This contribution examines the ECtHR's approach to discrimination claims under Article 14 ECHR. Despite non-discrimination being a core value of the Convention, Article 14 has been interpreted as an ancillary and non-independent provision. Accordingly, the Court frequently refrains from assessing discrimination allegations once a violation of a substantive right has been established. The contribution identifies two main categories of reasons behind the Court's reluctance: principled arguments, rooted in the interpretation of Article 14 as lacking autonomous existence, and practical considerations, such as resource constraints and difficulties in proving discriminatory intent. It then explores counterarguments advocating for a shift towards recognizing Article 14 as conferring an autonomous right not to be discriminated against, albeit with a limited scope tied to the enjoyment of Convention rights. Such a development would align with evolutive interpretation, international trends in anti-discrimination law, and the principle of effectiveness, ensuring that rights under the Convention are practical and effective. The paper argues that non-examination of discrimination claims undermines individual justice and the Court's signalling function, which is crucial for promoting equality and combating structural discriminations. Finally, the article calls for a more consistent and transparent approach, limiting absorption of Article 14 complaints to clearly defined circumstances and treating evidentiary and practical challenges as ordinary questions of admissibility or merits. By reassessing the Court's interpretative stance and practice, this contribution advocates for strengthening the role of Article 14 in the ECtHR's case-law, thereby enhancing the protection against discrimination within the European human rights system.
The unfolding climate crisis along with a latent crisis of global public finances currently represent major threats to the conditions of equity and inclusion necessary for the strengthening and preservation of social cohesion. Against this background, the paper explores the potential role of multilateral development banks in fostering debt sustainability and environmental protection, drawing in particular on the example of debt-for-nature swaps. Broadly defined, debt-for-nature swaps involve debt buyback operations-of-ten including an element of debt relief-linked to environmental objectives. Although not a new concept, interest in these mechanisms has been revived following a landmark transaction concluded by Belize in 2021, followed by several other deals (e.g., in Barbados, Ecuador and Gabon). The paper assesses the potential and the limitations of these arrangements, both from an environmental and a financial perspective, and identifies the conditions that might contribute to their success. It argues that the involvement of multilateral development institutions could help addressing current shortcomings, especially in terms of scale, amount of debt relief and legitimacy. Moreover, it shows how debt-for-nature swaps could play an important role in supporting the international climate change regime, functioning as indirect enforcement mechanisms for international environmental obligations.
In the past months different States have announced their intention to withdraw from two disarmament treaties: the Cluster Munitions Convention and the Anti-personnel Landmines Convention. Considering the possible re-employment of these weapons by the withdrawing States in armed conflicts, an investigation on the role of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in this regard is necessary. In greater detail, the aim of this contribution is to convincingly re-assess that even if a weapon is legitimate under International Disarmament Law (IDL), it does not become legitimate under IHL as well. To this end, firstly an overview of the characteristics of IDL will be carried out, examining, in particular, the withdrawal clauses enshrined under the existing disarmament treaties. Secondly, the relevant rules of IHL regulating means and methods of warfare will be described. Thirdly, the continuity of the application of these rules to withdrawing States will be demonstrated, outlining, also, the role of the external dimension of Common Article 1 in this regard. Finally, the role of IHL in the face of withdrawals from disarmament obligations will be assessed.
This contribution applies a historical reading to the conference room paper published by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel in September 2025. It first frames the report and the entire discussion on human rights in Gaza as a conflict between the Global North and the Global South, tracing the debate back to the campaign by the Non-Aligned-Movement regarding Palestine. It moves to an analysis of the Commission's report through the lens of Critical Genocide Studies, highlighting the shortcomings of the concept of genocide in accounting for the multifaceted nature of extreme violence and its structural components. Though the article rejects much of the criticism leveled against the Commission's findings, it underscores that a merely juridical notion of genocide shows its limits in fully representing the situation in Gaza and other theatres of extreme violence.
The present contribution provides a critical appraisal of the Italian Court of Cassation's decision in the Greenpeace v. ENI case. The latter has been brought by two environmental associations and several individuals against the Italian oil and gas company ENI S.p.A., as well as its main shareholders, with the aim of establishing the defendants' liability for damages resulting from climate change. In its 2025 decision on jurisdiction, the Court of Cassation ruled that the Tribunal of Rome is competent to hear such claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Court gave some insights into its understanding of the private international law rules on jurisdiction enshrined in the Brussels I-bis Regulation. The paper argues that the Court's interpretation of the Regulation is flawed, as it is inconsistent with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and could lead to extreme uncertainty for defendants in subsequent cases. However, the decision is noteworthy to the extent it is the first climate litigation case in which the jurisdiction of Italian courts is established, leaving it now to the Tribunal of Rome to address the complex topic of the law applicable to the merits of the claim, with particular regard to the issue of the direct (horizontal) application of the European Convention of Human Rights.
