In recent years, retail consumers have become increasingly aware of the practices employed by factory farms in the production of meat, eggs, and other animal-derived food products. Although some consumers choose to abstain entirely from foods derived from animals, many others instead seek out products they perceive to be ethically sourced. Products that come from humane farms, however, are more expensive to produce and thus command a higher price. Some producers, seeking to capitalize on this consumer demand, market their products as humanely sourced while continuing to engage in conventional factory-farming practices. Their ability to "humanewash" is protected by a federal regulatory landscape that leaves terms like "pasture-raised" and increase in humanewashing and then analyzes the law governing food product labeling. It identifies the gaps in current law, including a lack of binding definitions and ineffective enforcement mechanisms. Finally, it recounts the success of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") National Organic Program in solving a similar problem regarding products marketed as "organic." Building on that model, this Note proposes expanding the National Organic Program to establish enforceable standards and permissible practices for products labeled as "humane."
Immunity from a court's jurisdiction is an enticing prospect when facing criminal prosecution. Sovereign immunity generally protects foreign nations from the jurisdiction of courts of another sovereign state. State-owned enterprises have sought that same protection from the exaction of a criminal conviction abroad. A 2023 Supreme Court decision, Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, held that the federal statute governing foreign sovereign immunity does not apply to criminal cases, but only civil ones. Now, no statutory framework exists for courts to determine whether immunity applies to state-owned enterprises in criminal cases. This Note recommends a statutory solution to facilitate immunity determinations for foreign, state-owned enterprises that respects judicial authority, develops clear precedent, and complies with international law. This proposal assumes that immunity does not apply in criminal cases against state-owned enterprises, balancing international comity with accountability for criminal conduct.
Although the development of modern technology has impacted and enhanced the lives of average consumers, it has also presented numerous unex-pected legal challenges and considerations. These new challenges have made it dif!cult for many antiquated laws to adequately address the modern legal problems that have emerged with new technology. Of the many growing pains discovered, privacy concerns reign as a dominant issue affecting all citizens across the United States. Technological advancement has made it easy for indi-viduals to log their personal information-including records of their physical location-to better use services that give them directions, local dinner recom-mendations, and other location-based services. Law enforcement has since caught on and begun seeking this location data to aid their investigations, using geofence warrants to identify individuals who use these location services and subpoenaing the technology companies that store the information. This Note argues that the practice of geofencing violates an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital curtilage-a digital sphere of information that re"ects intimate, private details of a person's life. This Note also proposes a reimagining of how geofence warrants could be altered to conform with existing jurisprudence surrounding Fourth Amendment protections. This proposal recognizes the challenges posed by applying existing law to modern problems and balances privacy concerns with the need to keep pace with a con-tinuously evolving technological world.
For many years, federal agencies have deputized state and local law enforcement to serve on federal task forces in limited capacities. This Note addresses a loophole created by the unique legal status of specially deputized of!cers, whereby they have been able to escape civil liability for breaking the law. Traditionally, private citizens can hold state law enforcement civilly liable under 42"U.S.C. & sect;"1983, but multiple circuits have interpreted & sect;"1983 to exclude specially deputized of!cers. These courts have held that these of!cers do not act under color of state law-a requirement of & sect;"1983-when participating in federal task forces. Further, the Bivens action, a judicially created cause of action against federal agents, has been constrained nearly to extinction. As a consequence, victims of specially deputized of!cers have been unable to recover monetary damages. This Note explores the statutory authority underpinning special deputation and proposes that specially deputized of!cers do indeed act under color of state law by virtue of their authority originating with the state, meaning & sect;"1983 does apply to them. This Note therefore encourages courts to apply & sect;"1983 to specially deputized of!cers to ensure that these of!cers are held accountable for civil rights violations. Finally, this Note proposes an amend-ment to & sect;"1983 that clari!es that special deputies act under color of state law as a supplemental solution to close this loophole.
Scholars, judges, and legislators have failed to recognize the broader implications of attacks on public education. Once conceived as the means to sustain American democracy, public schools are now entwined with the forces tearing it down. This Article is the first to analyze those forces and the rhetoric and policies they produce in education as a form of what international scholars call democratic erosion. This analysis provides an apolitical lens for evaluating contentious education policy debates and reveals the depth of democratic erosion occurring in the United States. The United States Supreme Court has long warned that orthodoxy in the classroom imperils democracy and violates the First Amendment. But over time, the challenge of articulating a neutral standard that could limit orthodoxy without undermining efforts to foster civic values overtook the Court's warnings. The Court began to justify what might otherwise look like censorship or orthodoxy as normal pedagogical judgments that warrant judicial deference. The resulting doctrines have left students defenseless against policies that aim to dictate what they think about race, gender, and other controversial topics. The remedy for both students and the Court's doctrinal challenge lies in a First Amendment framework that accounts for the unique constitutional history and purpose of public education: preparing students for citizenship, preserving individual rights for the long term, empowering citizens to resist governmental tyranny, and fostering the common good.
