This article analyses the evolutionary recalibration of India’s national security doctrine vis-à-vis Pakistan, examining how the state navigates the complex tension between sub-conventional provocation and nuclear deterrence. It explores the challenge posed by the adversary’s asymmetric warfare strategy, which sought to exploit the ‘stability–instability paradox’—where strategic nuclear stability is leveraged to foment tactical instability—thereby constraining India’s conventional options. Rather than positing a radical rupture, the study argues that India’s transition from ‘strategic restraint’ to the current ‘new normal’ represents a sophisticated adjustment within the framework of defensive realism. By reflecting on a series of punitive measures culminating in Operation Sindoor, the article demonstrates how the Indian state has matured in its ability to manage the escalation ladder. The central argument posits that this calibrated posture aims to restore credible deterrence through limited punitive strikes, validating indigenous defence capabilities while exercising the strategic maturity necessary to prevent conflict from spiralling into a nuclear exchange.
India–Qatar cooperation and interdependence are underpinned by a significant diasporic dimension. The migration of Indians to Qatar became steady from the 1970s onwards, driven by Qatar’s expanding hydrocarbon economy and its subsequent demand for a diverse labour force. Indian expatriates filled both skilled white-collar and manual blue-collar positions, establishing a sustained migration flow. Despite structural constraints—including the restrictive Kafala sponsorship system, sociocultural stratification, challenging labour conditions and systemic residency insecurities—the diaspora established the baseline economic networks necessary for India’s trade and entrepreneurial expansion into Qatar. While the diaspora’s technical skill and economic integration laid this groundwork, the strategic partnership between India and Qatar is equally driven by growing political convergence and deliberate bilateral engagements. Accordingly, this paper analyses India–Qatar relations through three interrelated factors: migration, cooperation and institutional constraints. It examines the historical trajectory of Indian migration, evaluates the diaspora’s role in facilitating resilient bilateral economic cooperation alongside diplomatic factors and assesses the systemic sociocultural and legal impediments that continue to limit the full utilisation of diasporic potential.
The United States and Israel’s pre-emptive strikes on Iran, aimed at destroying Iranian nuclear facilities, have contributed to the latest confrontation between the US–Israel axis and Iran, marking a sharp escalation characterised by retaliatory attacks and an ongoing strategic standoff that underscores deepening tensions over nuclear capabilities and regional influence. Iran’s continued support for allied militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis—rooted in its pursuit of regional predominance and Shiite ideological influence—has further intensified its rivalry with Israel. Iran’s attitude towards Israel and the United States reflects a complex mixture of religious and ethnic hostility, as well as elements of admiration. Beneath Iran’s hostility lies a more nuanced reality in which opposition coexists with selective admiration for American and Israeli achievements, institutions and modernity. Moreover, the domestic political dynamics of both Iran and Israel are closely intertwined with their foreign policies, as internal pressures generate a cycle of hostility driven by ideological and political priorities within each state. Ideology and religious narratives not only define each nation’s self-image but also shape foreign policies in which both Iran and Israel perceive each other as ideological and existential adversaries. The role of the United States remains critical and deeply intertwined with concerns over Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. In this context, the article analyses the Iran–Israel rivalry through the interplay of cultural and ideational factors by drawing on a social constructivist approach to international relations. It argues that the ongoing conflict is driven not only by geopolitical competition but also by deep-rooted ideological and identity-based differences that sustain mutual mistrust and perceptions of threat.
Mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship overwhelmingly interprets India’s cultural engagement with Southeast Asia through Joseph Nye’s soft power lens, a framework designed for competitive, state-centric cultural projection. This article argues that such an approach fundamentally misreads a civilisational relationship stretching back over two millennia. Drawing on Assmann’s cultural memory theory; Pollock’s concept of the Sanskrit cosmopolis; and the decolonial interventions of Mignolo, Quijano and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the article advances civilisational memory as an alternative analytical category for understanding India’s Buddhist diplomacy. Dharma, conceptualised not as religion but as a universal, practice-oriented moral-directive principle, is shown to constitute the epistemic ground of this civilisational bond. Two extended case studies, India’s archaeological restoration of the Ta Prohm temple complex in Cambodia and the revival of Nalanda University as an ASEAN-supported knowledge institution, demonstrate how contemporary diplomatic practice re-activates, rather than manufactures, shared civilisational memory. The article’s principal theoretical contribution is the concept of Dharma Setu (bridge of Dharma), a historically constituted, non-competitive and pluralistic mode of cultural engagement that operates through civilisational resonance rather than strategic attraction. Dharma Setu is operationalised through four core propositions and distinguished systematically from Nye’s soft power, Bourdieu’s cultural capital and Gramsci’s cultural hegemony. The article thereby contributes to the decolonisation of IR by articulating a conceptual framework grounded in Global South intellectual traditions.
Donald Trump's 2025 inauguration marks a pivotal moment in the retreat from rule-based globalism. It signals a move towards neo-mercantilist bilateralism, where 'Make America Great Again' replaces multilateral norms with transactional bargaining. In this, the strategic competition of inordinately large-sized economies of the United States and China threatens to further erode the power of rule-based multilateralism, overtaking it with transnationalism. Their shared negation of various time-tested international arrangements-that undergirded global stability since the Second World War-has led the Trump administration to resurrect the 'Monroe doctrine' and reiterate American retreat from much of its global responsibilities. India, as a result, faces intensifying asymmetry with China and a growing US unpredictability, as also likely US retreat from the Indo-Pacific where India stands heavily invested. Amidst these blurring distinctions between partner and competitor identities in India's engagement with Beijing and Washington DC, as also in US-China ties, this article examines the sustainability of India's strategic autonomy posture. It examines how, in the face of competing frameworks of US-led AUKUS or China-led RCEP, India must operationalise an inclusive and non-militarised Quadrilateral Security Framework (Quad) and broaden its engagements with all other stakeholders in search of alternatives to any excessive dependence on the US or Chinese preponderance in the Indo-Pacific.
Over the past two decades, Turkish domestic and foreign policy have undergone a profound transformation under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdo & gbreve;an. Historically, the Turkish Republic was anchored by the Kemalist secular establishment-a powerful, military-backed elite that enforced a strict, Western-oriented nationalism, systematically marginalising the country's pious and conservative majority. By politically mobilising this disenfranchised demographic against the traditional secular elite, Erdo & gbreve;an has successfully redefined the Turkish state and its global posture. Broadly divided into two parts, this article first examines this domestic political transformation, contrasting the economic upliftment and democratic consolidation of his first decade in power with his subsequent passage towards populist authoritarianism and the subjugation of political opponents. Rather than viewing his tenure strictly through the lens of competitive authoritarianism or rigid ideological Islamism, this article assesses Erdo & gbreve;an's political longevity through his reliance on strategic hedging. The second part of the article focuses on the shifting contours of T & uuml;rkiye's regional foreign policy, with a special emphasis on the Arab world. While his early attempts to project an ambitious 'Neo-Ottoman' ideological model during the Arab Spring resulted in regional isolation, Erdo & gbreve;an demonstrated considerable adaptability. When this Islamist-leaning foreign policy failed in the Middle East, he did not hesitate to abandon ideological purity to salvage the national economy. He pragmatically mended ties with former rivals like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. These status-quo regimes had viewed Erdo & gbreve;an's backing of the Muslim Brotherhood-a transnational Islamist movement seeking to overthrow established governments-as a direct existential threat to their own survival. By exploiting T & uuml;rkiye's geopolitical centrality and unique diplomatic access to conflicting global blocs, he transformed regional volatility into domestic leverage, cementing T & uuml;rkiye's status as an autonomous and consequential middle power.
