
Political forces shape financial outcomes through multiple transmission channels that extend beyond traditional market mechanisms. This survey examines how electoral competition, regulatory interventions, firm–government relationships, and partisan beliefs influence asset prices, corporate strategies, credit allocation, and household financial decisions. The authors organize the analysis around transmission mechanisms rather than stakeholder categories, tracing how political uncertainty commands risk premia in asset markets, how monetary, fiscal, trade, and financial regulation propagate through firms and industries, and how political connections generate value through preferential access to credit, government contracts, and regulatory forbearance. This study documents evidence that political connections can account for economically meaningful portions of firm value, with magnitudes varying sharply across institutional contexts; that political uncertainty distorts corporate investment decisions; and that partisan beliefs increasingly segment financial markets along ideological lines. The survey also provides comprehensive treatment of revolving-door dynamics between government and the private sector, methodological approaches for causal inference in political finance, and international dimensions including cross-border political risk pricing and the effects of geopolitical fragmentation on capital flows. The authors conclude by identifying emerging research frontiers, including climate policy uncertainty, populism’s effects on financial markets, the role of artificial intelligence in politics and trading, industrial policy responses, and competition for global talent and intellectual property. Understanding these political transmission mechanisms matters for policymakers designing institutions, managers weighing political engagement strategies, investors pricing political risk, and academics seeking to explain financial phenomena that purely economic models cannot.
This article surveys a large body of literature that investigates the relationship between corporate finance developments and human capital. Human capital has become increasingly important as a factor of production for firms, where it now rivals physical capital and as an asset, which constitutes a substantial proportion of wealth in modern economies. The increased importance of human capital has been linked to several trends in corporate finance and corporate governance: firms rely less on debt and public markets, hold more cash and conserve cash through their payout policies. The literature has established multiple mechanisms that connect these trends, which suggests that the link between them is causal. The key insight is that firms manage two types of constraints that intricately depend on each other: financial constraints and human resource constraints. Contractual solutions, ownership structures and power-sharing arrangements between investors and employees emerge as second-best solutions to balance these constraints. The article then argues that resource constraints and optimal governance arrangements necessarily change over the life cycle of the firm, which gives rise to different ownership and governance structures. This part discusses startups, the increasingly delayed decision to go public, private-equity buyouts and M&As and argues that firms change ownership and governance structures as they prioritize different constraints over the course of their life cycle. The final part shows how human capital is reflected in stock prices, which incorporate the value of human capital investments and employee relations, albeit only partially, which may potentially lead to underinvestment. Moreover, human capital constraints increase risk, which is priced in financial markets. The conclusion offers some reflections on the theory of the firm and provides a tentative outlook on future research.
In this essay, we review theories and empirical evidence describing how bidders and targets navigate the takeover process from the decision to initiate through bid revisions and final acceptance (or rejection) of the offer. This navigation involves complex decisions where potential rival bidders are jockeying for competitive advantage through multiple strategic decisions. Sequentially, these involve (1) Whether to initiate the takeover process (exploiting a first-mover advantage); (2) purchase target shares in the target prior to the first bid (toehold bidding); (3) how to respond to a prebid target stock price runup (markup pricing); (4) optimal bid revisions (jumps) following rival competition and target management resistance; and (5) deal financing and a strategic payment method choice under information asymmetries and a potential for bidder opportunism. We also address more policy-oriented issues related to (6) merger-driven listing dynamics and (7) antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers. We apply the standard auction framework with a single (pivotal) seller as our main theoretical workhorse, which we explain with a set of largely unified variable notations across takeover models. This auction framework, which helps identify theoretical puzzles, is also useful for explaining the outcomes of merger negotiations as it effectively describes the outside option during bargaining.
Corporate governance encompasses a set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions that affect how a corporation is directed, administered, or controlled. Technology both enhances and disrupts the traditional board-centric corporate governance system, enhancing efficiency and transparency while introducing new challenges and risks. In this paper we examine three key themes comprehensively: the redefinition of information and information asymmetry through the generation of and access to big data; blockchain technology’s transformative potential for aggregating preferences and exercising shareholder voting rights while blurring the line between securities and tokens; and the impact of smart contracts and their underlying infrastructure on the expansion of contracts and the implementation of decentralized governance through decentralized autonomous organizations. These innovative technological solutions empower stakeholders to exercise governance rights effectively, but their complexity also gives rise to new barriers and inequalities. As technology evolves, collaboration among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners is imperative to ensure that corporate governance remains effective and responsive to the current dynamic business environment.