
What type of leaders emerge from party leadership contests held during political crises? Multiple crises – the Brexit referendum, negotiating a Brexit deal, COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 financial instability – have plagued Britain’s leaders in and outside of the government. The resignation of five successive prime ministers and leaders of Britain’s Conservative Party between 2016 and 2024 resulted in the ascension of two ethnic majority women, one ethnic majority man, one ethnic minority man and one ethnic minority woman to the party’s top political post. We argue that the nature of a crisis – specifically, whether it is internally induced and whether an external audience is present – is critical to understanding this outcome and draw on the party’s hybrid ballot process to show how this increase in diversity occurs. We also underscore the gendered and ethnic implications of pushing non-traditional leadership candidates into roles that place them atop one of the highest glass cliffs in politics.
Violence against politicians (VAP) is on the rise. Complementing extant scholarship on the impact of violence on politicians, this article shifts focus to its effects on the democratic quality of political representation. Based on interview data ( N = 24) with politicians in Belgium, we identify three mechanisms – silencing, invisibilising and exiting – that are triggered by VAP and that reduce the democratic quality of representation by making it less inclusive, responsive and egalitarian. Our analysis of an original survey ( N = 212) shows that these mechanisms affect all Belgian politicians but seem to disproportionately impact women, minority ethnic people and young people in certain respects. Since these are groups for whom enhancing political representation is a key ‘democratising’ strategy for enacting political equality, we conclude that VAP ‘de-democratises’ political representation.
Sex education is one of the most contested yet least examined morality policies. In contrast to issues like abortion or same-sex marriage, research on the regulation of sex education is scarce, despite its centrality to debates on gender, family and sexuality. This article applies computational text analysis to an original regional-level data set of school curricula from Austria, Germany and Switzerland (1970–2020). In doing so, it breaks ground as the first longitudinal and comparative assessment of changes in sex education over time and across contexts. The analysis shows that religion is associated with curricula that cover fewer topics, while more culturally liberal governments are linked to curricula covering more topics, and that these associations vary by religious context. These findings position sex education as a gendered site of moral and political struggle, offering new insights for political science, public policy and education research for the governance of contested value-based policies.
This article asks how feminist foreign policy (FFP) becomes a neo/liberal project even if diplomats incorporate different feminisms in the policy. To explain the dominance of neo/liberal feminism, the article bridges discourse- and practice-theoretical approaches through institutional ethnography. Drawing on unique ethnographic access to the German Foreign Office, it demonstrates how diplomats incorporate intersectionality, diversity, marginalisation, ‘Global South feminism’ (white feminism) and ‘Realfeminism’ (a combination of liberal feminism and Realpolitik) in FFP and how this is shaped by translocal discourses on feminism in foreign policy. The article contends that diplomats continually reproduce neo/liberal feminist ruling relations. Rather than integrating alternative feminist traditions, this reifies difference between the policy’s intended beneficiaries and FFP states. Realfeminism is the only alternative to a purely liberal FFP given its privileging of state interest, but it cannot completely decentre neo/liberal feminism either. This illustrates the limitations of making FFP in the diplomatic everyday.