In this article, I aim to analyze the ontology proposed by Seneca in Letter 58 of the Epistulae Morales. Seneca argues that quod est (τὸ ὂν; being) is the highest genus, rejecting the Stoic claim that posits quid (τὸ τι; something) as such. Seneca argues that some Stoics take into account things that do not exist in nature, such as Giants and Centaurs. Given that his testimony is considered a key piece of evidence in the reconstruction of Stoic ontology, in this article I propose that the interpretation of this text should not be considered in isolation, but in light of Seneca’s overall argument.
The purpose of the contribution is to rediscuss the widespread idea that in ancient thought divination is incompatible with intellection. To that end, Plato, Aristotle and Cratippus of Pergamum will be considered. In particular, Plato's Symposium, Phaedrus and Timaeus, in which the link between nous and divination, albeit not explicitly stated, is nevertheless present; Aristotle's De philosophia, in which divination is linked to noetic faculty. Finally, the theory of divination of Cratippus of Pergamum, which can be derived from Cicero's De divinatione. Plato, Aristotle and Cratippus constitute a line of thought a line of thought based on the primacy of nous as the supreme cognitive faculty and, as a consequence, the only power capable of exerting divination.
Abstract. This article aims to illustrate some intersections between Greek philosophical satire and ancient Greek philosophy by discussing the Pyrrhonian satire of Timon of Phlius against the philosophy of Socrates and his followers. Timonian mockery operates not only through literary strategies such as ὀνομαστὶ κομῳδεῖν, a hallmark of Aristophanic Old Comedy, but also through caricatures of Socrates’ ideas and their reception, captured by the term “Philosophenspott”. Analysing this philosophical mockery opens new avenues for studying how ancient authors, including Timon, used satire both to undermine rival doctrines and also to articulate their own doctrines
This article examines Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella to elucidate his Neoplatonic conception of fate, Providence, and free will, focusing on their roles in the soul’s ascent to the divine. Although the term heimarmenē (fate) is absent, Porphyry frames human life as a cosmic journey within a Providential order, where the soul, guided by virtue and "right philosophy," navigates trials to achieve union with the divine. Integrating Platonic henology and Aristotelian ontology, Porphyry presents fate as a dynamic force subordinate to Providence, allowing individuals to exercise free will in overcoming bodily passions. Through metaphors of gold and iron chains, he contrasts the seductive pull of pleasure with the liberating potential of suffering, emphasizing intellectual purification and adherence to divine law as pathways to divinization. The Letter serves as both a personal exhortation to Marcella and a philosophical treatise, underscoring the interplay of divine guidance and human agency. This analysis highlights Porphyry’s non-fatalistic view of destiny, where Providence ensures cosmic rationality while free will empowers the soul’s ascent, offering insights into Neoplatonic soteriology.
Em Leis II, 669a7-b3, o Estrangeiro Ateniense propõe três critérios para a avaliação de obras miméticas, das quais fazem parte as artes musicais (μουσική). Uma pessoa que pretende ser um juiz justo destas obras deverá saber três coisas: i) o que a obra é (ὅ τέ ἐστι); ii) se ela está correta (ὡς ὀρθῶς); e iii) se é de boa qualidade (ὡς εὖ). O último critério, que visa julgar a qualidade da obra, traz consigo uma ambiguidade interpretativa: ele pode ser tomado como critério exclusivamente ético (que se ocupa de avaliar a qualidade moral de determinada obra), como exclusivamente técnico (que julga a execução artística aplicada) ou como simultaneamente técnico e ético. Neste sentido, este artigo pretende investigar tais possibilidades de leitura, reconstruindo o arcabouço conceitual e argumentativo do Livro II de Leis, a fim de compreender melhor a passagem e defender que, no contexto do diálogo, as avaliações ética e técnica podem se sobrepor.
