
Abstract The archetype remains central to Analytical Psychology, yet its theoretical status is disputed across biological, developmental, cultural, symbolic, and metaphysical accounts. This article presents Jung 4.0, or the School of Codes, as a research program that uses Code Biology to reconstruct the archetype-as-such as a regulatory architecture whose developmental constraints are phylogenetically stabilized and whose neurofunctional realization is constructed ontogenetically. Particular relations qualify as archetypal codes only if two independently specifiable domains are joined by a contingent rule embodied by an adaptor, established or preserved by a codemaker, and applied by a codeuser in producing an artifact. Their situated psychological expressions are candidate archetypal artifacts whose form is further shaped by developmental, modulatory, and interpretive processes. The model distinguishes coding from recurrence, correlation, representation, causation, and interpretation; clarifies domain, codomain, mapping, implementation, and artifact; and distinguishes three classes of testable hypotheses concerning inherited constraint, mediational variation, and genuine archetypal codes. Specific claims of archetypal coding are therefore formulated as falsifiable candidate hypotheses, not assumed by definition.
Abstract This article argues that Jungian and post-Jungian debates about consciousness are complicated by insufficient differentiation between metacognitive and phenomenal consciousness. Whereas traditional Jungian psychology often associates consciousness with ego-mediated reflection, reportability, and explicit awareness, contemporary consciousness studies frequently identify phenomenality—experience as such—as the central explanandum. This distinction bears directly on the conscious/unconscious dichotomy, the hard problem, and recent Jungian debates concerning psyche, agency, and metaphysics. By defining metacognition as a processual capacity involving self-referential accessibility and reportability, rather than as a stable egoic identity, the article redescribes much of what Jungian theory calls unconscious as phenomenal psychic activity outside present metacognitive access. This reframing does not abolish depth; it clarifies the dynamics of psychic multiplicity, phenomenal agency, and reportable awareness while challenging the necessity of the ego-complex as the structural center of consciousness.
Abstract Murray Stein’s Jung’s Map of the Soul—Deeper Explorations renews his introduction to Analytical Psychology through Jung’s imaginative writings, correspondence, and later interpreters. Its account of individuation illuminates psychological growth, symbolic experience, and clinical responsibility. This essay examines Stein’s explanations of evolution and Code Biology: development before birth, the citation linking neural and archetypal codes, and a non-biological code rooted in spirit. It also considers his boundary between human and artificial intelligence and proposes a relational account of the Self as the developing organization of bodily and psychological processes. The assessment distinguishes codes from their products, developmental possibilities from fixed programs, and psychological significance from proof about the nature of reality. These distinctions clarify the book’s claims and contribution. The essay invites investigation of archetypal organization and possible continuities between biological and technological intelligence, while preserving the openness to symbols that gives Stein’s account much of its value.
Abstract James Hillman is well known for his critique of Jung’s Self as a totalizing import from monotheistic religion, which erases differences within an infinitely pluralistic psyche. This topic remains a tension within contemporary post-Jungian discourse. In this paper, I propose the dispute between Hillman and Jung must be framed metaphysically to make sense of how unity and multiplicity function within the infinite. Drawing on Henri Bergson’s philosophy of duration, I develop a conceptual alignment between a Bergsonian “virtual unity” and the Self. Unlike an actual unity that is finished and static, virtual unity is a dynamic structural tendency that directs multiplicity toward coherence without final closure—the way in which, I argue, the Self operates. Through this Bergsonian mediation, Hillman’s critique emerges as a legitimate warning against the literalizing tendency of consciousness while also recovering a real, though virtual, sense in which unity is operative in the infinite psyche.
Abstract In Ryan Holsapple’s (2026) response to my critique (Mills, 2026) of his earlier work (Holsapple, 2025), he takes an entirely different line of argument and direction from his earlier claims that (1) the universe is conscious and (2) populated with (immaterial) souls emanating from a (3) grand Universal Spirit that serves as the godhead of the cosmos itself. Here I wish to take up a narrow locus that defends the ontological primacy of the unconscious while challenging Holsapple’s (2026) view that the notion of “phenomenal consciousness” better replaces our traditional understanding of unconscious process, which is merely another rendition of panpsychism.