Ethical Thought

The article sets a goal to show the problem area of digital ethics is today and to identify those problems whose solution will allow digital ethics to be considered as an independent branch of philosophical ethics. To this end, an analysis is conducted of the moral issues and solutions arising from the ever-increasing digitization of human activity. The structure of the problem area is determined by the degree of theoretical elaboration of the subject of digital ethics itself and is described in terms of applied and philosophical ethics. In the ap­plied aspect, two areas are also distinguished: non-specific – general ethical problems (con­fidentiality, security, lying, etc.); specific – new problems arising from digitalization (AI, auto­mated decision-making). The philosophical part includes questions arising from reflection on the phenomenon of digitalization itself and the definition of fundamental concepts. Defi­nitions are also divided into two types: essential – about what a digital subject or digital ac­tion is; substantial – about what the digital world / reality is, etc. It is shown that within the framework of applied ethics, digital ethics does not form its own subject, which raises doubts about its future development and does not provide a solution to the problem of dehu­manization, which manifests itself in the practice of applying digital technologies in two ways: through the alienation of decision-making from humans, the objectification of humans (direct dehumanization), and the dehumanization of humans by humans themselves through the use of digital technologies as amoral (reverse dehumanization). However, now, there is not only no theoretical foundation, but even no clear formulation of the problem of its con­ceptualization. It is concluded that for the development of digital ethics as a full-fledged the­matic area within the philosophy of ethics, for the internally coherent development of its is­sues, conceptualization is required both of digital existence (in its essential and substantial aspects) and of the relationship between digital and non-digital existence.

The inadmissibility of lying is widely recognized as one of the key features of Kant’s moral philosophy and arguably its most controversial characteristic. Kant is commonly positioned as a rigorist who does not allow lying under any circumstances, insisting on this prohibition as an unconditional ethical requirement. In support of this position, Kant’s own arguments from the article “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy” are usually cited. Equally widespread, however, is the reproach that Kant is inconsistent, since certain formulations of the categorical imperative seem to permit lying under some pre-specified circumstances. In our view, a significant part of such appeals distorts the content and intent of Kant’s arti­cle. The present paper aims to demonstrate the fallaciousness of both lines of reasoning by clarifying what kind of truthfulness (namely, truthfulness in testimony) Kant insists upon in this article, as well as by elucidating the grounds on which he does so. Thus, we maintain that “testimony” is a technical term, which is also confirmed by other Kantian texts (in par­ticular, the Metaphysics of Morals). Moreover, we demonstrate the illegitimacy of appealing to the categorical imperative as justification for the permissibility of lying to a wrongdoer by examining the grounds for its inadmissibility as presented by Kant himself in the article, and by situating them within the broader context presented by the Doctrine of Right and Per­petual Peace.

The article is devoted to the study of the history of the concept of moral dignity in philoso­phy. Such an inquiry is associated with a number of difficulties arising from the polysemy of the concept, as well as methodological issues linked to this complexity. At the center of the article lies the understanding of dignity as a universal and inalienable inner value (and/or status) of the human being, which justifies the demand for recognition and respect in human relations. The formation of a refined concept is analyzed through the use of a “ret­rospective” method, which makes it possible to trace the premises of this understanding of dignity in the history of thought. The article focuses on the interpretations of dignity in Cicero, Pufendorf, and Kant, which establish a certain line in the conceptual develop­ment. Through the lens of Kant’s mature conception of dignity, the reflections of Pufendorf and Cicero are examined. The example of Cicero’s philosophy shows that even early notions of dignity, albeit in embryonic form, already contained important premises later elaborated in the early modern period.

The article substantiates the key role of neurophilosophy in the formation of the method­ological basis of neuroethics, the discipline responsible for the ethical assessment of neu­rotechnologies (implants, deep brain stimulation, neuromarketing). The author demonstrates that the neurophilosophical synthesis of neuroscience data with classical philosophical con­cepts creates the necessary framework for analyzing the challenges associated with brain in­tervention. It is shown that neurophilosophy, with the necessary epistemological skepticism, opens up opportunities for protecting human dignity: it prevents the reduction of conscious­ness to neurocorrelates, develops criteria for personality authenticity in neuromodulations, and also identifies fundamental limitations of neuroimaging. At the same time, the spread of neurotechnologies generates critical risks: the exploitation of neural vulnerabilities for commercial purposes, the loss of confidentiality of neural data and freedom of choice when influencing decision-making. Special attention is paid to the need for neurophilosophical re­flection to overcome key problems: ignoring subjective experience (qualia) in neurointerac­tions, manipulation of behavior through triggers of fear and shame, as well as incorrect in­terpretation of neuroscientific data. Without such a foundation, neuroethics is unable to ade­quately assess the ethical implications of technology, risking legitimizing practices that threaten human autonomy and identity.

The article is devoted to the study of the history of the concept of moral dignity in philoso­phy. Such an inquiry is associated with a number of difficulties arising from the polysemy of the concept, as well as methodological issues linked to this complexity. At the center of the article lies the understanding of dignity as a universal and inalienable inner value (and/or status) of the human being, which justifies the demand for recognition and respect in human relations. The formation of a refined concept is analyzed through the use of a “ret­rospective” method, which makes it possible to trace the premises of this understanding of dignity in the history of thought. The article focuses on the interpretations of dignity in Cicero, Pufendorf, and Kant, which establish a certain line in the conceptual develop­ment. Through the lens of Kant’s mature conception of dignity, the reflections of Pufendorf and Cicero are examined. The example of Cicero’s philosophy shows that even early notions of dignity, albeit in embryonic form, already contained important premises later elaborated in the early modern period.