Abstract Aristotle records cases of perceptual delay (a trireme’s oars raised before their sound reaches the shore) but does not see what they cost his theory of perception. Three of his commitments cannot all be maintained: that perception is of what is temporally present, that perceptible qualities are inseparable from their substances, and that perception requires a medium rather than direct contact. Two are ruled out; only Temporal Presence is open to revision. The revised principle, Causal Presence, holds that we perceive what was present when the process began, provided the medium’s current state is the proximate cause. The mechanism draws on a distinction in Physics 3.3, not previously applied to perceptual delay, between an actuality that belongs to one subject but occurs in another. The actuality of being perceived belongs to the object but occurs in the perceiver; the argument holds even where the perceived object no longer exists.
Abstract In his later period, Schelling argued that being remains opaque to conceptual analysis in important ways and that a purely intellectual engagement with being is therefore insufficient. This issue is central to Schelling’s overall project, as his demand for a “positive” philosophy – one that exceeds the merely rational – depends on an effective self-limitation of a priori metaphysics. According to a widely held interpretation, Schelling’s appeal to a pre-conceptual dimension of being is based on Leibniz’s question regarding the cause of anything at all. In contrast, I propose that it is Aristotle who provides Schelling with the decisive argument for pre-conceptual being, and that the problem at stake is not the existence of anything at all, but rather the individuality of particular beings. I develop this claim through an analysis of Schelling’s argument in light of Aristotle’s theory of substance in Metaphysics VII and conclude by assessing its validity and scope.
Abstract The first part of this paper argues that there is a common core to the defenses of injustice offered by Plato’s immoralist characters. I show that in Gorgias , Republic , and Laws we find the ‘Tatters to Tyranny Observation.’ Socially disadvantaged individuals can, through the practice of injustice, ascend to ruling positions in society. In the second part of this paper, I leverage this finding to argue that Laws X contains a set of immoralist characters as well as a philosophical response to the appeal that injustice has for them. Though this has not been commented upon in the past, the prelude to the laws against impiety shows that the impious agents of Book X ought to avoid injustice. This is Plato’s final response to the appeal of injustice. The paper ends with a comparison of the different responses to the appeal of injustice in Gorgias , Republic , and Laws .
Abstract This paper examines the role of joy and its three species, enjoyment , cheerfulness and good spirits , in Stoic ethics. Getting a complete picture of joy requires dealing with its various manifestations in detail. Since these species of joy are defined in terms of their intentional objects, examining them will also shed fresh light on the disputed question of how frequently the Stoic sage experiences joy: Seneca claims that the joy of the sage is constant, while Arius Didymus thinks that some sages experience no joy at all. I argue that Seneca’s view is closer to the truth, but that the sage’s joy will be constantly available, not constantly active. Attention to the differing causes of joy will help to illuminate why this is the case. My analysis will also contribute to the debate, initiated by Cooper, on whether emotional life of the sage is recognizably human.
