Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) cannot be interpreted as a work of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense of grounding philosophy in the conditions of possibility of knowledge, nor in the early Fichtean sense of deriving philosophy from the self’s activity. Instead, this paper shows that Schelling’s STI develops a new form of transcendental philosophy that provides the foundation for understanding the relationship between transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature. This new framework makes possible an independent philosophy of nature that stands in parallel to transcendental philosophy, rather than being derived from it. Through analysis of the structure of the STI and its key concepts—particularly the introduction of the Absolute and the role of artistic intuition—this paper argues how this new transcendental philosophy not only foreshadows the philosophy of identity but also calls for a reconsideration of what transcendental philosophy can mean.
This article re-examines Friedrich W. J. Schelling’s philosophical divergence from dialectical philosophy, with a focus on his Freedom Essay. While traditionally viewed as rejecting dialectics—particularly following the publication of Georg W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—this study challenges that perception by arguing that Schelling employs a dialectical understanding of identity centred on disjunction (§ 1). It demonstrates how Schelling’s metaphysics, developed to accommodate freedom, incorporates the notion of identity of contradictory elements (§ 2). By exploring the central role of disjunction in Schelling’s “dialectical argument” (§ 3) and critically engaging with recent interpretations by Manfred Frank and Mark J. Thomas (§ 4), the article reassesses the Freedom Essay as a pivotal contribution to dialectical philosophy, broadly construed. Ultimately, it aims to facilitate a more nuanced comparison between Schelling’s and dialectical philosophies, challenging the entrenched narrative of their fundamental opposition (§ 5).
Nothing is an unconventional topic in ontology. In this essay, I argue that by positioning Nothing at the core of his ontology, Hegel initiates an even more radical conceptual framework—one that may be described as an anti-ontology. To uncover the significance of Nothing, I focus on the first two chapters of Hegel’s Objective Logic, setting aside broader metaphilosophical questions about his global ontological commitments. I distinguish between what I call proto-ontology (the study of Being qua Sein) and actual ontology (the study of Being qua Seiendes), as well as between what I call crypto-methodology and applied methodology in ontology. Ultimately, Nothing proves constitutive of both the concept of Being and the inquiry into it: to be is to become, and to comprehend this concept adequately is to unfold its content through immanent negation.
Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) cannot be interpreted as a work of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense of grounding philosophy in the conditions of possibility of knowledge, nor in the early Fichtean sense of deriving philosophy from the self's activity. Instead, this paper shows that Schelling's STI develops a new form of transcendental philosophy that provides the foundation for understanding the relationship between transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature. This new framework makes possible an independent philosophy of nature that stands in parallel to transcendental philosophy, rather than being derived from it. Through analysis of the structure of the STI and its key concepts-particularly the introduction of the Absolute and the role of artistic intuition-this paper argues how this new transcendental philosophy not only foreshadows the philosophy of identity but also calls for a reconsideration of what transcendental philosophy can mean.
This article examines the enduring relevance of Hegel's philosrelated to negativity, subjectivity, and the ideal of beauty. I first elaborate on the necessity of negativity and the importance of reconciliation in the dialectical development of spirit. I emphasize that the constant selfreturning of the spirit makes reconciliation a new and open whole, rather than a final closure. Next, I advocate that a movement from subject to substance is a crucial step toward overcoming the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. I also propose that a unity between audience and artworks is exemplary for the reconciliation between subjectivity and objectivity. Furthermore, I advance a defense of Hegel's ideal of beauty: it transforms the ugly and elevates the ordinary. It also contributes to an elucidation of the characteristics of the ideal subjectivity. Finally, I reflect on the broader implications of these readings.