India's strategic responses to cross-border terrorism have historically oscillated between restraint and limited retaliation. On the one hand, these episodic measures, such as the surgical strikes of 2016 and the Balakot airstrikes of 2019, demonstrated India's willingness to escalate, yet their capacity to generate sustained coercive effects on Pakistan appears to have been limited. The May 2025 Operation Sindoor may be interpreted as reflecting elements of graduated doctrinal adjustment; nevertheless, the continued absence of institutionalised and publicly verifiable attribution mechanisms left significant scope for contestation within the international information environment. Against this background, the article argues that the systematic integration of open-source intelligence (OSINT) into India's existing coercive toolkit may incrementally enhance the credibility and continuity of both episodic retaliation and longer-term cumulative pressure by narrowing attribution gaps and shaping external perceptions. This analysis is derived from classic theories of coercion (George, 1991, Forceful persuasion: Coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, United States Institute of Peace Press; Pape, 1996, Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war, Cornell University Press; Schelling, 1966, Arms and influence, Yale University Press) and contemporary debates on information warfare and intelligence (Betts, 1978, World Politics, 31[1], 61-89; Byman & Waxman, 2002, The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might, Cambridge University Press; Zegart, 2007, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11, Princeton University Press). The article also suggests a practical framework for integrating OSINT into India's security architecture. The cases of Balakot and Operation Sindoor are analysed to explore the effects of delayed attribution and contested imagery on information narratives, while also considering the possible role of timely and verifiable OSINT in addressing such dynamics. The article proposes an 'OSINT-enabled compellence triad' of demand dossiers, synchronised visual proof and time-bound assurances that could strengthen India's bargaining leverage under the nuclear shadow, while enhancing its credibility in multilateral forums and domestically. The integration of traditional prudence and modern transparency enables OSINT to function as an important mechanism for the furtherance of cumulative compellence against terrorism originating from Pakistan.
The formation logic and development trend of the China-US-India triangular relationship can be revealed through three dimensions: theoretical origin, historical analysis and realistic assessment. It is further found that under the background of new globalisation, this relationship will influence the global pattern in a way that combines cooperation and competition. From a historical perspective, after going through three stages: the Cold War period, the post-Cold War period and the period since the USA put forward the Indo-Pacific Strategy-the China-US-India relationship has formed close interactive ties. Economically, China, the USA and India are the world's three major economies with high interdependence. Strategically, the USA is in a period of contraction, China is consolidating its regional influence, and India is becoming more active and proactive in the Indian Ocean and on the global stage. In terms of comprehensive national strength, the USA has advantages in science, technology and maritime security; China holds an advantage in manufacturing; and India has advantages in the service industry and demographic dividend. The emerging China-US-India triangular relationship presents important characteristics such as inclusiveness, multi-hub nature, overlapping and being driven by new globalisation. Especially in the field of artificial intelligence, the three countries have complementary advantages while remaining independent of each other. In short, the China-US-India 'weak triangle' is different from the highly confrontational pattern during the Cold War. It emphasises an inclusive and multi-hub model and is expected to avoid traditional power traps through interdependence and strategic flexibility and jointly shape the future international order.
India and Nepal share long-standing cultural, historical and economic ties, formalised under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Despite close relations, a persistent irritant in their economic engagement is Nepal's widening trade deficit with India. While often attributed to treaty provisions, this article, drawing on extensive data analysis and key informant interviews, argues that the deficit is primarily a reflection of Nepal's structural supply-side constraints rather than India-specific factors. Nepal's exports have steadily weakened as industrial growth has stagnated since the mid-1990s, while imports have expanded rapidly, fuelled by rising remittance-driven incomes that now account for nearly a quarter of its GDP. The contraction of manufacturing has reduced export competitiveness, even as import demand has accelerated, leading to a sustained external imbalance. Addressing this challenge requires a forward-looking strategy that prioritises investment in Nepal's productive sectors, upgrading trade infrastructure, fostering cross-border value chains and enhancing bilateral investment cooperation.
