Artificial intelligence (AI) outputs challenge traditional notions of authorship under copyright law. As generative AI increasingly influences the creative process, critical questions arise as to whether AI outputs satisfy authorship requirements and, if so, who should be recognised as the author. Therefore, a key issue is the degree of human input required to qualify as an author. This article examines relevant European Union (EU) copyright directives and key rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to explore the concept of authorship within the EU copyright framework. It investigates whether copyright reform is necessary to reconcile human-centric models of authorship with the transformative potential of AI-driven creation.
The article traces and analyses the rise and subsequent emancipation of the right to an effective remedy (art.47(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)) in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or the Court). It demonstrates how, step-by-step, the Court has expanded its reach resulting in art.47(1) now standing on its own two feet. Building on the existing literature, the article proceeds to discuss the consequences of this development with regard to two key doctrines of European Union (EU) law: the doctrine that directives are incapable of having horizontal direct effect; and the doctrine of primacy with a particular focus on the remedy of (partial) disapplication. It concludes with an argument in favour of conceiving of the right to an effective remedy as containing positive obligations.
This article examines the potential inclusion of municipal waste incineration installations within the scope of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) under Directive 2023/959. It assesses the legal implications of extending carbon pricing to the waste management sector, which has historically remained outside the ETS despite its notable greenhouse gas contribution. To contextualise the issue, the article explores the legislative origins of the recent amendment, the feasibility assessment mandated to the European Commission (the Commission), and the likely consequences for Member States, including effects on landfilling trends and cross-border waste shipments. While the measure supports the EUs' climate-neutrality and circular-economy objectives, it simultaneously raises concerns regarding proportionality, environmental integrity, and distributive fairness. The article argues that inclusion should proceed only with robust safeguards to avoid unintended outcomes-such as increased landfilling of waste-thereby ensuring that climate policy remains coherent with broader environmental and sustainability goals.
The Court of Justice of the European Unions' (CJEUs') judgment in Mousse marks a significant development in the interpretation of arts 5 and 6 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), addressing whether the mandatory choice of courtesy title ("Mr/Mrs") in online transactions can be justified by contractual necessity or legitimate interest. The Court, following AG Szpunar, rejected both grounds, emphasising that linguistic custom cannot override the principle of data minimisation. It held that personalisation of communication is not essential for contract performance and that a vague reference to "legitimate interest" fails to meet the transparency requirements of art.13(1)(d). The commentary welcomes the Courts' rights-protective stance but criticises its neglect of grammatical realities in gendered languages, where knowledge of gender may be necessary for correct correspondence. It proposes a more flexible interpretation of "necessity" where linguistic structure genuinely requires such processing and advocates linking data protection with anti-discrimination law through the concepts of "privacy-by-design" and "equality-by-design". Mousse thus strengthens fundamental-rights protection while exposing tensions between linguistic diversity, proportionality, and transparency within the EUs' data-protection framework.
Are Member States required by virtue of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive to enact national legislation that prohibits and penalises the broadcasting of audiovisual content that undermines the value of human dignity? In case of an affirmative answer, are they allowed to exempt from this legislation media service providers broadcasting their content exclusively via the internet? If such an exemption is illegal, does the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law preclude that national legislation from being given a broad interpretation so as to include within its scope also that latter category of media service providers? That was the thrust of the preliminary questions referred for an answer in Makeleio and Zougla, which provided the Court with the opportunity to explain the content and scope of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and to elaborate on the limits imposed on the operation of the principle of consistent interpretation. The preliminary ruling provides important clarification about the regulation of online broadcasts and the obligations imposed in this respect on the national legislature, while confirming at the same time the priority accorded to the principle of legal certainty over the need to ensure the primacy and effectiveness of European Union (EU) law.
