dynamics: government MPs maintained firm support for the bill, while opposition MPs organized in dissent. However, tracking voting patterns over time, I find that opposition legislators increasingly shifted towards abstention as the executive continued to push the bill forward. Further, MPs representing urban constituencies, where protest exposure and cost-of-living pressures were most acute, were more likely to oppose the bill or deviate from party lines. The study highlights a divergence between executive and legislative responsiveness, suggesting that while protests can prompt rapid policy concessions, their effects on lawmaking remain limited and conditional.