Starting from the early 1990s, India has sought to 'open up' its North East Region (NER) as a 'gateway' to Southeast Asia, but it is yet to produce satisfactory outcomes. This article highlights India's cautious diplomatic preferences that recognise the NER's paradiplomatic 'actorness'. It argues that New Delhi's centripetal forces reprimand the NER to deal effectively with foreign entities independently or under the guidance of the Ministry of External Affairs. Consequently, the NER's paradiplomatic role in India has remained inconsistent and ineffective. It is primarily because of structural constraints such as the centre's interference, political instabilities and internal conflicts among the NER states. However, the significance of the NER in foreign policy implementation has been growing steadily. Although its influence on foreign policy-making remains limited, the region effectively deals with various foreign players and potentially connects Southeast Asia and beyond. Despite the lack of collective consciousness and assertiveness, some of the NER states have begun to effectively deal with foreign players at their individual state levels. India, by considering such developments, may explore the possibilities of transforming the collective NER as a paradiplomatic component of its wider diplomatic affairs.
The melting polar environment has amplified the strategic significance of the Arctic, transforming it into a theatre for both resource extraction and great power competition. Russia, India and China are increasingly seeking strategic partnerships and economic opportunities within this region. This article explores the evolving cooperation dynamics, opportunities and challenges for these three nations in Arctic energy development and logistics, specifically within the context of Western sanctions. The study identifies a developing cooperative paradigm driven by complementary resource and technology markets, despite obstacles such as technological bottlenecks and governance limitations. Data from 2024 indicate robust growth, with the Northern Sea Route (NSR) reaching a record cargo turnover of 37.9 million tonnes. The analysis concludes that although sanctions complicate logistics and payment mechanisms, they are unlikely to disrupt long-term bilateral and trilateral cooperation, given the strong market potential and political will among the three nations.
India's growing economy and population create immense energy demands, making its heavy reliance on a concentrated set of traditional suppliers a significant strategic vulnerability. To enhance its energy security, India is pursuing a dual strategy: mitigating short-term geopolitical risks by diversifying its external fossil fuel suppliers while simultaneously accelerating a long-term domestic transition towards renewable energy. The first prong of this strategy involves forging new energy partnerships with resource-rich countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Mozambique, to secure alternative supplies of fossil fuels and reduce dependency on any single bloc. This diversification effort is being pursued within the Indo-Pacific, a region increasingly defined by geopolitical competition and strategic rivalry. In parallel, the second prong focuses on reducing long-term import dependency through ambitious domestic initiatives, including the National Solar Mission and the National Green Hydrogen Mission, aimed at fundamentally shifting India's energy mix. Findings indicate that while these domestic green initiatives show significant promise, India's external strategy is complicated by the geopolitical competition inherent to the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the green transition faces internal hurdles related to infrastructure and technological gaps. Ultimately, strengthening regional partnerships to manage import dependency and scaling renewable energy deployment are the critical, parallel paths India must navigate to achieve sustainable growth and energy security.
This article investigates the relevance of Mahatma Gandhi's writings and ideas for the intellectual interactions and activist movements in postcommunist 1 Romania while also considering the parallels between the larger region of Central and Eastern Europe and the postcolonial space. Despite the asymmetrical timeline and the geographical differences, postcommunism and postcolonialism share a series of common features, among which are hybridity and the will to disrupt the hegemonic discourse of the former colonisers. It is thus difficult to understand how postcommunist Romania seems to be largely unaware of Gandhi's philosophy. The discussion takes into consideration, on the one hand, the lack of publications of Gandhian philosophy and thought in the Romanian market of ideas and, on the other hand, the clear intersection of Gandhi's vision of passive resistance, civil disobedience and search for truth through satyagraha and ahimsa with the 35-year-long peaceful protests in Romania, which culminated in a major diaspora protest in 2018. In this way, the hypothesis of the transactive character of postcolonialism and postcommunism is verified, as well as the exchange of knowledge of their similar (once subaltern, now quasi-liberated) conditions.