Dieter Henrich’s emphasis on the via negationis offers a compelling interpretation of Being and Nothing in the Hegelian logical beginning, but it does not account for the inner necessity driving their development into Becoming. Drawing on Hegel’s retrospective justification of Being, this paper argues that the self-dialectic of mediation functions as the metalogic underlying Hegel’s logical beginning. First, by analyzing the self-dialectical operation of mediation, it demonstrates the internal necessity that underlies Hegel’s approach via negationis. Second, it proposes that Being and Nothing can be understood as the “im-mediate” poles generated by a contracting motion. Third, in the extreme intensity between Being and Nothing, it contends that Becoming emerges as the neutralization of polarization. Finally, this paper analyzes Hegel’s critique of the law of excluded middle by constructing a thought experiment to reveal the empirical truth of mediation and its self-dialectical operation.
This paper attempts to resituate the concept of embodiment within Fichte's Jena-era Wissenschaftslehre, by reading Fichte as a protoMerleau-Pontean on the topics of embodiment and intersubjectivity. In so doing, I argue that embodiment on Fichte's account serves a mediating role between the I as Tathandlung [f/act], absolute self-consciousness, and the I as intersubjectively constituted. I highlight the ways in which Fichte echoes Merleau-Ponty's intertwined notions of the 'Body Schema' [sch & eacute;ma corporel] and the tacit cogito to suggest that Fichte's notion of the body is at the same time an intersubjective 'site' of intentionality, the active 'being towards' other rational beings, and the phenomenal experience of the checked activity of the subject. The body is, as such, the subject's lived experience of the Fichtean Ansto ss [check/impetus], an argument that is, perhaps surprisingly, bolstered, rather than hindered, by spotlighting the areas in which Fichte anticipates Merleau-Ponty.
Art in Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism is normally considered to be a direct and irrational leap from immanence to transcendence, liberating consciousness from the structure of differentiation to absolute identity. I challenge this view on two grounds. First, transcendence and immanence, or absolute identity and consciousness, are not mutually exclusive but intrinsically unified within the principle of productivity. Second, art is not a leap from one side to the other but a full enactment of productivity, thereby revealing the unity of immanence and transcendence-each affirming itself only through the other. In conclusion, Schelling redefines transcendence and immanence from the standpoint of productivity, diverging from common scholarly interpretations as well as the philosophies of Plotinus and Spinoza. The transcendent is the intrinsic vitality that drives the ceaseless generation and transformation of finite determinations in the immanent realm. In turn, immanence is the dynamic medium through which the transcendent actualizes its freedom and posits itself as a real transcendent.
Nothing is an unconventional topic in ontology. In this essay, I argue that by positioning Nothing at the core of his ontology, Hegel initiates an even more radical conceptual framework-one that may be described as an anti-ontology. To uncover the significance of Nothing, I focus on the first two chapters of Hegel's Objective Logic, setting aside broader metaphilosophical questions about his global ontological commitments. I distinguish between what I call proto-ontology (the study of Being qua Sein) and actual ontology (the study of Being qua Seiendes), as well as between what I call crypto-methodology and applied methodology in ontology. Ultimately, Nothing proves constitutive of both the concept of Being and the inquiry into it: to be is to become, and to comprehend this concept adequately is to unfold its content through immanent negation.
The longstanding debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists on Hegel's sense-certainty has missed the dialectical forest for the analytical trees. Conceptualists argue sense-certainty's cognitive contents are concepts (Begriffe); non-conceptualists argue they are not concepts, and are instead representations (Vorstellung). They are both right. While from the perspective of the Understanding (Verstand) sense-certainty's cognitive contents are representations and as such nonconceptual, from the higher perspective of Reason (Vernunft), sense-certainty's contents are conceptual. The controversy turns upon the question of the importance of the implicitness or explicitness of the alleged conceptual contents of sense-certainty. If explicitness is taken to be a necessary condition for concepts, then the non-conceptualist reading of sense-certainty is correct: concepts are not explicitly present in sense-certainty. However, explicitness is ultimately an inadequate condition. The implicit presence of concepts is a fundamental and undetachable component of a properly dialectical reading of the refutation of sense-certainty.
