Single-family offices (SFOs) must balance financial, social welfare, and family logics. Drawing on institutional logics research, this multi-case study of German SFOs examines how the family logic shapes the relationship between financial and social welfare logics in investment decisions. We find that the family logic acts as a meta-logic. Depending on power distribution, value alignment, and governance design, it enables centrality, compatibility, or pseudo-compatibility of the two logics, and it works as an exit barrier that keeps tensions from escalating. We contribute by conceptualizing the family meta-logic and by showing how power dynamics and generational differences shape decision-making in SFOs.
A central debate concerns under which conditions sustainability orientation—a firm’s attitudinal disposition toward creating social and environmental value alongside economic value—translates into concrete environmental practices in some family firms but not others. Drawing on socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory, we argue that specific socioemotional priorities shape whether family firms “walk the talk” in their environmental practices. Using survey data from 182 Turkish family firms, we find that sustainability orientation is more strongly associated with environmental practices when owning families emphasize preserving the business across generations (renewal of family bonds), but not when they show stronger emotional attachment to the firm.
Drawing on principal–principal agency theory, we examine how multiple family offices (MFOs) affect stock crash risk of family firms owned and managed by at least two founding families or family lineages. In a study of publicly listed Korean firms where principal–principal agency conflicts are prevalent due to substantial control by family owner-managers, we find that MFOs help reduce stock crash risk by enhancing governance mechanisms that facilitate the alignment of divergent principal interests, especially in non-business-group-affiliated family firms and those facing unfavorable investment environments. Overall, we contribute toward the understanding of the governance function of family offices.
We examine how family management control affects trade credit utilization. We find that firms with family management control use significantly lower trade credit, reflecting both lower financial constraints and a stronger preference to preserve control. More importantly, we show that the effect varies across family firms, becoming stronger with deeper family involvement and under first-generation control. We also note that institutional ownership and competitive environment encourage greater trade credit utilization, whereas independent directors and nonfamily Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) exert limited influence. Overall, our findings indicate that substantive family control matters more than formal governance structures in shaping family firms’ short-term financing decisions.
This study engages directly with family office professionals to develop a practitioner-informed research agenda. Using an exploratory sequential mixed-methods design, we conduct 27 semi-structured interviews followed by a survey of 331 respondents. Practitioners identify that the most important areas to research are the benefits of strong governance, how succession planning should be implemented within the family office, and how to engage the next generation. Building on these insights, we develop a research agenda across three primary dimensions and identify nine gaps to inspire future research, offering both theoretical directions for scholars while maintaining practical relevance for family office professionals.