This article re-examines Friedrich W. J. Schelling's philosophical divergence from dialectical philosophy, with a focus on his Freedom Essay. While traditionally viewed as rejecting dialectics-particularly following the publication of Georg W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit-this study challenges that perception by arguing that Schelling employs a dialectical understanding of identity centred on disjunction ( 1). It demonstrates how Schelling's metaphysics, developed to accommodate freedom, incorporates the notion of identity of contradictory elements ( 2). By exploring the central role of disjunction in Schelling's "dialectical argument" ( 3) and critically engaging with recent interpretations by Manfred Frank and Mark J. Thomas ( 4), the article reassesses the Freedom Essay as a pivotal contribution to dialectical philosophy, broadly construed. Ultimately, it aims to facilitate a more nuanced comparison between Schelling's and dialectical philosophies, challenging the entrenched narrative of their fundamental opposition ( 5).
This paper examines the contribution of Kant's discussion of internal purposiveness to Hegel's speculative philosophy. It argues that Kant's analysis illuminates a distinctive notion essential to the success of speculative philosophy: the self-actualising concept. The organism serves as a prominent example, wherein the purpose of living is posited as both potentiality and actuality. Since speculative philosophy demands the identity of subject and object, it faces a fundamental challenge, that this relational identity inevitably reintroduces the very difference it seeks to overcome. Therefore, to establish a successful speculative framework, the compatibility between difference and self-relation must be explained. Although Kant relegates this notion to a mere idea of reason, the self-actualising concept represents a form of self-affected difference that satisfies this demand. This analysis reframes Hegel's debt to Kant, demonstrating that Kant did not merely pose a problem but also provided the essential seed for its speculative solution.
This paper examines the central role of human bodily experience in the philosophical anthropology that Eugen Fink developed after the Second World War within the framework of his cosmological ontology. Interpreting human existence by means of the notion of “world” entails a non-Platonic conception of embodiment, which emerges from Fink’s analysis of various existential phenomena, such as power, work, eros, play, ethics, education, coexistence, fashion, and the relation to death. This account of embodiment constitutes a distinctive case within the phenomenological tradition, whose originality stems from the combination of at least three key aspects: the emphasis on the experiential significance of the corporeal and natural dimension of human existence, the interpretation of this dimension as a mode of openness to Being, and its articulation into anthropological structures that can be compared with the anthropological models of Western philosophical history.
This contribution aims to highlight the presence of a performative paradigm underlying Hans-Georg Gadamer’s aesthetics. In line with Erika Fischer-Lichte’s performative aesthetics, in Gadamer’s reflection, art exists in its performance. The latter is based on the interaction between the artist and the audience, and displays a transformative and social character. On this basis, my contribution seeks to indicate the possible opening of Gadamer’s aesthetics to body and corporeality, using the hermeneutical concepts of “gesture” and “presence,” going beyond Gadamer himself. In particular, the first section is dedicated to showing how the performative paradigm of art is already present in Truth and Method, expressed through the two concepts of Darstellung (which has a broader performative sense) and Aufführung (which is restricted to the “performing arts” of drama and music). The second section shows how, in Gadamer’s subsequent writings, this performative paradigm is extended to the figurative arts and expressed through the concept of Vollzug. Finally, the third and fourth sections attempt to pave the way for a hermeneutical reflection on the body that brings together its corporeal and historical aspects, sketching the concept of gesture and the possible contribution of Gadamer’s notion of presence to the debates on Body Art.
This paper investigates Heidegger’s question of affectivity and its essential connection to embodiment and the disclosedness of human existence. I will reconstruct the genesis of the ontological primacy Heidegger ascribes to situatedness (Befindlichkeit), which requires an exploration of the origin of Heidegger’s emphasis on the pre-theoretical sphere of existence and the profound relationship it manifests with respect to the bodily dimension of the human being. The first conceptualisation of the notion of Befindlichkeit may be traced back to Heidegger’s hermeneutical analysis of facticity in his 1920s lectures, where Heidegger confronts Aristotle’s treatment of pathos. In light of Heidegger’s account of affections as inseparable from corporeality, I will show how it offers fundamental insights into the disclosing function Heidegger assigns to affectivity in relation to the embodied thrownness of being-there in the context of his renewed formulation of the question concerning human being (Menschfrage).
